<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git, branch v4.9.78</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.78</id>
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<updated>2018-01-23T18:57:10Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 4.9.78</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:57:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-23T18:57:10Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:79584a4221253611a4d033087f373b046350df9f</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>MIPS: AR7: ensure the port type's FCR value is used</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:57:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonas Gorski</name>
<email>jonas.gorski@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-29T15:27:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:60249fe9050bad1bd814dfb1c4ed5fc9155ef5cb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0a5191efe06b5103909206e4fbcff81d30283f8e upstream.

Since commit aef9a7bd9b67 ("serial/uart/8250: Add tunable RX interrupt
trigger I/F of FIFO buffers"), the port's default FCR value isn't used
in serial8250_do_set_termios anymore, but copied over once in
serial8250_config_port and then modified as needed.

Unfortunately, serial8250_config_port will never be called if the port
is shared between kernel and userspace, and the port's flag doesn't have
UPF_BOOT_AUTOCONF, which would trigger a serial8250_config_port as well.

This causes garbled output from userspace:

[    5.220000] random: procd urandom read with 49 bits of entropy available
ers
   [kee

Fix this by forcing it to be configured on boot, resulting in the
expected output:

[    5.250000] random: procd urandom read with 50 bits of entropy available
Press the [f] key and hit [enter] to enter failsafe mode
Press the [1], [2], [3] or [4] key and hit [enter] to select the debug level

Fixes: aef9a7bd9b67 ("serial/uart/8250: Add tunable RX interrupt trigger I/F of FIFO buffers")
Signed-off-by: Jonas Gorski &lt;jonas.gorski@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Yoshihiro YUNOMAE &lt;yoshihiro.yunomae.ez@hitachi.com&gt;
Cc: Florian Fainelli &lt;f.fainelli@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Nicolas Schichan &lt;nschichan@freebox.fr&gt;
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17544/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Cc: James Hogan &lt;jhogan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:57:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andi Kleen</name>
<email>ak@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-17T22:53:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:06d7342d8498b7426ab50368436417cdf6ed1923</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3f7d875566d8e79c5e0b2c9a413e91b2c29e0854 upstream.

The generated assembler for the C fill RSB inline asm operations has
several issues:

- The C code sets up the loop register, which is then immediately
  overwritten in __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER with the same value again.

- The C code also passes in the iteration count in another register, which
  is not used at all.

Remove these two unnecessary operations. Just rely on the single constant
passed to the macro for the iterations.

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180117225328.15414-1-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/pti: Document fix wrong index</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:57:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>zhenwei.pi</name>
<email>zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-18T01:04:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b9f8b5935394362e68147cb2792c5f74ff3fc4ca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 98f0fceec7f84d80bc053e49e596088573086421 upstream.

In section &lt;2. Runtime Cost&gt;, fix wrong index.

Signed-off-by: zhenwei.pi &lt;zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516237492-27739-1-git-send-email-zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:57:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-18T16:15:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4b71be496642d3c7908a0e40a3073ce5bcf87330</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c86a32c09f8ced67971a2310e3b0dda4d1749007 upstream.

Since indirect jump instructions will be replaced by jump
to __x86_indirect_thunk_*, those jmp instruction must be
treated as an indirect jump. Since optprobe prohibits to
optimize probes in the function which uses an indirect jump,
it also needs to find out the function which jump to
__x86_indirect_thunk_* and disable optimization.

Add a check that the jump target address is between the
__indirect_thunk_start/end when optimizing kprobe.

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli &lt;ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151629212062.10241.6991266100233002273.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:57:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-18T16:14:51Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:36ad6ba501d626f5bac505e6f70ffc54292b76d9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c1804a236894ecc942da7dc6c5abe209e56cba93 upstream.

Mark __x86_indirect_thunk_* functions as blacklist for kprobes
because those functions can be called from anywhere in the kernel
including blacklist functions of kprobes.

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli &lt;ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151629209111.10241.5444852823378068683.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:57:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-18T16:14:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=09402d83395f6b377841bcf9460aeee37501486d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:09402d83395f6b377841bcf9460aeee37501486d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 736e80a4213e9bbce40a7c050337047128b472ac upstream.

Introduce start/end markers of __x86_indirect_thunk_* functions.
To make it easy, consolidate .text.__x86.indirect_thunk.* sections
to one .text.__x86.indirect_thunk section and put it in the
end of kernel text section and adds __indirect_thunk_start/end
so that other subsystem (e.g. kprobes) can identify it.

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli &lt;ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151629206178.10241.6828804696410044771.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:57:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-18T15:28:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c5aa687060a85d849574ad014639f93b1dc98ea0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c5aa687060a85d849574ad014639f93b1dc98ea0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6f41c34d69eb005e7848716bbcafc979b35037d5 upstream.

The machine check idtentry uses an indirect branch directly from the low
level code. This evades the speculation protection.

Replace it by a direct call into C code and issue the indirect call there
so the compiler can apply the proper speculation protection.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by:Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Niced-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801181626290.1847@nanos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>usbip: fix warning in vhci_hcd_probe/lockdep_init_map</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:57:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Shuah Khan</name>
<email>shuahkh@osg.samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-05T19:56:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:87ac29717de8abaa3199eda5ef3c04e2924a6fdc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 918b8ac55b6c809b70aa05c279087109584e393e upstream.

vhci_hcd calls sysfs_create_group() with dynamically allocated sysfs
attributes triggering the lock-class key not persistent warning. Call
sysfs_attr_init() for dynamically allocated sysfs attributes to fix it.

vhci_hcd vhci_hcd: USB/IP Virtual Host Controller
vhci_hcd vhci_hcd: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 2
BUG: key ffff88006a7e8d18 not in .data!
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3131
lockdep_init_map+0x60c/0x770
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1)[    1.567044] Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.9.0-rc7+ #58
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 ffff88006bce6eb8 ffffffff81f96c8a ffffffff00000a02 1ffff1000d79cd6a
 ffffed000d79cd62 000000046bce6ed8 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff8598af40
 ffffffff81f969f8 0000000000000000 0000000041b58ab3 0000000000000200
Call Trace:
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [&lt;ffffffff81f96c8a&gt;] dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51
 [&lt;ffffffff812b808f&gt;] __warn+0x19f/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:550
 [&lt;ffffffff812b8195&gt;] warn_slowpath_fmt+0xc5/0x110 kernel/panic.c:565
 [&lt;ffffffff813f3efc&gt;] lockdep_init_map+0x60c/0x770 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3131
 [&lt;ffffffff819e43d4&gt;] __kernfs_create_file+0x114/0x2a0 fs/kernfs/file.c:954
 [&lt;ffffffff819e68f5&gt;] sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0x225/0x520 fs/sysfs/file.c:305
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] create_files fs/sysfs/group.c:64
 [&lt;ffffffff819e8a89&gt;] internal_create_group+0x239/0x8f0 fs/sysfs/group.c:134
 [&lt;ffffffff819e915f&gt;] sysfs_create_group+0x1f/0x30 fs/sysfs/group.c:156
 [&lt;ffffffff8323de24&gt;] vhci_start+0x5b4/0x7a0 drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c:978
 [&lt;ffffffff82c907ca&gt;] usb_add_hcd+0x8da/0x1c60 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:2867
 [&lt;ffffffff8323bc57&gt;] vhci_hcd_probe+0x97/0x130
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_hcd.c:1103
 ---
 ---
---[ end trace c33c7b202cf3aac8 ]---

Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan &lt;shuahkh@osg.samsung.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:57:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-27T05:43:54Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0d92cf7f29e6ea8565546c5685b34e633300d8e8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 694d99d40972f12e59a3696effee8a376b79d7c8 upstream.

AMD processors are not subject to the types of attacks that the kernel
page table isolation feature protects against.  The AMD microarchitecture
does not allow memory references, including speculative references, that
access higher privileged data when running in a lesser privileged mode
when that access would result in a page fault.

Disable page table isolation by default on AMD processors by not setting
the X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE feature, which controls whether X86_FEATURE_PTI
is set.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171227054354.20369.94587.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Cc: Nick Lowe &lt;nick.lowe@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
