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<title>user/sven/linux.git, branch v5.4.135</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.4.135</id>
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<updated>2021-07-25T12:35:16Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 5.4.135</title>
<updated>2021-07-25T12:35:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-25T12:35:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0a0beb1f9120cf49a429e12f4ea69ddd74471d68</id>
<content type='text'>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722155617.865866034@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkrobot@huawei.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jon Hunter &lt;jonathanh@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing &lt;lkft@linaro.org&gt;
Tested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;f.fainelli@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: annotate data races around unix_sk(sk)-&gt;gso_size</title>
<updated>2021-07-25T12:35:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-30T16:42:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d2f7b384a74fdded8271f5ab27ea76ac8ee80cf7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 18a419bad63b7f68a1979e28459782518e7b6bbe upstream.

Accesses to unix_sk(sk)-&gt;gso_size are lockless.
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() around them.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in udp_lib_setsockopt / udpv6_sendmsg

write to 0xffff88812d78f47c of 2 bytes by task 10849 on cpu 1:
 udp_lib_setsockopt+0x3b3/0x710 net/ipv4/udp.c:2696
 udpv6_setsockopt+0x63/0x90 net/ipv6/udp.c:1630
 sock_common_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3265
 __sys_setsockopt+0x18f/0x200 net/socket.c:2104
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2115 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2112 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2112
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88812d78f47c of 2 bytes by task 10852 on cpu 0:
 udpv6_sendmsg+0x161/0x16b0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1299
 inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:642
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2337
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2391 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2477
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2506 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2503 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2503
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000 -&gt; 0x0005

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 10852 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: bec1f6f69736 ("udp: generate gso with UDP_SEGMENT")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf test bpf: Free obj_buf</title>
<updated>2021-07-25T12:35:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Riccardo Mancini</name>
<email>rickyman7@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-15T16:07:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c72374978b3fb46e620793a8fcba901a9cef7b7e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 937654ce497fb6e977a8c52baee5f7d9616302d9 upstream.

ASan reports some memory leaks when running:

  # perf test "42: BPF filter"

The first of these leaks is caused by obj_buf never being deallocated in
__test__bpf.

This patch adds the missing free.

Signed-off-by: Riccardo Mancini &lt;rickyman7@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: ba1fae431e74bb42 ("perf test: Add 'perf test BPF'")
Cc: Ian Rogers &lt;irogers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Wang Nan &lt;wangnan0@huawei.com&gt;
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/60f3ca935fe6672e7e866276ce6264c9e26e4c87.1626343282.git.rickyman7@gmail.com
[ Added missing stdlib.h include ]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpftool: Properly close va_list 'ap' by va_end() on error</title>
<updated>2021-07-25T12:35:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gu Shengxian</name>
<email>gushengxian@yulong.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-06T01:35:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:17bc942c0b962a5c7eea2ec72c23d1f73b64a92f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bc832065b60f973771ff3e657214bb21b559833c upstream.

va_list 'ap' was opened but not closed by va_end() in error case. It should
be closed by va_end() before the return.

Fixes: aa52bcbe0e72 ("tools: bpftool: Fix json dump crash on powerpc")
Signed-off-by: Gu Shengxian &lt;gushengxian@yulong.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210706013543.671114-1-gushengxian507419@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: tcp: drop silly ICMPv6 packet too big messages</title>
<updated>2021-07-25T12:35:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-08T07:21:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:84ed8340941a29826009d7baae233a9b7133158d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c7bb4b89033b764eb07db4e060548a6311d801ee upstream.

While TCP stack scales reasonably well, there is still one part that
can be used to DDOS it.

IPv6 Packet too big messages have to lookup/insert a new route,
and if abused by attackers, can easily put hosts under high stress,
with many cpus contending on a spinlock while one is stuck in fib6_run_gc()

ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu()
 icmpv6_rcv()
  icmpv6_notify()
   tcp_v6_err()
    tcp_v6_mtu_reduced()
     inet6_csk_update_pmtu()
      ip6_rt_update_pmtu()
       __ip6_rt_update_pmtu()
        ip6_rt_cache_alloc()
         ip6_dst_alloc()
          dst_alloc()
           ip6_dst_gc()
            fib6_run_gc()
             spin_lock_bh() ...

Some of our servers have been hit by malicious ICMPv6 packets
trying to _increase_ the MTU/MSS of TCP flows.

We believe these ICMPv6 packets are a result of a bug in one ISP stack,
since they were blindly sent back for _every_ (small) packet sent to them.

These packets are for one TCP flow:
09:24:36.266491 IP6 Addr1 &gt; Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240
09:24:36.266509 IP6 Addr1 &gt; Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240
09:24:36.316688 IP6 Addr1 &gt; Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240
09:24:36.316704 IP6 Addr1 &gt; Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240
09:24:36.608151 IP6 Addr1 &gt; Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240

TCP stack can filter some silly requests :

1) MTU below IPV6_MIN_MTU can be filtered early in tcp_v6_err()
2) tcp_v6_mtu_reduced() can drop requests trying to increase current MSS.

This tests happen before the IPv6 routing stack is entered, thus
removing the potential contention and route exhaustion.

Note that IPv6 stack was performing these checks, but too late
(ie : after the route has been added, and after the potential
garbage collect war)

v2: fix typo caught by Martin, thanks !
v3: exports tcp_mtu_to_mss(), caught by David, thanks !

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski &lt;maze@google.com&gt;
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: annotate data races around tp-&gt;mtu_info</title>
<updated>2021-07-25T12:35:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-02T20:09:03Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:315033cab379a35ad19b1ea73ffbb38f90aea833</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 561022acb1ce62e50f7a8258687a21b84282a4cb upstream.

While tp-&gt;mtu_info is read while socket is owned, the write
sides happen from err handlers (tcp_v[46]_mtu_reduced)
which only own the socket spinlock.

Fixes: 563d34d05786 ("tcp: dont drop MTU reduction indications")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dma-buf/sync_file: Don't leak fences on merge failure</title>
<updated>2021-07-25T12:35:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Ekstrand</name>
<email>jason@jlekstrand.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-24T17:47:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:41f45e91c92c8480242ea448d54e28c753b13902</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ffe000217c5068c5da07ccb1c0f8cce7ad767435 upstream.

Each add_fence() call does a dma_fence_get() on the relevant fence.  In
the error path, we weren't calling dma_fence_put() so all those fences
got leaked.  Also, in the krealloc_array failure case, we weren't
freeing the fences array.  Instead, ensure that i and fences are always
zero-initialized and dma_fence_put() all the fences and kfree(fences) on
every error path.

Signed-off-by: Jason Ekstrand &lt;jason@jlekstrand.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian König &lt;christian.koenig@amd.com&gt;
Fixes: a02b9dc90d84 ("dma-buf/sync_file: refactor fence storage in struct sync_file")
Cc: Gustavo Padovan &lt;gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Christian König &lt;christian.koenig@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210624174732.1754546-1-jason@jlekstrand.net
Signed-off-by: Christian König &lt;christian.koenig@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fddi: fix UAF in fza_probe</title>
<updated>2021-07-25T12:35:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Skripkin</name>
<email>paskripkin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-13T10:58:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:04b06716838bfc26742dbed3ae1d3697fe5317ee</id>
<content type='text'>
commit deb7178eb940e2c5caca1b1db084a69b2e59b4c9 upstream.

fp is netdev private data and it cannot be
used after free_netdev() call. Using fp after free_netdev()
can cause UAF bug. Fix it by moving free_netdev() after error message.

Fixes: 61414f5ec983 ("FDDI: defza: Add support for DEC FDDIcontroller 700
TURBOchannel adapter")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin &lt;paskripkin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: validate lwtstate-&gt;data before returning from skb_tunnel_info()</title>
<updated>2021-07-25T12:35:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Taehee Yoo</name>
<email>ap420073@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-09T17:35:18Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8aa13a86964cdec4fd969ef677c6614ff068641a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 67a9c94317402b826fc3db32afc8f39336803d97 upstream.

skb_tunnel_info() returns pointer of lwtstate-&gt;data as ip_tunnel_info
type without validation. lwtstate-&gt;data can have various types such as
mpls_iptunnel_encap, etc and these are not compatible.
So skb_tunnel_info() should validate before returning that pointer.

Splat looks like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888106ec2698 by task ping/811

CPU: 1 PID: 811 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.13.0+ #1195
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x7b
 print_address_description.constprop.8.cold.13+0x13/0x2ee
 ? vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
 ? vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
 kasan_report.cold.14+0x83/0xdf
 ? vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
 vxlan_get_route+0x418/0x4b0 [vxlan]
 [ ... ]
 vxlan_xmit_one+0x148b/0x32b0 [vxlan]
 [ ... ]
 vxlan_xmit+0x25c5/0x4780 [vxlan]
 [ ... ]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1ae/0x6e0
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f39/0x31a0
 [ ... ]
 neigh_xmit+0x2f9/0x940
 mpls_xmit+0x911/0x1600 [mpls_iptunnel]
 lwtunnel_xmit+0x18f/0x450
 ip_finish_output2+0x867/0x2040
 [ ... ]

Fixes: 61adedf3e3f1 ("route: move lwtunnel state to dst_entry")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo &lt;ap420073@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: send SYNACK packet with accepted fwmark</title>
<updated>2021-07-25T12:35:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Ovechkin</name>
<email>ovov@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-09T15:28:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8cff7b28ab05acaf252daf115f641c3ed8291330</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 43b90bfad34bcb81b8a5bc7dc650800f4be1787e upstream.

commit e05a90ec9e16 ("net: reflect mark on tcp syn ack packets")
fixed IPv4 only.

This part is for the IPv6 side.

Fixes: e05a90ec9e16 ("net: reflect mark on tcp syn ack packets")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Ovechkin &lt;ovov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Dmitry Yakunin &lt;zeil@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
