diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'setup.c')
-rw-r--r-- | setup.c | 131 |
1 files changed, 129 insertions, 2 deletions
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include "string-list.h" #include "chdir-notify.h" #include "promisor-remote.h" +#include "quote.h" static int inside_git_dir = -1; static int inside_work_tree = -1; @@ -12,6 +13,7 @@ static int work_tree_config_is_bogus; static struct startup_info the_startup_info; struct startup_info *startup_info = &the_startup_info; +const char *tmp_original_cwd; /* * The input parameter must contain an absolute path, and it must already be @@ -432,6 +434,69 @@ void setup_work_tree(void) initialized = 1; } +static void setup_original_cwd(void) +{ + struct strbuf tmp = STRBUF_INIT; + const char *worktree = NULL; + int offset = -1; + + if (!tmp_original_cwd) + return; + + /* + * startup_info->original_cwd points to the current working + * directory we inherited from our parent process, which is a + * directory we want to avoid removing. + * + * For convience, we would like to have the path relative to the + * worktree instead of an absolute path. + * + * Yes, startup_info->original_cwd is usually the same as 'prefix', + * but differs in two ways: + * - prefix has a trailing '/' + * - if the user passes '-C' to git, that modifies the prefix but + * not startup_info->original_cwd. + */ + + /* Normalize the directory */ + strbuf_realpath(&tmp, tmp_original_cwd, 1); + free((char*)tmp_original_cwd); + tmp_original_cwd = NULL; + startup_info->original_cwd = strbuf_detach(&tmp, NULL); + + /* + * Get our worktree; we only protect the current working directory + * if it's in the worktree. + */ + worktree = get_git_work_tree(); + if (!worktree) + goto no_prevention_needed; + + offset = dir_inside_of(startup_info->original_cwd, worktree); + if (offset >= 0) { + /* + * If startup_info->original_cwd == worktree, that is already + * protected and we don't need original_cwd as a secondary + * protection measure. + */ + if (!*(startup_info->original_cwd + offset)) + goto no_prevention_needed; + + /* + * original_cwd was inside worktree; precompose it just as + * we do prefix so that built up paths will match + */ + startup_info->original_cwd = \ + precompose_string_if_needed(startup_info->original_cwd + + offset); + return; + } + +no_prevention_needed: + free((char*)startup_info->original_cwd); + startup_info->original_cwd = NULL; +} + static int read_worktree_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata) { struct repository_format *data = vdata; @@ -495,7 +560,8 @@ static enum extension_result handle_extension(const char *var, return config_error_nonbool(var); format = hash_algo_by_name(value); if (format == GIT_HASH_UNKNOWN) - return error("invalid value for 'extensions.objectformat'"); + return error(_("invalid value for '%s': '%s'"), + "extensions.objectformat", value); data->hash_algo = format; return EXTENSION_OK; } @@ -1025,6 +1091,48 @@ static int canonicalize_ceiling_entry(struct string_list_item *item, } } +struct safe_directory_data { + const char *path; + int is_safe; +}; + +static int safe_directory_cb(const char *key, const char *value, void *d) +{ + struct safe_directory_data *data = d; + + if (strcmp(key, "safe.directory")) + return 0; + + if (!value || !*value) { + data->is_safe = 0; + } else if (!strcmp(value, "*")) { + data->is_safe = 1; + } else { + const char *interpolated = NULL; + + if (!git_config_pathname(&interpolated, key, value) && + !fspathcmp(data->path, interpolated ? interpolated : value)) + data->is_safe = 1; + + free((char *)interpolated); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int ensure_valid_ownership(const char *path) +{ + struct safe_directory_data data = { .path = path }; + + if (!git_env_bool("GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER", 0) && + is_path_owned_by_current_user(path)) + return 1; + + read_very_early_config(safe_directory_cb, &data); + + return data.is_safe; +} + enum discovery_result { GIT_DIR_NONE = 0, GIT_DIR_EXPLICIT, @@ -1033,7 +1141,8 @@ enum discovery_result { /* these are errors */ GIT_DIR_HIT_CEILING = -1, GIT_DIR_HIT_MOUNT_POINT = -2, - GIT_DIR_INVALID_GITFILE = -3 + GIT_DIR_INVALID_GITFILE = -3, + GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP = -4 }; /* @@ -1123,11 +1232,15 @@ static enum discovery_result setup_git_directory_gently_1(struct strbuf *dir, } strbuf_setlen(dir, offset); if (gitdirenv) { + if (!ensure_valid_ownership(dir->buf)) + return GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP; strbuf_addstr(gitdir, gitdirenv); return GIT_DIR_DISCOVERED; } if (is_git_directory(dir->buf)) { + if (!ensure_valid_ownership(dir->buf)) + return GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP; strbuf_addstr(gitdir, "."); return GIT_DIR_BARE; } @@ -1259,6 +1372,19 @@ const char *setup_git_directory_gently(int *nongit_ok) dir.buf); *nongit_ok = 1; break; + case GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP: + if (!nongit_ok) { + struct strbuf quoted = STRBUF_INIT; + + sq_quote_buf_pretty("ed, dir.buf); + die(_("unsafe repository ('%s' is owned by someone else)\n" + "To add an exception for this directory, call:\n" + "\n" + "\tgit config --global --add safe.directory %s"), + dir.buf, quoted.buf); + } + *nongit_ok = 1; + break; case GIT_DIR_NONE: /* * As a safeguard against setup_git_directory_gently_1 returning @@ -1330,6 +1456,7 @@ const char *setup_git_directory_gently(int *nongit_ok) setenv(GIT_PREFIX_ENVIRONMENT, "", 1); } + setup_original_cwd(); strbuf_release(&dir); strbuf_release(&gitdir); |