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<title>user/sven/linux.git, branch v3.2.75</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.2.75</id>
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<updated>2015-12-30T02:26:04Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 3.2.75</title>
<updated>2015-12-30T02:26:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-30T02:26:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:31b79119914d59febac1bccd19660f98802fece7</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ppp, slip: Validate VJ compression slot parameters completely</title>
<updated>2015-12-30T02:26:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-01T16:22:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:df085f1cb3acd3d75408ff94f366983873bce7d2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4ab42d78e37a294ac7bc56901d563c642e03c4ae upstream.

Currently slhc_init() treats out-of-range values of rslots and tslots
as equivalent to 0, except that if tslots is too large it will
dereference a null pointer (CVE-2015-7799).

Add a range-check at the top of the function and make it return an
ERR_PTR() on error instead of NULL.  Change the callers accordingly.

Compile-tested only.

Reported-by: 郭永刚 &lt;guoyonggang@360.cn&gt;
References: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.oss.general/17908
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust indentation]
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>isdn_ppp: Add checks for allocation failure in isdn_ppp_open()</title>
<updated>2015-12-30T02:26:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-01T16:21:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3ed88ba9e848aac74ae150b089ed36c25016faca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0baa57d8dc32db78369d8b5176ef56c5e2e18ab3 upstream.

Compile-tested only.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>af_unix: fix a fatal race with bit fields</title>
<updated>2015-12-30T02:26:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-05-01T05:24:03Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2ee9cbe7e7bfe2d36374288b818aa31b2c4981db</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 60bc851ae59bfe99be6ee89d6bc50008c85ec75d upstream.

Using bit fields is dangerous on ppc64/sparc64, as the compiler [1]
uses 64bit instructions to manipulate them.
If the 64bit word includes any atomic_t or spinlock_t, we can lose
critical concurrent changes.

This is happening in af_unix, where unix_sk(sk)-&gt;gc_candidate/
gc_maybe_cycle/lock share the same 64bit word.

This leads to fatal deadlock, as one/several cpus spin forever
on a spinlock that will never be available again.

A safer way would be to use a long to store flags.
This way we are sure compiler/arch wont do bad things.

As we own unix_gc_lock spinlock when clearing or setting bits,
we can use the non atomic __set_bit()/__clear_bit().

recursion_level can share the same 64bit location with the spinlock,
as it is set only with this spinlock held.

[1] bug fixed in gcc-4.8.0 :
http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=52080

Reported-by: Ambrose Feinstein &lt;ambrose@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>af_unix: Revert 'lock_interruptible' in stream receive code</title>
<updated>2015-12-30T02:26:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rainer Weikusat</name>
<email>rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-16T20:09:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1a3b55eee77490693bb4d1338f24b6c9f11e3e1d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3822b5c2fc62e3de8a0f33806ff279fb7df92432 ]

With b3ca9b02b00704053a38bfe4c31dbbb9c13595d0, the AF_UNIX SOCK_STREAM
receive code was changed from using mutex_lock(&amp;u-&gt;readlock) to
mutex_lock_interruptible(&amp;u-&gt;readlock) to prevent signals from being
delayed for an indefinite time if a thread sleeping on the mutex
happened to be selected for handling the signal. But this was never a
problem with the stream receive code (as opposed to its datagram
counterpart) as that never went to sleep waiting for new messages with the
mutex held and thus, wouldn't cause secondary readers to block on the
mutex waiting for the sleeping primary reader. As the interruptible
locking makes the code more complicated in exchange for no benefit,
change it back to using mutex_lock.

Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat &lt;rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind().</title>
<updated>2015-12-30T02:26:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-15T20:39:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:805ce945362d9e496563c9885e7fde00cbd83635</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5233252fce714053f0151680933571a2da9cbfb4 ]

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pptp: verify sockaddr_len in pptp_bind() and pptp_connect()</title>
<updated>2015-12-30T02:26:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>WANG Cong</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-14T21:48:36Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1e44aafdd1181dd5e5b0638f9d3498b73c4d89e9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 09ccfd238e5a0e670d8178cf50180ea81ae09ae1 ]

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sh_eth: fix kernel oops in skb_put()</title>
<updated>2015-12-30T02:26:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sergei Shtylyov</name>
<email>sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-03T22:45:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:814a895e7373b5d71f60659d42e4f13ffdbc2e1c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 248be83dcb3feb3f6332eb3d010a016402138484 ]

In a low memory situation the following kernel oops occurs:

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000050
pgd = 8490c000
[00000050] *pgd=4651e831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT ARM
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0    Not tainted  (3.4-at16 #9)
PC is at skb_put+0x10/0x98
LR is at sh_eth_poll+0x2c8/0xa10
pc : [&lt;8035f780&gt;]    lr : [&lt;8028bf50&gt;]    psr: 60000113
sp : 84eb1a90  ip : 84eb1ac8  fp : 84eb1ac4
r10: 0000003f  r9 : 000005ea  r8 : 00000000
r7 : 00000000  r6 : 940453b0  r5 : 00030000  r4 : 9381b180
r3 : 00000000  r2 : 00000000  r1 : 000005ea  r0 : 00000000
Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
Control: 10c53c7d  Table: 4248c059  DAC: 00000015
Process klogd (pid: 2046, stack limit = 0x84eb02e8)
[...]

This is  because netdev_alloc_skb() fails and 'mdp-&gt;rx_skbuff[entry]' is left
NULL but sh_eth_rx() later  uses it without checking.  Add such check...

Reported-by: Yasushi SHOJI &lt;yashi@atmark-techno.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sergei Shtylyov &lt;sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument</title>
<updated>2015-12-30T02:26:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-14T21:03:39Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ef6d51d24d878be2291d7af783441356eb77649d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 ]

郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:

	int socket_fd;
	struct sockaddr_in addr;
	addr.sin_port = 0;
	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
	addr.sin_family = 10;

	socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
	connect(socket_fd , &amp;addr,16);

AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.

This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.

kernel: Call Trace:
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db90e&gt;] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db9a4&gt;] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645069&gt;] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810ac51b&gt;] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810236d8&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645e0e&gt;] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81779515&gt;] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89

I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.

CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Reported-by: 郭永刚 &lt;guoyonggang@360.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: open-code U8_MAX]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: sctp: clone options to avoid use after free</title>
<updated>2015-12-30T02:26:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-09T15:25:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5c85649e8da22945f8e4616717543991a81bfba2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9470e24f35ab81574da54e69df90c1eb4a96b43f ]

SCTP is lacking proper np-&gt;opt cloning at accept() time.

TCP and DCCP use ipv6_dup_options() helper, do the same
in SCTP.

We might later factorize this code in a common helper to avoid
future mistakes.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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