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<title>user/sven/linux.git, branch v3.2.91</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.2.91</id>
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<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:46Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 3.2.91</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-18T17:38:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:30e5012693c9c32070f9c570d458736ccb4a1094</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: timer: Fix missing queue indices reset at SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-02T15:26:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:128b87e76b86adcfae4a6658085dceb8234d5e75</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ba3021b2c79b2fa9114f92790a99deb27a65b728 upstream.

snd_timer_user_tselect() reallocates the queue buffer dynamically, but
it forgot to reset its indices.  Since the read may happen
concurrently with ioctl and snd_timer_user_tselect() allocates the
buffer via kmalloc(), this may lead to the leak of uninitialized
kernel-space data, as spotted via KMSAN:

  BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory in snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10
  CPU: 0 PID: 1037 Comm: probe Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2739
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
   dump_stack+0x143/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:52
   kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1007
   kmsan_check_memory+0xc2/0x140 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1086
   copy_to_user ./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:725
   snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10 sound/core/timer.c:2004
   do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:716
   __do_readv_writev+0x94c/0x1380 fs/read_write.c:864
   do_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:894
   vfs_readv fs/read_write.c:908
   do_readv+0x52a/0x5d0 fs/read_write.c:934
   SYSC_readv+0xb6/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:1021
   SyS_readv+0x87/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1018

This patch adds the missing reset of queue indices.  Together with the
previous fix for the ioctl/read race, we cover the whole problem.

Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: timer: Fix race between read and ioctl</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-02T13:03:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7aba7242b83b6e9a56a8eb875d669cfab4eff542</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d11662f4f798b50d8c8743f433842c3e40fe3378 upstream.

The read from ALSA timer device, the function snd_timer_user_tread(),
may access to an uninitialized struct snd_timer_user fields when the
read is concurrently performed while the ioctl like
snd_timer_user_tselect() is invoked.  We have already fixed the races
among ioctls via a mutex, but we seem to have forgotten the race
between read vs ioctl.

This patch simply applies (more exactly extends the already applied
range of) tu-&gt;ioctl_lock in snd_timer_user_tread() for closing the
race window.

Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-23T22:08:57Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cea299eb189fca09c413432b807abd607385b3bc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 98da7d08850fb8bdeb395d6368ed15753304aa0c upstream.

When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit,
the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included.  This means
that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack
limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the
pointers to the strings.

For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721
single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB /
4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the
remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884).

The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space
entirely.  Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in
pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional commenting from Kees]
Fixes: b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622001720.GA32173@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: use ACCESS_ONCE() instead of READ_ONCE()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>char: lp: fix possible integer overflow in lp_setup()</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-16T17:18:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:550845d02afb926d50d1487f9e2b954270c83963</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3e21f4af170bebf47c187c1ff8bf155583c9f3b1 upstream.

The lp_setup() code doesn't apply any bounds checking when passing
"lp=none", and only in this case, resulting in an overflow of the
parport_nr[] array. All versions in Git history are affected.

Reported-By: Roee Hay &lt;roee.hay@hcl.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Beulich</name>
<email>jbeulich@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-13T20:28:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cc21fe1ff77acfab555df5577ea46fc89932f3b2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 089bc0143f489bd3a4578bdff5f4ca68fb26f341 upstream.

Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).

This is XSA-216.


Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-05T16:39:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b8f254aa17f720053054c4ecff3920973a83b9d6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a4866aa812518ed1a37d8ea0c881dc946409de94 upstream.

Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:

usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)

This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.

Reported-by: Tommi Rantala &lt;tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala &lt;tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm/init.c: Fix devmem_is_allowed() off by one</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>T Makphaibulchoke</name>
<email>tmac@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-08-29T03:21:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f95fb77e908a1efa2772f2155d1db87ca6664d67</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 73e8f3d7e2cb23614d5115703d76d8e54764b641 upstream.

Fixing an off-by-one error in devmem_is_allowed(), which allows
accesses to physical addresses 0x100000-0x100fff, an extra page
past 1MB.

Signed-off-by: T Makphaibulchoke &lt;tmac@hp.com&gt;
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: yinghai@kernel.org
Cc: tiwai@suse.de
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1346210503-14276-1-git-send-email-tmac@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Input: i8042 - add Clevo P650RS to the i8042 reset list</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Torokhov</name>
<email>dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-13T22:36:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:883aafc56e3535083fb59f778506fd9c59915aaf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7c5bb4ac2b76d2a09256aec8a7d584bf3e2b0466 upstream.

Clevo P650RS and other similar devices require i8042 to be reset in order
to detect Synaptics touchpad.

Reported-by: Paweł Bylica &lt;chfast@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ed Bordin &lt;edbordin@gmail.com&gt;
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=190301
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: tc35815: move free after the dereference</title>
<updated>2017-07-18T17:38:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-21T10:49:37Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4717cd19172d406f48b145e879d5763806378f39</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 11faa7b0359aaf7efd406b7a6a077fda2b037d8e upstream.

We dereference "skb" to get "skb-&gt;len" so we should probably do that
step before freeing the skb.

Fixes: eea221ce4880 ("tc35815 driver update (take 2)")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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