<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git, branch v4.4.272</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.272</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.272'/>
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<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 4.4.272</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-10T10:41:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=2b9e462d8dc2b13e6b5d9dc8c7ed95502c9718f5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2b9e462d8dc2b13e6b5d9dc8c7ed95502c9718f5</id>
<content type='text'>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210608175926.524658689@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) &lt;pavel@denx.de&gt;
Tested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jon Hunter &lt;jonathanh@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing &lt;lkft@linaro.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jason Self &lt;jason@bluehome.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen-pciback: redo VF placement in the virtual topology</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Beulich</name>
<email>jbeulich@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-18T16:13:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bbd9b5f5c852e7881e3f511160ae8b6a36d07188'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bbd9b5f5c852e7881e3f511160ae8b6a36d07188</id>
<content type='text'>
The commit referenced below was incomplete: It merely affected what
would get written to the vdev-&lt;N&gt; xenstore node. The guest would still
find the function at the original function number as long as
__xen_pcibk_get_pci_dev() wouldn't be in sync. The same goes for AER wrt
__xen_pcibk_get_pcifront_dev().

Undo overriding the function to zero and instead make sure that VFs at
function zero remain alone in their slot. This has the added benefit of
improving overall capacity, considering that there's only a total of 32
slots available right now (PCI segment and bus can both only ever be
zero at present).

This is upstream commit 4ba50e7c423c29639878c00573288869aa627068.

Fixes: 8a5248fe10b1 ("xen PV passthru: assign SR-IOV virtual functions to 
separate virtual slots")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8def783b-404c-3452-196d-3f3fd4d72c9e@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: Remove unimplemented syscall log message</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Weiser</name>
<email>michael.weiser@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-01T22:13:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a6ae5b7a6820ffc7b958a8693c4cea0d31937b5b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a6ae5b7a6820ffc7b958a8693c4cea0d31937b5b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1962682d2b2fbe6cfa995a85c53c069fadda473e upstream.

Stop printing a (ratelimited) kernel message for each instance of an
unimplemented syscall being called. Userland making an unimplemented
syscall is not necessarily misbehaviour and to be expected with a
current userland running on an older kernel. Also, the current message
looks scary to users but does not actually indicate a real problem nor
help them narrow down the cause. Just rely on sys_ni_syscall() to return
-ENOSYS.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Weiser &lt;michael.weiser@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: SVM: Truncate GPR value for DR and CR accesses in !64-bit mode</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-22T02:21:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=aa4d57deef70dd7b1da52ff1b11ecb7c12c7da73'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aa4d57deef70dd7b1da52ff1b11ecb7c12c7da73</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0884335a2e653b8a045083aa1d57ce74269ac81d upstream.

Drop bits 63:32 on loads/stores to/from DRs and CRs when the vCPU is not
in 64-bit mode.  The APM states bits 63:32 are dropped for both DRs and
CRs:

  In 64-bit mode, the operand size is fixed at 64 bits without the need
  for a REX prefix. In non-64-bit mode, the operand size is fixed at 32
  bits and the upper 32 bits of the destination are forced to 0.

Fixes: 7ff76d58a9dc ("KVM: SVM: enhance MOV CR intercept handler")
Fixes: cae3797a4639 ("KVM: SVM: enhance mov DR intercept handler")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20210422022128.3464144-4-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
[sudip: manual backport to old file]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fixup error handling in fixup_inode_link_counts</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-19T17:13:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9d20683fb38d7e990a03d7c4423f1bae72139520</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 011b28acf940eb61c000059dd9e2cfcbf52ed96b upstream.

This function has the following pattern

	while (1) {
		ret = whatever();
		if (ret)
			goto out;
	}
	ret = 0
out:
	return ret;

However several places in this while loop we simply break; when there's
a problem, thus clearing the return value, and in one case we do a
return -EIO, and leak the memory for the path.

Fix this by re-arranging the loop to deal with ret == 1 coming from
btrfs_search_slot, and then simply delete the

	ret = 0;
out:

bit so everybody can break if there is an error, which will allow for
proper error handling to occur.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfc: fix NULL ptr dereference in llcp_sock_getname() after failed connect</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Krzysztof Kozlowski</name>
<email>krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-31T07:21:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=eb6875d48590d8e564092e831ff07fa384d7e477'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eb6875d48590d8e564092e831ff07fa384d7e477</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4ac06a1e013cf5fdd963317ffd3b968560f33bba upstream.

It's possible to trigger NULL pointer dereference by local unprivileged
user, when calling getsockname() after failed bind() (e.g. the bind
fails because LLCP_SAP_MAX used as SAP):

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
  CPU: 1 PID: 426 Comm: llcp_sock_getna Not tainted 5.13.0-rc2-next-20210521+ #9
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   llcp_sock_getname+0xb1/0xe0
   __sys_getpeername+0x95/0xc0
   ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xd5/0x180
   ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x40
   __x64_sys_getpeername+0x11/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x36/0x70
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

This can be reproduced with Syzkaller C repro (bind followed by
getpeername):
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=14def446e00000

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Reported-by: syzbot+80fb126e7f7d8b1a5914@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck &lt;butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210531072138.5219-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Junxiao Bi</name>
<email>junxiao.bi@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-05T03:01:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=624fa7baa3788dc9e57840ba5b94bc22b03cda57'/>
<id>urn:sha1:624fa7baa3788dc9e57840ba5b94bc22b03cda57</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6bba4471f0cc1296fe3c2089b9e52442d3074b2e upstream.

When fallocate punches holes out of inode size, if original isize is in
the middle of last cluster, then the part from isize to the end of the
cluster will be zeroed with buffer write, at that time isize is not yet
updated to match the new size, if writeback is kicked in, it will invoke
ocfs2_writepage()-&gt;block_write_full_page() where the pages out of inode
size will be dropped.  That will cause file corruption.  Fix this by
zero out eof blocks when extending the inode size.

Running the following command with qemu-image 4.2.1 can get a corrupted
coverted image file easily.

    qemu-img convert -p -t none -T none -f qcow2 $qcow_image \
             -O qcow2 -o compat=1.1 $qcow_image.conv

The usage of fallocate in qemu is like this, it first punches holes out
of inode size, then extend the inode size.

    fallocate(11, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE|FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 2276196352, 65536) = 0
    fallocate(11, 0, 2276196352, 65536) = 0

v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg193999.html
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210525093034.GB4112@quack2.suse.cz/T/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210528210648.9124-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Changwei Ge &lt;gechangwei@live.cn&gt;
Cc: Gang He &lt;ghe@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Jun Piao &lt;piaojun@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pid: take a reference when initializing `cad_pid`</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-05T03:01:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=764c2e892d1fe895392aff62fb353fdce43bb529'/>
<id>urn:sha1:764c2e892d1fe895392aff62fb353fdce43bb529</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0711f0d7050b9e07c44bc159bbc64ac0a1022c7f upstream.

During boot, kernel_init_freeable() initializes `cad_pid` to the init
task's struct pid.  Later on, we may change `cad_pid` via a sysctl, and
when this happens proc_do_cad_pid() will increment the refcount on the
new pid via get_pid(), and will decrement the refcount on the old pid
via put_pid().  As we never called get_pid() when we initialized
`cad_pid`, we decrement a reference we never incremented, can therefore
free the init task's struct pid early.  As there can be dangling
references to the struct pid, we can later encounter a use-after-free
(e.g.  when delivering signals).

This was spotted when fuzzing v5.13-rc3 with Syzkaller, but seems to
have been around since the conversion of `cad_pid` to struct pid in
commit 9ec52099e4b8 ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid") from the
pre-KASAN stone age of v2.6.19.

Fix this by getting a reference to the init task's struct pid when we
assign it to `cad_pid`.

Full KASAN splat below.

   ==================================================================
   BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
   BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
   Read of size 4 at addr ffff23794dda0004 by task syz-executor.0/273

   CPU: 1 PID: 273 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.12.0-00001-g9aef892b2d15 #1
   Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
   Call trace:
    ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
    task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
    do_notify_parent+0x308/0xe60 kernel/signal.c:1950
    exit_notify kernel/exit.c:682 [inline]
    do_exit+0x2334/0x2bd0 kernel/exit.c:845
    do_group_exit+0x108/0x2c8 kernel/exit.c:922
    get_signal+0x4e4/0x2a88 kernel/signal.c:2781
    do_signal arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:882 [inline]
    do_notify_resume+0x300/0x970 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:936
    work_pending+0xc/0x2dc

   Allocated by task 0:
    slab_post_alloc_hook+0x50/0x5c0 mm/slab.h:516
    slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2907 [inline]
    slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2915 [inline]
    kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f4/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:2920
    alloc_pid+0xdc/0xc00 kernel/pid.c:180
    copy_process+0x2794/0x5e18 kernel/fork.c:2129
    kernel_clone+0x194/0x13c8 kernel/fork.c:2500
    kernel_thread+0xd4/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2552
    rest_init+0x44/0x4a0 init/main.c:687
    arch_call_rest_init+0x1c/0x28
    start_kernel+0x520/0x554 init/main.c:1064
    0x0

   Freed by task 270:
    slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1562 [inline]
    slab_free_freelist_hook+0x98/0x260 mm/slub.c:1600
    slab_free mm/slub.c:3161 [inline]
    kmem_cache_free+0x224/0x8e0 mm/slub.c:3177
    put_pid.part.4+0xe0/0x1a8 kernel/pid.c:114
    put_pid+0x30/0x48 kernel/pid.c:109
    proc_do_cad_pid+0x190/0x1b0 kernel/sysctl.c:1401
    proc_sys_call_handler+0x338/0x4b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:591
    proc_sys_write+0x34/0x48 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:617
    call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1977 [inline]
    new_sync_write+0x3ac/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518
    vfs_write fs/read_write.c:605 [inline]
    vfs_write+0x9c4/0x1018 fs/read_write.c:585
    ksys_write+0x124/0x240 fs/read_write.c:658
    __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:670 [inline]
    __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:667 [inline]
    __arm64_sys_write+0x78/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:667
    __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
    invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 [inline]
    el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x16c/0x388 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
    do_el0_svc+0xf8/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:168
    el0_svc+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:416
    el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:432
    el0_sync+0x154/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:701

   The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff23794dda0000
    which belongs to the cache pid of size 224
   The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of
    224-byte region [ffff23794dda0000, ffff23794dda00e0)
   The buggy address belongs to the page:
   page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x4dda0
   head:(____ptrval____) order:1 compound_mapcount:0
   flags: 0x3fffc0000010200(slab|head)
   raw: 03fffc0000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff23794d40d080
   raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
   page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

   Memory state around the buggy address:
    ffff23794dd9ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
    ffff23794dd9ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   &gt;ffff23794dda0000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                      ^
    ffff23794dda0080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
    ffff23794dda0100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   ==================================================================

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210524172230.38715-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Fixes: 9ec52099e4b8678a ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Cedric Le Goater &lt;clg@fr.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian@brauner.io&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix bug on in ext4_es_cache_extent as ext4_split_extent_at failed</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ye Bin</name>
<email>yebin10@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-06T14:10:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e33bafad30d34cfa5e9787cb099cab05e2677fcb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e33bafad30d34cfa5e9787cb099cab05e2677fcb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 082cd4ec240b8734a82a89ffb890216ac98fec68 upstream.

We got follow bug_on when run fsstress with injecting IO fault:
[130747.323114] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:762!
[130747.323117] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
......
[130747.334329] Call trace:
[130747.334553]  ext4_es_cache_extent+0x150/0x168 [ext4]
[130747.334975]  ext4_cache_extents+0x64/0xe8 [ext4]
[130747.335368]  ext4_find_extent+0x300/0x330 [ext4]
[130747.335759]  ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x74/0x1178 [ext4]
[130747.336179]  ext4_map_blocks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [ext4]
[130747.336567]  ext4_mpage_readpages+0x4a8/0x7a8 [ext4]
[130747.336995]  ext4_readpage+0x54/0x100 [ext4]
[130747.337359]  generic_file_buffered_read+0x410/0xae8
[130747.337767]  generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x190
[130747.338152]  ext4_file_read_iter+0x5c/0x140 [ext4]
[130747.338556]  __vfs_read+0x11c/0x188
[130747.338851]  vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[130747.339110]  ksys_read+0x74/0xf0

This patch's modification is according to Jan Kara's suggestion in:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-ext4/patch/20210428085158.3728201-1-yebin10@huawei.com/
"I see. Now I understand your patch. Honestly, seeing how fragile is trying
to fix extent tree after split has failed in the middle, I would probably
go even further and make sure we fix the tree properly in case of ENOSPC
and EDQUOT (those are easily user triggerable).  Anything else indicates a
HW problem or fs corruption so I'd rather leave the extent tree as is and
don't try to fix it (which also means we will not create overlapping
extents)."

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin &lt;yebin10@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506141042.3298679-1-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: timer: Fix master timer notification</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-02T11:38:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=400d3eff06ea7e2f37c7e1d08420613541e7bacb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:400d3eff06ea7e2f37c7e1d08420613541e7bacb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9c1fe96bded935369f8340c2ac2e9e189f697d5d upstream.

snd_timer_notify1() calls the notification to each slave for a master
event, but it passes a wrong event number.  It should be +10 offset,
corresponding to SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MXXX, but it's incorrectly with
+100 offset.  Casually this was spotted by UBSAN check via syzkaller.

Reported-by: syzbot+d102fa5b35335a7e544e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela &lt;perex@perex.cz&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000e5560e05c3bd1d63@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210602113823.23777-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
