user/sven/linux.git, branch v4.14.14

Linux 4.14.14

2018-01-17T08:45:30Z

x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning

2018-01-17T08:45:30Z

commit b8b9ce4b5aec8de9e23cabb0a26b78641f9ab1d6 upstream. Remove the compile time warning when CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y and the compiler does not have retpoline support. Linus rationale for this is: It's wrong because it will just make people turn off RETPOLINE, and the asm updates - and return stack clearing - that are independent of the compiler are likely the most important parts because they are likely the ones easiest to target. And it's annoying because most people won't be able to do anything about it. The number of people building their own compiler? Very small. So if their distro hasn't got a compiler yet (and pretty much nobody does), the warning is just annoying crap. It is already properly reported as part of the sysfs interface. The compile-time warning only encourages bad things. Fixes: 76b043848fd2 ("x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support") Requested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzWgquv4i6Mab6bASqYXg3ErV3XDFEYf=GEcCDQg5uAtw@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI

2018-01-17T08:45:30Z

commit 99a9dc98ba52267ce5e062b52de88ea1f1b2a7d8 upstream. The intel_bts driver does not use the 'normal' BTS buffer which is exposed through the cpu_entry_area but instead uses the memory allocated for the perf AUX buffer. This obviously comes apart when using PTI because then the kernel mapping; which includes that AUX buffer memory; disappears. Fixing this requires to expose a mapping which is visible in all context and that's not trivial. As a quick fix disable this driver when PTI is enabled to prevent malfunction. Fixes: 385ce0ea4c07 ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig") Reported-by: Vince Weaver Reported-by: Robert Święcki Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: greg@kroah.com Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: luto@amacapital.net Cc: Vince Weaver Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180114102713.GB6166@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI

2018-01-17T08:45:30Z

commit a237f762681e2a394ca67f21df2feb2b76a3609b upstream. When the config option for PTI was added a reference to documentation was added as well. But the documentation did not exist at that point. The final documentation has a different file name. Fix it up to point to the proper file. Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig") Signed-off-by: W. Trevor King Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3009cc8ccbddcd897ec1e0cb6dda524929de0d14.1515799398.git.wking@tremily.us Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines

2018-01-17T08:45:30Z

commit f10ee3dcc9f0aba92a5c4c064628be5200765dc2 upstream. The switch to the user space page tables in the low level ASM code sets unconditionally bit 12 and bit 11 of CR3. Bit 12 is switching the base address of the page directory to the user part, bit 11 is switching the PCID to the PCID associated with the user page tables. This fails on a machine which lacks PCID support because bit 11 is set in CR3. Bit 11 is reserved when PCID is inactive. While the Intel SDM claims that the reserved bits are ignored when PCID is disabled, the AMD APM states that they should be cleared. This went unnoticed as the AMD APM was not checked when the code was developed and reviewed and test systems with Intel CPUs never failed to boot. The report is against a Centos 6 host where the guest fails to boot, so it's not yet clear whether this is a virt issue or can happen on real hardware too, but thats irrelevant as the AMD APM clearly ask for clearing the reserved bits. Make sure that on non PCID machines bit 11 is not set by the page table switching code. Andy suggested to rename the related bits and masks so they are clearly describing what they should be used for, which is done as well for clarity. That split could have been done with alternatives but the macro hell is horrible and ugly. This can be done on top if someone cares to remove the extra orq. For now it's a straight forward fix. Fixes: 6fd166aae78c ("x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches") Reported-by: Laura Abbott Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: stable Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Willy Tarreau Cc: David Woodhouse Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801140009150.2371@nanos Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall

2018-01-17T08:45:30Z

commit 352909b49ba0d74929b96af6dfbefc854ab6ebb5 upstream. This tests that the vsyscall entries do what they're expected to do. It also confirms that attempts to read the vsyscall page behave as expected. If changes are made to the vsyscall code or its memory map handling, running this test in all three of vsyscall=none, vsyscall=emulate, and vsyscall=native are helpful. (Because it's easy, this also compares the vsyscall results to their vDSO equivalents.) Note to KAISER backporters: please test this under all three vsyscall modes. Also, in the emulate and native modes, make sure that test_vsyscall_64 agrees with the command line or config option as to which mode you're in. It's quite easy to mess up the kernel such that native mode accidentally emulates or vice versa. Greg, etc: please backport this to all your Meltdown-patched kernels. It'll help make sure the patches didn't regress vsyscalls. CSigned-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Juergen Gross Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b9c5a174c1d60fd7774461d518aa75598b1d8fd.1515719552.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit

2018-01-17T08:45:29Z

commit 117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b upstream. In accordance with the Intel and AMD documentation, we need to overwrite all entries in the RSB on exiting a guest, to prevent malicious branch target predictions from affecting the host kernel. This is needed both for retpoline and for IBRS. [ak: numbers again for the RSB stuffing labels] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Paul Turner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515755487-8524-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps

2018-01-17T08:45:29Z

commit 7614e913db1f40fff819b36216484dc3808995d4 upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in 32bit irq inline asm code to use non speculative sequences. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven Acked-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Paul Turner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-12-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps

2018-01-17T08:45:29Z

commit 5096732f6f695001fa2d6f1335a2680b37912c69 upstream. Convert all indirect jumps in 32bit checksum assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven Acked-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Paul Turner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-11-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps

2018-01-17T08:45:29Z

commit ea08816d5b185ab3d09e95e393f265af54560350 upstream. Convert indirect call in Xen hypercall to use non-speculative sequence, when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven Acked-by: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Paul Turner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-10-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman