user/sven/linux.git, branch v3.10.42

Linux 3.10.42

2014-06-07T20:48:31Z

futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

2014-06-07T20:25:41Z

commit 54a217887a7b658e2650c3feff22756ab80c7339 upstream. The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path or from user space just for fun. The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some circumstances. Handle the cases explicit: Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID | uODIED | ? [1] NULL | --- | --- | 0 | 0/1 | Valid [2] NULL | --- | --- | >0 | 0/1 | Valid [3] Found | NULL | -- | Any | 0/1 | Invalid [4] Found | Found | NULL | 0 | 1 | Valid [5] Found | Found | NULL | >0 | 1 | Invalid [6] Found | Found | task | 0 | 1 | Valid [7] Found | Found | NULL | Any | 0 | Invalid [8] Found | Found | task | ==taskTID | 0/1 | Valid [9] Found | Found | task | 0 | 0 | Invalid [10] Found | Found | task | !=taskTID | 0/1 | Invalid [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died. [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED. [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list() and exit_pi_state_list() [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in the pi_state but cannot access the user space value. [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set. [8] Owner and user space value match [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0 except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4] [10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space TID out of sync. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Will Drewry Cc: Darren Hart Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi

2014-06-07T20:25:40Z

commit 13fbca4c6ecd96ec1a1cfa2e4f2ce191fe928a5e upstream. If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner (the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state, especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred. Clean it up unconditionally. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Will Drewry Cc: Darren Hart Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()

2014-06-07T20:25:40Z

commit b3eaa9fc5cd0a4d74b18f6b8dc617aeaf1873270 upstream. We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel associated to the real owner. Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem. [ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try restoring the already corrupted user space state. ] Signed-off-by: Darren Hart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Will Drewry Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

2014-06-07T20:25:40Z

commit e9c243a5a6de0be8e584c604d353412584b592f8 upstream. If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable condition. This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi() which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()") [ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be different depending on the mapping ] Fixes CVE-2014-3153. Reported-by: Pinkie Pie Signed-off-by: Will Drewry Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Darren Hart Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ath9k: protect tid->sched check

2014-06-07T20:25:40Z

[ Upstream commit 21f8aaee0c62708654988ce092838aa7df4d25d8 ] We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice (second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below: [424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104 [424271.637328] IP: [] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k] ... [424271.639953] Call Trace: [424271.639998] [] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k] [424271.640083] [] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k] [424271.640177] [] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211] [424271.640258] [] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40 [424271.640346] [] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211] [424271.640437] [] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0 [424271.640510] [] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90 [424271.640578] [] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40 [424271.640640] [] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90 [424271.640706] [] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90 [424271.640787] [] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211] [424271.640897] [] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211] [424271.641009] [] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211] [424271.641104] [] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0 [424271.641182] [] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211] [424271.641266] [] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k] [424271.641358] [] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211] [424271.641445] [] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k] Bug report: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551 Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka Signed-off-by: John W. Linville [ xl: backported to 3.10: adjusted context ] Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Lu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

media: V4L2: fix VIDIOC_CREATE_BUFS in 64- / 32-bit compatibility mode

2014-06-07T20:25:40Z

commit 97d9d23dda6f37d90aefeec4ed619d52df525382 upstream. If a struct contains 64-bit fields, it is aligned on 64-bit boundaries within containing structs in 64-bit compilations. This is the case with struct v4l2_window, which contains pointers and is embedded into struct v4l2_format, and that one is embedded into struct v4l2_create_buffers. Unlike some other structs, used as a part of the kernel ABI as ioctl() arguments, that are packed, these structs aren't packed. This isn't a problem per se, but the ioctl-compat code for VIDIOC_CREATE_BUFS contains a bug, that triggers in such 64-bit builds. That code wrongly assumes, that in struct v4l2_create_buffers, struct v4l2_format immediately follows the __u32 memory field, which in fact isn't the case. This bug wasn't visible until now, because until recently hardly any applications used this ioctl() and mostly embedded 32-bit only drivers implemented it. This is changing now with addition of this ioctl() to some USB drivers, e.g. UVC. This patch fixes the bug by copying parts of struct v4l2_create_buffers separately. Signed-off-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

media: V4L2: ov7670: fix a wrong index, potentially Oopsing the kernel from user-space

2014-06-07T20:25:40Z

commit cfece5857ca51d1dcdb157017aba226f594e9dcf upstream. Commit 75e2bdad8901a0b599e01a96229be922eef1e488 "ov7670: allow configuration of image size, clock speed, and I/O method" uses a wrong index to iterate an array. Apart from being wrong, it also uses an unchecked value from user-space, which can cause access to unmapped memory in the kernel, triggered by a normal desktop user with rights to use V4L2 devices. Signed-off-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

media: fc2580: fix tuning failure on 32-bit arch

2014-06-07T20:25:40Z

commit 8845cc6415ec28ef8d57b3fb81c75ef9bce69c5f upstream. There was some frequency calculation overflows which caused tuning failure on 32-bit architecture. Use 64-bit numbers where needed in order to avoid calculation overflows. Thanks for the Finnish person, who asked remain anonymous, reporting, testing and suggesting the fix. Signed-off-by: Antti Palosaari Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

iommu/amd: Fix interrupt remapping for aliased devices

2014-06-07T20:25:40Z

commit e028a9e6b8a637af09ac4114083280df4a7045f1 upstream. An apparent cut and paste error prevents the correct flags from being set on the alias device resulting in MSI on conventional PCI devices failing to work. This also produces error events from the IOMMU like: AMD-Vi: Event logged [INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST device=00:14.4 address=0x000000fdf8000000 flags=0x0a00] Where 14.4 is a PCIe-to-PCI bridge with a device behind it trying to use MSI interrupts. Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman