user/sven/linux.git, branch v4.19.241

Linux 4.19.241

2022-05-01T15:00:38Z

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220429104048.459089941@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lightnvm: disable the subsystem

2022-05-01T15:00:38Z

In commit 9ea9b9c48387 ("remove the lightnvm subsystem") the lightnvm subsystem was removed as there is no hardware in the wild for it, and the code is known to have problems. This should also be disabled for older LTS kernels as well to prevent anyone from accidentally using it. Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Matias Bjørling Cc: Javier González Cc: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "net: ethernet: stmmac: fix altr_tse_pcs function when using a fixed-link"

2022-05-01T15:00:38Z

This reverts commit e2423aa174e6c3e9805e96db778245ba73cdd88c which is commit a6aaa00324240967272b451bfa772547bd576ee6 upstream. Pavel reports that it causes boot issues, so revert it for now. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220429074341.GB1423@amd Reported-by: Pavel Machek Cc: Dinh Nguyen Cc: David S. Miller Cc: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ia64: kprobes: Fix to pass correct trampoline address to the handler

2022-05-01T15:00:37Z

commit a7fe2378454cf46cd5e2776d05e72bbe8f0a468c upstream. The following commit: Commit e792ff804f49 ("ia64: kprobes: Use generic kretprobe trampoline handler") Passed the wrong trampoline address to __kretprobe_trampoline_handler(): it passes the descriptor address instead of function entry address. Pass the right parameter. Also use correct symbol dereference function to get the function address from 'kretprobe_trampoline' - an IA64 special. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/163163042696.489837.12551102356265354730.stgit@devnote2 Fixes: e792ff804f49 ("ia64: kprobes: Use generic kretprobe trampoline handler") Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: X86 ML Cc: Daniel Xu Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Abhishek Sagar Cc: Andrii Nakryiko Cc: Paul McKenney Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "ia64: kprobes: Use generic kretprobe trampoline handler"

2022-05-01T15:00:37Z

This reverts commit d3380de483d55d904fb94a241406b34ed2fada7d. Since this commit is a part of generic kretprobe trampoline handler series, without the other patches in that series, this causes a build error on ia64. Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "ia64: kprobes: Fix to pass correct trampoline address to the handler"

2022-05-01T15:00:37Z

This reverts commit f5f96e3643dc33d6117cf7047e73512046e4858b. The commit f5f96e3643dc ("ia64: kprobes: Fix to pass correct trampoline address to the handler") was wrongly backported. It involves another commit which is a part of another bigger series, so it should not be backported to the stable tree. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/64s: Unmerge EX_LR and EX_DAR

2022-05-01T15:00:36Z

The SLB miss handler is not fully re-entrant, it is able to work because we ensure that the SLB entries for the kernel text and data segment, as well as the kernel stack are pinned in the SLB. Accesses to kernel data outside of those areas has to be carefully managed and can only occur in certain parts of the code. One way we deal with that is by storing some values in temporary slots in the paca. In v4.13 in commit dbeea1d6b4bd ("powerpc/64s/paca: EX_LR can be merged with EX_DAR") we merged the storage for two temporary slots for register storage during SLB miss handling. That was safe at the time because the two slots were never used at the same time. Unfortunately in v4.17 in commit c2b4d8b7417a ("powerpc/mm/hash64: Increase the VA range") we broke that condition, and introduced a case where the two slots could be in use at the same time, leading to one being corrupted. Specifically in slb_miss_common() when we detect that we're handling a fault for a large virtual address (> 512TB) we go to the "8" label, there we store the original fault address into paca->exslb[EX_DAR], before jumping to large_addr_slb() (using rfid). We then use the EXCEPTION_PROLOG_COMMON and RECONCILE_IRQ_STATE macros to do exception setup, before reloading the fault address from paca->exslb[EX_DAR] and storing it into pt_regs->dar (Data Address Register). However the code generated by those macros can cause a recursive SLB miss on a kernel address in three places. Firstly is the saving of the PPR (Program Priority Register), which happens on all CPUs since Power7, the PPR is saved to the thread struct which can be anywhere in memory. There is also the call to accumulate_stolen_time() if CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_NATIVE=y and CONFIG_PPC_SPLPAR=y, and also the call to trace_hardirqs_off() if CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS=y. The latter two call into generic C code and can lead to accesses anywhere in memory. On modern 64-bit CPUs we have 1TB segments, so for any of those accesses to cause an SLB fault they must access memory more than 1TB away from the kernel text, data and kernel stack. That typically only happens on machines with more than 1TB of RAM. However it is possible on multi-node Power9 systems, because memory on the 2nd node begins at 32TB in the linear mapping. If we take a recursive SLB fault then we will corrupt the original fault address with the LR (Link Register) value, because the EX_DAR and EX_LR slots share storage. Subsequently we will think we're trying to fault that LR address, which is the wrong address, and will also mostly likely lead to a segfault because the LR address will be < 512TB and so will be rejected by slb_miss_large_addr(). This appears as a spurious segfault to userspace, and if show_unhandled_signals is enabled you will see a fault reported in dmesg with the LR address, not the expected fault address, eg: prog[123]: segfault (11) at 128a61808 nip 128a618cc lr 128a61808 code 3 in prog[128a60000+10000] prog[123]: code: 4bffffa4 39200040 3ce00004 7d2903a6 3c000200 78e707c6 780083e4 7d3b4b78 prog[123]: code: 7d455378 7d7d5b78 7d9f6378 7da46b78 7d3a4b78 7d465378 7d7c5b78 Notice that the fault address == the LR, and the faulting instruction is a simple store that should never use LR. In upstream this was fixed in v4.20 in commit 48e7b7695745 ("powerpc/64s/hash: Convert SLB miss handlers to C"), however that is a huge rewrite and not backportable. The minimal fix for stable is to just unmerge the EX_LR and EX_DAR slots again, avoiding the corruption of the DAR value. This uses an extra 8 bytes per CPU, which is negligble. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc/64/interrupt: Temporarily save PPR on stack to fix register corruption due to SLB miss

2022-05-01T15:00:36Z

This is a minimal stable kernel fix for the problem solved by 4c2de74cc869 ("powerpc/64: Interrupts save PPR on stack rather than thread_struct"). Upstream kernels between 4.17-4.20 have this bug, so I propose this patch for 4.19 stable. Longer description from mpe: In commit f384796c4 ("powerpc/mm: Add support for handling > 512TB address in SLB miss") we added support for using multiple context ids per process. Previously accessing past the first context id was a fatal error for the process. With the new support it became non-fatal, and so the previous "bad_addr_slb" handler was changed to be the "large_addr_slb" handler. That handler uses the EXCEPTION_PROLOG_COMMON() macro, which in-turn calls the SAVE_PPR() macro. At the point where SAVE_PPR() is used, the r9-13 register values from the original user fault are saved in paca->exslb. It's not until later in EXCEPTION_PROLOG_COMMON_2() that they are saved from paca->exslb onto the kernel stack. The PPR is saved into current->thread.ppr, which is notably not on the kernel stack the way pt_regs are. This means we can take an SLB miss on current->thread.ppr. If that happens in the "large_addr_slb" case we will clobber the saved user r9-r13 in paca->exslb with kernel values. Later we will save those clobbered values into the pt_regs on the stack, and when we return to userspace those kernel values will be restored. Typically this appears as some sort of segfault in userspace, with an address that looks like a kernel address. In dmesg it can appear as: [19117.440331] some_program[1869625]: unhandled signal 11 at c00000000f6bda10 nip 00007fff780d559c lr 00007fff781ae56c code 30001 The upstream fix for this issue was to move PPR into pt_regs, on the kernel stack, avoiding the possibility of an SLB fault when saving it. However changing the size of pt_regs is an intrusive change, and has side effects in other parts of the kernel. A minimal fix is to temporarily save the PPR in an unused part of pt_regs, then save the user register values from paca->exslb into pt_regs, and then move the saved PPR into thread.ppr. Fixes: f384796c40dc ("powerpc/mm: Add support for handling > 512TB address in SLB miss") Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220316033235.903657-1-npiggin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/sched: cls_u32: fix netns refcount changes in u32_change()

2022-05-01T15:00:35Z

commit 3db09e762dc79584a69c10d74a6b98f89a9979f8 upstream. We are now able to detect extra put_net() at the moment they happen, instead of much later in correct code paths. u32_init_knode() / tcf_exts_init() populates the ->exts.net pointer, but as mentioned in tcf_exts_init(), the refcount on netns has not been elevated yet. The refcount is taken only once tcf_exts_get_net() is called. So the two u32_destroy_key() calls from u32_change() are attempting to release an invalid reference on the netns. syzbot report: refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21708 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbf/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:31 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 21708 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-next-20220412-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xbf/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:31 Code: 1d 14 b6 b2 09 31 ff 89 de e8 6d e9 89 fd 84 db 75 e0 e8 84 e5 89 fd 48 c7 c7 40 aa 26 8a c6 05 f4 b5 b2 09 01 e8 e5 81 2e 05 <0f> 0b eb c4 e8 68 e5 89 fd 0f b6 1d e3 b5 b2 09 31 ff 89 de e8 38 RSP: 0018:ffffc900051af1b0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff8160a0c8 RDI: fffff52000a35e28 RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffff81604a9e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff92000a35e3b R13: 00000000ffffffef R14: ffff8880211a0194 R15: ffff8880577d0a00 FS: 00007f25d183e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f19c859c028 CR3: 0000000051009000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:344 [inline] refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:359 [inline] ref_tracker_free+0x535/0x6b0 lib/ref_tracker.c:118 netns_tracker_free include/net/net_namespace.h:327 [inline] put_net_track include/net/net_namespace.h:341 [inline] tcf_exts_put_net include/net/pkt_cls.h:255 [inline] u32_destroy_key.isra.0+0xa7/0x2b0 net/sched/cls_u32.c:394 u32_change+0xe01/0x3140 net/sched/cls_u32.c:909 tc_new_tfilter+0x98d/0x2200 net/sched/cls_api.c:2148 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6016 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2495 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x543/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e2/0x800 net/socket.c:2413 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2496 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f25d0689049 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f25d183e168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f25d079c030 RCX: 00007f25d0689049 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000340 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f25d06e308d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffd0b752e3f R14: 00007f25d183e300 R15: 0000000000022000 Fixes: 35c55fc156d8 ("cls_u32: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Cc: Cong Wang Cc: Jiri Pirko Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski [rkolchmeyer: Backported to 4.19: adjusted u32_destroy_key() signature] Signed-off-by: Robert Kolchmeyer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

hamradio: remove needs_free_netdev to avoid UAF

2022-05-01T15:00:35Z

commit 81b1d548d00bcd028303c4f3150fa753b9b8aa71 upstream. The former patch "defer 6pack kfree after unregister_netdev" reorders the kfree of two buffer after the unregister_netdev to prevent the race condition. It also adds free_netdev() function in sixpack_close(), which is a direct copy from the similar code in mkiss_close(). However, in sixpack driver, the flag needs_free_netdev is set to true in sp_setup(), hence the unregister_netdev() will free the netdev automatically. Therefore, as the sp is netdev_priv, use-after-free occurs. This patch removes the needs_free_netdev = true and just let the free_netdev to finish this deallocation task. Fixes: 0b9111922b1f ("hamradio: defer 6pack kfree after unregister_netdev") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111141402.7551-1-linma@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman