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<title>user/sven/linux.git, branch v5.10.129</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.10.129</id>
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<updated>2022-07-07T15:52:23Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 5.10.129</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T15:52:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-07T15:52:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7208d1236f72085a3290c41463ee3ee246d8afa5</id>
<content type='text'>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220705115615.323395630@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Jon Hunter &lt;jonathanh@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;f.fainelli@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Tested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkrobot@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>clocksource/drivers/ixp4xx: remove EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL from ixp4xx_timer_setup()</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T15:52:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-30T09:55:42Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0e21ef18019c5f3c83935f27e13995f37e1982f4</id>
<content type='text'>
ixp4xx_timer_setup is exported, and so can not be an __init function.
But it does not need to be exported as it is only called from one
in-kernel function, so just remove the EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() marking to
resolve the build warning.

This is fixed "properly" in commit 41929c9f628b
("clocksource/drivers/ixp4xx: Drop boardfile probe path") but that can
not be backported to older kernels as the reworking of the IXP4xx
codebase is not suitable for stable releases.

Cc: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Daniel Lezcano &lt;daniel.lezcano@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit 0x1070 composition</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T15:52:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniele Palmas</name>
<email>dnlplm@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-10T09:57:22Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7055e34462445f88c7de5a72be68ba655fa5d700</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 94f2a444f28a649926c410eb9a38afb13a83ebe0 upstream.

Add the following Telit FN990 composition:

0x1070: tty, adb, rmnet, tty, tty, tty, tty

Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas &lt;dnlplm@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Bjørn Mork &lt;bjorn@mork.no&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210095722.22269-1-dnlplm@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Fabio Porcedda &lt;fabio.porcedda@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit 0x1060 composition</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T15:52:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Carlo Lobrano</name>
<email>c.lobrano@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-03T12:09:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f1a53bb27f17b26ba4080cd567c784457a64dd19</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8d17a33b076d24aa4861f336a125c888fb918605 upstream.

This patch adds support for Telit LN920 0x1060 composition

0x1060: tty, adb, rmnet, tty, tty, tty, tty

Signed-off-by: Carlo Lobrano &lt;c.lobrano@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Fabio Porcedda &lt;fabio.porcedda@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/arm: Fix race in RB-tree based P2M accounting</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T15:52:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksandr Tyshchenko</name>
<email>oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-01T07:57:42Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:43c8d33ce353091f15312cb6de3531517d7bba90</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b75cd218274e01d026dc5240e86fdeb44bbed0c8 upstream.

During the PV driver life cycle the mappings are added to
the RB-tree by set_foreign_p2m_mapping(), which is called from
gnttab_map_refs() and are removed by clear_foreign_p2m_mapping()
which is called from gnttab_unmap_refs(). As both functions end
up calling __set_phys_to_machine_multi() which updates the RB-tree,
this function can be called concurrently.

There is already a "p2m_lock" to protect against concurrent accesses,
but the problem is that the first read of "phys_to_mach.rb_node"
in __set_phys_to_machine_multi() is not covered by it, so this might
lead to the incorrect mappings update (removing in our case) in RB-tree.

In my environment the related issue happens rarely and only when
PV net backend is running, the xen_add_phys_to_mach_entry() claims
that it cannot add new pfn &lt;-&gt; mfn mapping to the tree since it is
already exists which results in a failure when mapping foreign pages.

But there might be other bad consequences related to the non-protected
root reads such use-after-free, etc.

While at it, also fix the similar usage in __pfn_to_mfn(), so
initialize "struct rb_node *n" with the "p2m_lock" held in both
functions to avoid possible bad consequences.

This is CVE-2022-33744 / XSA-406.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko &lt;oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen-netfront: restore __skb_queue_tail() positioning in xennet_get_responses()</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T15:52:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Beulich</name>
<email>jbeulich@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-01T07:57:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:547b7c640df545a344358ede93e491a89194cdfa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f63c2c2032c2e3caad9add3b82cc6e91c376fd26 upstream.

The commit referenced below moved the invocation past the "next" label,
without any explanation. In fact this allows misbehaving backends undue
control over the domain the frontend runs in, as earlier detected errors
require the skb to not be freed (it may be retained for later processing
via xennet_move_rx_slot(), or it may simply be unsafe to have it freed).

This is CVE-2022-33743 / XSA-405.

Fixes: 6c5aa6fc4def ("xen networking: add basic XDP support for xen-netfront")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/blkfront: force data bouncing when backend is untrusted</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T15:52:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roger Pau Monne</name>
<email>roger.pau@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-07T11:04:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=cbbd2d2531539212ff090aecbea9877c996e6ce6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cbbd2d2531539212ff090aecbea9877c996e6ce6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2400617da7eebf9167d71a46122828bc479d64c9 upstream.

Split the current bounce buffering logic used with persistent grants
into it's own option, and allow enabling it independently of
persistent grants.  This allows to reuse the same code paths to
perform the bounce buffering required to avoid leaking contiguous data
in shared pages not part of the request fragments.

Reporting whether the backend is to be trusted can be done using a
module parameter, or from the xenstore frontend path as set by the
toolstack when adding the device.

This is CVE-2022-33742, part of XSA-403.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné &lt;roger.pau@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/netfront: force data bouncing when backend is untrusted</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T15:52:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roger Pau Monne</name>
<email>roger.pau@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-07T10:20:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4923217af5742a796821272ee03f8d6de15c0cca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4923217af5742a796821272ee03f8d6de15c0cca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4491001c2e0fa69efbb748c96ec96b100a5cdb7e upstream.

Bounce all data on the skbs to be transmitted into zeroed pages if the
backend is untrusted. This avoids leaking data present in the pages
shared with the backend but not part of the skb fragments.  This
requires introducing a new helper in order to allocate skbs with a
size multiple of XEN_PAGE_SIZE so we don't leak contiguous data on the
granted pages.

Reporting whether the backend is to be trusted can be done using a
module parameter, or from the xenstore frontend path as set by the
toolstack when adding the device.

This is CVE-2022-33741, part of XSA-403.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné &lt;roger.pau@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/netfront: fix leaking data in shared pages</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T15:52:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roger Pau Monne</name>
<email>roger.pau@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-06T15:38:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=728d68bfe68d92eae1407b8a9edc7817d6227404'/>
<id>urn:sha1:728d68bfe68d92eae1407b8a9edc7817d6227404</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 307c8de2b02344805ebead3440d8feed28f2f010 upstream.

When allocating pages to be used for shared communication with the
backend always zero them, this avoids leaking unintended data present
on the pages.

This is CVE-2022-33740, part of XSA-403.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné &lt;roger.pau@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/blkfront: fix leaking data in shared pages</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T15:52:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roger Pau Monne</name>
<email>roger.pau@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-30T07:03:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=cfea428030be836d79a7690968232bb7fa4410f1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cfea428030be836d79a7690968232bb7fa4410f1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2f446ffe9d737e9a844b97887919c4fda18246e7 upstream.

When allocating pages to be used for shared communication with the
backend always zero them, this avoids leaking unintended data present
on the pages.

This is CVE-2022-26365, part of XSA-403.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné &lt;roger.pau@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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