<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git, branch v2.6.22.13</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v2.6.22.13</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v2.6.22.13'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2007-11-16T18:27:09Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.22.13</title>
<updated>2007-11-16T18:27:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2007-11-16T18:27:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4d3a89200a923ef066014b850dc9c53d810f78bb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4d3a89200a923ef066014b850dc9c53d810f78bb</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>TCP: Make sure write_queue_from does not begin with NULL ptr (CVE-2007-5501)</title>
<updated>2007-11-16T18:26:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ilpo Järvinen</name>
<email>ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi</email>
</author>
<published>2007-11-14T23:47:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1ca9e250e9f8675dc1db7fcd1cee8c0bf0bfc071'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1ca9e250e9f8675dc1db7fcd1cee8c0bf0bfc071</id>
<content type='text'>
patch 96a2d41a3e495734b63bff4e5dd0112741b93b38 in mainline.

NULL ptr can be returned from tcp_write_queue_head to cached_skb
and then assigned to skb if packets_out was zero. Without this,
system is vulnerable to a carefully crafted ACKs which obviously
is remotely triggerable.

Besides, there's very little that needs to be done in sacktag
if there weren't any packets outstanding, just skipping the rest
doesn't hurt.

Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wait_task_stopped: Check p-&gt;exit_state instead of TASK_TRACED (CVE-2007-5500)</title>
<updated>2007-11-16T18:26:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roland McGrath</name>
<email>roland@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-11-14T06:11:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5ef016ad9ba96a77a7249a2bd8d3196af5bfd920'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5ef016ad9ba96a77a7249a2bd8d3196af5bfd920</id>
<content type='text'>
patch a3474224e6a01924be40a8255636ea5522c1023a in mainline

The original meaning of the old test (p-&gt;state &gt; TASK_STOPPED) was
"not dead", since it was before TASK_TRACED existed and before the
state/exit_state split.  It was a wrong correction in commit
14bf01bb0599c89fc7f426d20353b76e12555308 to make this test for
TASK_TRACED instead.  It should have been changed when TASK_TRACED
was introducted and again when exit_state was introduced.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@sw.ru&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@ubuntu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Scott James Remnant &lt;scott@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.22.12</title>
<updated>2007-11-05T17:59:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2007-11-05T17:59:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e405fd3dce2abe36894ab5955fd17aff0e45daf0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e405fd3dce2abe36894ab5955fd17aff0e45daf0</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "x86_64: allocate sparsemem memmap above 4G"</title>
<updated>2007-11-05T17:56:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2007-10-29T18:36:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=572b445e0403ec0b7b6e3cc3a98588dbe660139a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:572b445e0403ec0b7b6e3cc3a98588dbe660139a</id>
<content type='text'>
patch 6a22c57b8d2a62dea7280a6b2ac807a539ef0716 in mainline.

This reverts commit 2e1c49db4c640b35df13889b86b9d62215ade4b6.

First off, testing in Fedora has shown it to cause boot failures,
bisected down by Martin Ebourne, and reported by Dave Jobes.  So the
commit will likely be reverted in the 2.6.23 stable kernels.

Secondly, in the 2.6.24 model, x86-64 has now grown support for
SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, which disables the relevant code anyway, so while the
bug is not visible any more, it's become invisible due to the code just
being irrelevant and no longer enabled on the only architecture that
this ever affected.

backported to 2.6.22 by Chuck Ebbert

Reported-by: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Martin Ebourne &lt;fedora@ebourne.me.uk&gt;
Cc: Zou Nan hai &lt;nanhai.zou@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Suresh Siddha &lt;suresh.b.siddha@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft &lt;apw@shadowen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;


</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm snapshot: fix invalidation deadlock</title>
<updated>2007-11-05T17:56:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Milan Broz</name>
<email>mbroz@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-07-12T16:28:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d91447ee784cf4954cea7e1e1018d1809d084f67'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d91447ee784cf4954cea7e1e1018d1809d084f67</id>
<content type='text'>
patch fcac03abd325e4f7a4cc8fe05fea2793b1c8eb75 in mainline

Process persistent exception store metadata IOs in a separate thread.

A snapshot may become invalid while inside generic_make_request().
A synchronous write is then needed to update the metadata while still
inside that function.  Since the introduction of
md-dm-reduce-stack-usage-with-stacked-block-devices.patch this has to
be performed by a separate thread to avoid deadlock.

Signed-off-by: Milan Broz &lt;mbroz@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon &lt;agk@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: fix global_flush_tlb() bug</title>
<updated>2007-11-05T17:56:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@elte.hu</email>
</author>
<published>2007-10-19T10:19:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e2b35e3aaf9f6e140a56aba85aca84463a3d16c4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e2b35e3aaf9f6e140a56aba85aca84463a3d16c4</id>
<content type='text'>
patch 9a24d04a3c26c223f22493492c5c9085b8773d4a upstream

While we were reviewing pageattr_32/64.c for unification,
Thomas Gleixner noticed the following serious SMP bug in
global_flush_tlb():

	down_read(&amp;init_mm.mmap_sem);
	list_replace_init(&amp;deferred_pages, &amp;l);
	up_read(&amp;init_mm.mmap_sem);

this is SMP-unsafe because list_replace_init() done on two CPUs in
parallel can corrupt the list.

This bug has been introduced about a year ago in the 64-bit tree:

       commit ea7322decb974a4a3e804f96a0201e893ff88ce3
       Author: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@suse.de&gt;
       Date:   Thu Dec 7 02:14:05 2006 +0100

       [PATCH] x86-64: Speed and clean up cache flushing in change_page_attr

                down_read(&amp;init_mm.mmap_sem);
        -       dpage = xchg(&amp;deferred_pages, NULL);
        +       list_replace_init(&amp;deferred_pages, &amp;l);
                up_read(&amp;init_mm.mmap_sem);

the xchg() based version was SMP-safe, but list_replace_init() is not.
So this "cleanup" introduced a nasty bug.

why this bug never become prominent is a mystery - it can probably be
explained with the (still) relative obscurity of the x86_64 architecture.

the safe fix for now is to write-lock init_mm.mmap_sem.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>param_sysfs_builtin memchr argument fix</title>
<updated>2007-11-05T17:56:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Young</name>
<email>hidave.darkstar@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-10-18T10:05:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b5f591838db12ca39e25b70278beec499fa56751'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b5f591838db12ca39e25b70278beec499fa56751</id>
<content type='text'>
patch faf8c714f4508207a9c81cc94dafc76ed6680b44 in mainline.

If memchr argument is longer than strlen(kp-&gt;name), there will be some
weird result.

It will casuse duplicate filenames in sysfs for the "nousb".  kernel
warning messages are as bellow:

sysfs: duplicate filename 'usbcore' can not be created
WARNING: at fs/sysfs/dir.c:416 sysfs_add_one()
 [&lt;c01c4750&gt;] sysfs_add_one+0xa0/0xe0
 [&lt;c01c4ab8&gt;] create_dir+0x48/0xb0
 [&lt;c01c4b69&gt;] sysfs_create_dir+0x29/0x50
 [&lt;c024e0fb&gt;] create_dir+0x1b/0x50
 [&lt;c024e3b6&gt;] kobject_add+0x46/0x150
 [&lt;c024e2da&gt;] kobject_init+0x3a/0x80
 [&lt;c053b880&gt;] kernel_param_sysfs_setup+0x50/0xb0
 [&lt;c053b9ce&gt;] param_sysfs_builtin+0xee/0x130
 [&lt;c053ba33&gt;] param_sysfs_init+0x23/0x60
 [&lt;c024d062&gt;] __next_cpu+0x12/0x20
 [&lt;c052aa30&gt;] kernel_init+0x0/0xb0
 [&lt;c052aa30&gt;] kernel_init+0x0/0xb0
 [&lt;c052a856&gt;] do_initcalls+0x46/0x1e0
 [&lt;c01bdb12&gt;] create_proc_entry+0x52/0x90
 [&lt;c0158d4c&gt;] register_irq_proc+0x9c/0xc0
 [&lt;c01bda94&gt;] proc_mkdir_mode+0x34/0x50
 [&lt;c052aa30&gt;] kernel_init+0x0/0xb0
 [&lt;c052aa92&gt;] kernel_init+0x62/0xb0
 [&lt;c0104f83&gt;] kernel_thread_helper+0x7/0x14
 =======================
kobject_add failed for usbcore with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory.
 [&lt;c024e466&gt;] kobject_add+0xf6/0x150
 [&lt;c053b880&gt;] kernel_param_sysfs_setup+0x50/0xb0
 [&lt;c053b9ce&gt;] param_sysfs_builtin+0xee/0x130
 [&lt;c053ba33&gt;] param_sysfs_init+0x23/0x60
 [&lt;c024d062&gt;] __next_cpu+0x12/0x20
 [&lt;c052aa30&gt;] kernel_init+0x0/0xb0
 [&lt;c052aa30&gt;] kernel_init+0x0/0xb0
 [&lt;c052a856&gt;] do_initcalls+0x46/0x1e0
 [&lt;c01bdb12&gt;] create_proc_entry+0x52/0x90
 [&lt;c0158d4c&gt;] register_irq_proc+0x9c/0xc0
 [&lt;c01bda94&gt;] proc_mkdir_mode+0x34/0x50
 [&lt;c052aa30&gt;] kernel_init+0x0/0xb0
 [&lt;c052aa92&gt;] kernel_init+0x62/0xb0
 [&lt;c0104f83&gt;] kernel_thread_helper+0x7/0x14
 =======================
Module 'usbcore' failed to be added to sysfs, error number -17
The system will be unstable now.

Signed-off-by: Dave Young &lt;hidave.darkstar@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;greg@kroah.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>minixfs: limit minixfs printks on corrupted dir i_size (CVE-2006-6058)</title>
<updated>2007-11-05T17:56:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Sandeen</name>
<email>sandeen@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-10-17T06:27:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=59531fe84bf82bdc2abc9b688919552c0bec1d47'/>
<id>urn:sha1:59531fe84bf82bdc2abc9b688919552c0bec1d47</id>
<content type='text'>
patch 44ec6f3f89889a469773b1fd894f8fcc07c29cf in mainline

This attempts to address CVE-2006-6058
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-6058

first reported at http://projects.info-pull.com/mokb/MOKB-17-11-2006.html

Essentially a corrupted minix dir inode reporting a very large
i_size will loop for a very long time in minix_readdir, minix_find_entry,
etc, because on EIO they just move on to try the next page.  This is
under the BKL, printk-storming as well.  This can lock up the machine
for a very long time.  Simply ratelimiting the printks gets things back
under control.  Make the message a bit more informative while we're here.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Bodo Eggert &lt;7eggert@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/uverbs: Fix checking of userspace object ownership</title>
<updated>2007-11-05T17:56:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roland Dreier</name>
<email>rolandd@cisco.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-10-28T17:14:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b67e7778425404c0261e5df2a04e41ae93a261f1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b67e7778425404c0261e5df2a04e41ae93a261f1</id>
<content type='text'>
Upstream as cbfb50e6e2e9c580848c0f51d37c24cdfb1cb704

Commit 9ead190b ("IB/uverbs: Don't serialize with ib_uverbs_idr_mutex")
rewrote how userspace objects are looked up in the uverbs module's
idrs, and introduced a severe bug in the process: there is no checking
that an operation is being performed by the right process any more.
Fix this by adding the missing check of uobj-&gt;context in __idr_get_uobj().

Apparently everyone is being very careful to only touch their own
objects, because this bug was introduced in June 2006 in 2.6.18, and
has gone undetected until now.

Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier &lt;rolandd@cisco.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
