<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git, branch v3.12.69</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.12.69</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.12.69'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2016-12-13T19:52:06Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 3.12.69</title>
<updated>2016-12-13T19:52:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Slaby</name>
<email>jslaby@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-13T19:52:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3c3714c3bfc473a667c5d906a8fea778bedc0edb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3c3714c3bfc473a667c5d906a8fea778bedc0edb</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sparc64: fix compile warning section mismatch in find_node()</title>
<updated>2016-12-13T16:01:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Tai</name>
<email>thomas.tai@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-12T00:41:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bc38f4f1a7d51f36112723fe6aa74800995c0ef4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bc38f4f1a7d51f36112723fe6aa74800995c0ef4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 87a349f9cc0908bc0cfac0c9ece3179f650ae95a ]

A compile warning is introduced by a commit to fix the find_node().
This patch fix the compile warning by moving find_node() into __init
section. Because find_node() is only used by memblock_nid_range() which
is only used by a __init add_node_ranges(). find_node() and
memblock_nid_range() should also be inside __init section.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Tai &lt;thomas.tai@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sparc64: Fix find_node warning if numa node cannot be found</title>
<updated>2016-12-13T16:01:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Tai</name>
<email>thomas.tai@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-03T16:19:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d68ed46bd6c06585e61556d4a7171d8ea198101c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d68ed46bd6c06585e61556d4a7171d8ea198101c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 74a5ed5c4f692df2ff0a2313ea71e81243525519 ]

When booting up LDOM, find_node() warns that a physical address
doesn't match a NUMA node.

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c:835
find_node+0xf4/0x120 find_node: A physical address doesn't
match a NUMA node rule. Some physical memory will be
owned by node 0.Modules linked in:

CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.9.0-rc3 #4
Call Trace:
 [0000000000468ba0] __warn+0xc0/0xe0
 [0000000000468c74] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x34/0x60
 [00000000004592f4] find_node+0xf4/0x120
 [0000000000dd0774] add_node_ranges+0x38/0xe4
 [0000000000dd0b1c] numa_parse_mdesc+0x268/0x2e4
 [0000000000dd0e9c] bootmem_init+0xb8/0x160
 [0000000000dd174c] paging_init+0x808/0x8fc
 [0000000000dcb0d0] setup_arch+0x2c8/0x2f0
 [0000000000dc68a0] start_kernel+0x48/0x424
 [0000000000dcb374] start_early_boot+0x27c/0x28c
 [0000000000a32c08] tlb_fixup_done+0x4c/0x64
 [0000000000027f08] 0x27f08

It is because linux use an internal structure node_masks[] to
keep the best memory latency node only. However, LDOM mdesc can
contain single latency-group with multiple memory latency nodes.

If the address doesn't match the best latency node within
node_masks[], it should check for an alternative via mdesc.
The warning message should only be printed if the address
doesn't match any node_masks[] nor within mdesc. To minimize
the impact of searching mdesc every time, the last matched
mask and index is stored in a variable.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Tai &lt;thomas.tai@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chris Hyser &lt;chris.hyser@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick &lt;liam.merwick@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sparc32: Fix inverted invalid_frame_pointer checks on sigreturns</title>
<updated>2016-12-13T16:01:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andreas Larsson</name>
<email>andreas@gaisler.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-09T09:43:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3378ee071387341c924b81e7d8749827370911cf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3378ee071387341c924b81e7d8749827370911cf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 07b5ab3f71d318e52c18cc3b73c1d44c908aacfa ]

Signed-off-by: Andreas Larsson &lt;andreas@gaisler.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: ping: check minimum size on ICMP header length</title>
<updated>2016-12-13T15:57:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-05T18:34:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3b395fd11b5bc1933e5ffcb83ad92e4a33977ee7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3b395fd11b5bc1933e5ffcb83ad92e4a33977ee7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0eab121ef8750a5c8637d51534d5e9143fb0633f ]

Prior to commit c0371da6047a ("put iov_iter into msghdr") in v3.19, there
was no check that the iovec contained enough bytes for an ICMP header,
and the read loop would walk across neighboring stack contents. Since the
iov_iter conversion, bad arguments are noticed, but the returned error is
EFAULT. Returning EINVAL is a clearer error and also solves the problem
prior to v3.19.

This was found using trinity with KASAN on v3.18:

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy_fromiovec+0x60/0x114 at addr ffffffc071077da0
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c2/9623
page:ffffffbe034b9a08 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x0()
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
CPU: 0 PID: 9623 Comm: trinity-c2 Tainted: G    BU         3.18.0-dirty #15
Hardware name: Google Tegra210 Smaug Rev 1,3+ (DT)
Call trace:
[&lt;ffffffc000209c98&gt;] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:90
[&lt;ffffffc000209e54&gt;] show_stack+0x10/0x1c arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:171
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[&lt;ffffffc000f18dc4&gt;] dump_stack+0x7c/0xd0 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:147
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:236
[&lt;ffffffc000373dcc&gt;] kasan_report+0x380/0x4b8 mm/kasan/report.c:259
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] check_memory_region mm/kasan/kasan.c:264
[&lt;ffffffc00037352c&gt;] __asan_load8+0x20/0x70 mm/kasan/kasan.c:507
[&lt;ffffffc0005b9624&gt;] memcpy_fromiovec+0x5c/0x114 lib/iovec.c:15
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:2667
[&lt;ffffffc000ddeba0&gt;] ping_common_sendmsg+0x50/0x108 net/ipv4/ping.c:674
[&lt;ffffffc000dded30&gt;] ping_v4_sendmsg+0xd8/0x698 net/ipv4/ping.c:714
[&lt;ffffffc000dc91dc&gt;] inet_sendmsg+0xe0/0x12c net/ipv4/af_inet.c:749
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] __sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:624
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632
[&lt;ffffffc000cab61c&gt;] sock_sendmsg+0x124/0x164 net/socket.c:643
[&lt;     inline     &gt;] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:1797
[&lt;ffffffc000cad270&gt;] SyS_sendto+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:1761

CVE-2016-8399

Reported-by: Qidan He &lt;i@flanker017.me&gt;
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE</title>
<updated>2016-12-13T15:57:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-02T17:44:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=40c753f1714416931dc093b960aa3fcac4a545c5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:40c753f1714416931dc093b960aa3fcac4a545c5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290 ]

CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...

Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.

This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.

Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring</title>
<updated>2016-12-13T15:57:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Philip Pettersson</name>
<email>philip.pettersson@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-30T22:55:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c80480c4ad5208431a7fb003472bd576bbe6ebb7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c80480c4ad5208431a7fb003472bd576bbe6ebb7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 84ac7260236a49c79eede91617700174c2c19b0c ]

When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.

This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.

The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.

Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson &lt;philip.pettersson@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/dccp: fix use-after-free in dccp_invalid_packet</title>
<updated>2016-12-13T15:57:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-28T14:26:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7d4c3e3e3d69e854333e664a3e6071a8da65e879'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7d4c3e3e3d69e854333e664a3e6071a8da65e879</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 648f0c28df282636c0c8a7a19ca3ce5fc80a39c3 ]

pskb_may_pull() can reallocate skb-&gt;head, we need to reload dh pointer
in dccp_invalid_packet() or risk use after free.

Bug found by Andrey Konovalov using syzkaller.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/sched: pedit: make sure that offset is valid</title>
<updated>2016-12-13T15:57:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Vadai</name>
<email>amir@vadai.me</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-28T10:56:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f277a1310514bff1c5f05c93b33bd7caf2e119fb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f277a1310514bff1c5f05c93b33bd7caf2e119fb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 95c2027bfeda21a28eb245121e6a249f38d0788e ]

Add a validation function to make sure offset is valid:
1. Not below skb head (could happen when offset is negative).
2. Validate both 'offset' and 'at'.

Signed-off-by: Amir Vadai &lt;amir@vadai.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()</title>
<updated>2016-12-13T15:57:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Guillaume Nault</name>
<email>g.nault@alphalink.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-18T21:13:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c20932ae0d412f1aabf3514891cdd6ae6a08ae01'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c20932ae0d412f1aabf3514891cdd6ae6a08ae01</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 32c231164b762dddefa13af5a0101032c70b50ef ]

Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
 ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
 ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
 ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff829f835b&gt;] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [&lt;ffffffff8174d3cc&gt;] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
 [&lt;ffffffff8174d666&gt;] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
 [&lt;ffffffff8174db7e&gt;] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
 [&lt;ffffffff8579047e&gt;] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
 [&lt;ffffffff850b2dfd&gt;] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [&lt;ffffffff851dc5a0&gt;] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [&lt;ffffffff84c4581d&gt;] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [&lt;ffffffff84c45976&gt;] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [&lt;ffffffff817a108c&gt;] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [&lt;ffffffff817a1605&gt;] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [&lt;ffffffff813774f9&gt;] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [&lt;ffffffff81324aae&gt;] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [&lt;ffffffff81326dc8&gt;] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [&lt;ffffffff81348cf7&gt;] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [&lt;ffffffff811b49af&gt;] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [&lt;ffffffff810039bf&gt;] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [&lt;ffffffff81006060&gt;] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [&lt;ffffffff85e4d726&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff811ddcb6&gt;] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174c736&gt;] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174c9ad&gt;] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174cee2&gt;] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff817476a8&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c4f6a9&gt;] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c58ac8&gt;] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff851ddf67&gt;] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c4af7b&gt;] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c4b46f&gt;] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff85e4d685&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff811ddcb6&gt;] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174c736&gt;] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8174cf61&gt;] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81748b28&gt;] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c541eb&gt;] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c5aca4&gt;] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c5ad33&gt;] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c5af23&gt;] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c5cb6c&gt;] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff8579044e&gt;] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff850b2dfd&gt;] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff851dc5a0&gt;] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c4581d&gt;] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff84c45976&gt;] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff817a108c&gt;] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff817a1605&gt;] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff813774f9&gt;] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81324aae&gt;] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81326dc8&gt;] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81348cf7&gt;] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff811b49af&gt;] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff810039bf&gt;] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;     inline     &gt;] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff81006060&gt;] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
 [ 1116.897025] [&lt;ffffffff85e4d726&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
&gt;ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                    ^
 ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

==================================================================

The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.

Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding &lt;sploving1@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault &lt;g.nault@alphalink.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
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