diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fsck.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fsck.c | 133 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 133 deletions
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ #include "packfile.h" #include "submodule-config.h" #include "config.h" -#include "credential.h" #include "help.h" static ssize_t max_tree_entry_len = 4096; @@ -1047,138 +1046,6 @@ done: return ret; } -static int starts_with_dot_slash(const char *const path) -{ - return path_match_flags(path, PATH_MATCH_STARTS_WITH_DOT_SLASH | - PATH_MATCH_XPLATFORM); -} - -static int starts_with_dot_dot_slash(const char *const path) -{ - return path_match_flags(path, PATH_MATCH_STARTS_WITH_DOT_DOT_SLASH | - PATH_MATCH_XPLATFORM); -} - -static int submodule_url_is_relative(const char *url) -{ - return starts_with_dot_slash(url) || starts_with_dot_dot_slash(url); -} - -/* - * Count directory components that a relative submodule URL should chop - * from the remote_url it is to be resolved against. - * - * In other words, this counts "../" components at the start of a - * submodule URL. - * - * Returns the number of directory components to chop and writes a - * pointer to the next character of url after all leading "./" and - * "../" components to out. - */ -static int count_leading_dotdots(const char *url, const char **out) -{ - int result = 0; - while (1) { - if (starts_with_dot_dot_slash(url)) { - result++; - url += strlen("../"); - continue; - } - if (starts_with_dot_slash(url)) { - url += strlen("./"); - continue; - } - *out = url; - return result; - } -} -/* - * Check whether a transport is implemented by git-remote-curl. - * - * If it is, returns 1 and writes the URL that would be passed to - * git-remote-curl to the "out" parameter. - * - * Otherwise, returns 0 and leaves "out" untouched. - * - * Examples: - * http::https://example.com/repo.git -> 1, https://example.com/repo.git - * https://example.com/repo.git -> 1, https://example.com/repo.git - * git://example.com/repo.git -> 0 - * - * This is for use in checking for previously exploitable bugs that - * required a submodule URL to be passed to git-remote-curl. - */ -static int url_to_curl_url(const char *url, const char **out) -{ - /* - * We don't need to check for case-aliases, "http.exe", and so - * on because in the default configuration, is_transport_allowed - * prevents URLs with those schemes from being cloned - * automatically. - */ - if (skip_prefix(url, "http::", out) || - skip_prefix(url, "https::", out) || - skip_prefix(url, "ftp::", out) || - skip_prefix(url, "ftps::", out)) - return 1; - if (starts_with(url, "http://") || - starts_with(url, "https://") || - starts_with(url, "ftp://") || - starts_with(url, "ftps://")) { - *out = url; - return 1; - } - return 0; -} - -static int check_submodule_url(const char *url) -{ - const char *curl_url; - - if (looks_like_command_line_option(url)) - return -1; - - if (submodule_url_is_relative(url) || starts_with(url, "git://")) { - char *decoded; - const char *next; - int has_nl; - - /* - * This could be appended to an http URL and url-decoded; - * check for malicious characters. - */ - decoded = url_decode(url); - has_nl = !!strchr(decoded, '\n'); - - free(decoded); - if (has_nl) - return -1; - - /* - * URLs which escape their root via "../" can overwrite - * the host field and previous components, resolving to - * URLs like https::example.com/submodule.git and - * https:///example.com/submodule.git that were - * susceptible to CVE-2020-11008. - */ - if (count_leading_dotdots(url, &next) > 0 && - (*next == ':' || *next == '/')) - return -1; - } - - else if (url_to_curl_url(url, &curl_url)) { - struct credential c = CREDENTIAL_INIT; - int ret = 0; - if (credential_from_url_gently(&c, curl_url, 1) || - !*c.host) - ret = -1; - credential_clear(&c); - return ret; - } - - return 0; -} - struct fsck_gitmodules_data { const struct object_id *oid; struct fsck_options *options; |