user/sven/linux.git, branch v5.4.250

Linux 5.4.250

2023-07-24T17:10:53Z

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix

2023-07-24T17:10:53Z

Upstream commit: 522b1d69219d8f083173819fde04f994aa051a98 Add a fix for the Zen2 VZEROUPPER data corruption bug where under certain circumstances executing VZEROUPPER can cause register corruption or leak data. The optimal fix is through microcode but in the case the proper microcode revision has not been applied, enable a fallback fix using a chicken bit. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/cpu/amd: Move the errata checking functionality up

2023-07-24T17:10:53Z

Upstream commit: 8b6f687743dacce83dbb0c7cfacf88bab00f808a Avoid new and remove old forward declarations. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/microcode/AMD: Load late on both threads too

2023-07-24T17:10:53Z

commit a32b0f0db3f396f1c9be2fe621e77c09ec3d8e7d upstream. Do the same as early loading - load on both threads. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230605141332.25948-1-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Linux 5.4.249

2023-06-28T08:18:42Z

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230626180739.558575012@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Harshit Mogalapalli Tested-by: Chris Paterson (CIP) Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfs: verify buffer contents when we skip log replay

2023-06-28T08:18:42Z

commit 22ed903eee23a5b174e240f1cdfa9acf393a5210 upstream. syzbot detected a crash during log recovery: XFS (loop0): Mounting V5 Filesystem bfdc47fc-10d8-4eed-a562-11a831b3f791 XFS (loop0): Torn write (CRC failure) detected at log block 0x180. Truncating head block from 0x200. XFS (loop0): Starting recovery (logdev: internal) ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xfs_btree_lookup_get_block+0x15c/0x6d0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1813 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807e89f258 by task syz-executor132/5074 CPU: 0 PID: 5074 Comm: syz-executor132 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:306 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:417 kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:517 xfs_btree_lookup_get_block+0x15c/0x6d0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1813 xfs_btree_lookup+0x346/0x12c0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1913 xfs_btree_simple_query_range+0xde/0x6a0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:4713 xfs_btree_query_range+0x2db/0x380 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:4953 xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers+0x2d1/0xa60 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_refcount.c:1946 xfs_reflink_recover_cow+0xab/0x1b0 fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c:930 xlog_recover_finish+0x824/0x920 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3493 xfs_log_mount_finish+0x1ec/0x3d0 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:829 xfs_mountfs+0x146a/0x1ef0 fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:933 xfs_fs_fill_super+0xf95/0x11f0 fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1666 get_tree_bdev+0x400/0x620 fs/super.c:1282 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1489 do_new_mount+0x289/0xad0 fs/namespace.c:3145 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3488 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3697 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x2d3/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f89fa3f4aca Code: 83 c4 08 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fffd5fb5ef8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00646975756f6e2c RCX: 00007f89fa3f4aca RDX: 0000000020000100 RSI: 0000000020009640 RDI: 00007fffd5fb5f10 RBP: 00007fffd5fb5f10 R08: 00007fffd5fb5f50 R09: 000000000000970d R10: 0000000000200800 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 0000555556c6b2c0 R14: 0000000000200800 R15: 00007fffd5fb5f50 The fuzzed image contains an AGF with an obviously garbage agf_refcount_level value of 32, and a dirty log with a buffer log item for that AGF. The ondisk AGF has a higher LSN than the recovered log item. xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2 reads the buffer, compares the LSNs, and decides to skip replay because the ondisk buffer appears to be newer. Unfortunately, the ondisk buffer is corrupt, but recovery just read the buffer with no buffer ops specified: error = xfs_buf_read(mp->m_ddev_targp, buf_f->blf_blkno, buf_f->blf_len, buf_flags, &bp, NULL); Skipping the buffer leaves its contents in memory unverified. This sets us up for a kernel crash because xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers reads the buffer (which is still around in XBF_DONE state, so no read verification) and creates a refcountbt cursor of height 32. This is impossible so we run off the end of the cursor object and crash. Fix this by invoking the verifier on all skipped buffers and aborting log recovery if the ondisk buffer is corrupt. It might be smarter to force replay the log item atop the buffer and then see if it'll pass the write verifier (like ext4 does) but for now let's go with the conservative option where we stop immediately. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7e9494b8b399902e994e Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: make wait_on_page_writeback() wait for multiple pending writebacks

2023-06-28T08:18:42Z

commit c2407cf7d22d0c0d94cf20342b3b8f06f1d904e7 upstream. Ever since commit 2a9127fcf229 ("mm: rewrite wait_on_page_bit_common() logic") we've had some very occasional reports of BUG_ON(PageWriteback) in write_cache_pages(), which we thought we already fixed in commit 073861ed77b6 ("mm: fix VM_BUG_ON(PageTail) and BUG_ON(PageWriteback)"). But syzbot just reported another one, even with that commit in place. And it turns out that there's a simpler way to trigger the BUG_ON() than the one Hugh found with page re-use. It all boils down to the fact that the page writeback is ostensibly serialized by the page lock, but that isn't actually really true. Yes, the people _setting_ writeback all do so under the page lock, but the actual clearing of the bit - and waking up any waiters - happens without any page lock. This gives us this fairly simple race condition: CPU1 = end previous writeback CPU2 = start new writeback under page lock CPU3 = write_cache_pages() CPU1 CPU2 CPU3 ---- ---- ---- end_page_writeback() test_clear_page_writeback(page) ... delayed... lock_page(); set_page_writeback() unlock_page() lock_page() wait_on_page_writeback(); wake_up_page(page, PG_writeback); .. wakes up CPU3 .. BUG_ON(PageWriteback(page)); where the BUG_ON() happens because we woke up the PG_writeback bit becasue of the _previous_ writeback, but a new one had already been started because the clearing of the bit wasn't actually atomic wrt the actual wakeup or serialized by the page lock. The reason this didn't use to happen was that the old logic in waiting on a page bit would just loop if it ever saw the bit set again. The nice proper fix would probably be to get rid of the whole "wait for writeback to clear, and then set it" logic in the writeback path, and replace it with an atomic "wait-to-set" (ie the same as we have for page locking: we set the page lock bit with a single "lock_page()", not with "wait for lock bit to clear and then set it"). However, out current model for writeback is that the waiting for the writeback bit is done by the generic VFS code (ie write_cache_pages()), but the actual setting of the writeback bit is done much later by the filesystem ".writepages()" function. IOW, to make the writeback bit have that same kind of "wait-to-set" behavior as we have for page locking, we'd have to change our roughly ~50 different writeback functions. Painful. Instead, just make "wait_on_page_writeback()" loop on the very unlikely situation that the PG_writeback bit is still set, basically re-instating the old behavior. This is very non-optimal in case of contention, but since we only ever set the bit under the page lock, that situation is controlled. Reported-by: syzbot+2fc0712f8f8b8b8fa0ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 2a9127fcf229 ("mm: rewrite wait_on_page_bit_common() logic") Acked-by: Hugh Dickins Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: fix VM_BUG_ON(PageTail) and BUG_ON(PageWriteback)

2023-06-28T08:18:42Z

commit 073861ed77b6b957c3c8d54a11dc503f7d986ceb upstream. Twice now, when exercising ext4 looped on shmem huge pages, I have crashed on the PF_ONLY_HEAD check inside PageWaiters(): ext4_finish_bio() calling end_page_writeback() calling wake_up_page() on tail of a shmem huge page, no longer an ext4 page at all. The problem is that PageWriteback is not accompanied by a page reference (as the NOTE at the end of test_clear_page_writeback() acknowledges): as soon as TestClearPageWriteback has been done, that page could be removed from page cache, freed, and reused for something else by the time that wake_up_page() is reached. https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200827122019.GC14765@casper.infradead.org/ Matthew Wilcox suggested avoiding or weakening the PageWaiters() tail check; but I'm paranoid about even looking at an unreferenced struct page, lest its memory might itself have already been reused or hotremoved (and wake_up_page_bit() may modify that memory with its ClearPageWaiters()). Then on crashing a second time, realized there's a stronger reason against that approach. If my testing just occasionally crashes on that check, when the page is reused for part of a compound page, wouldn't it be much more common for the page to get reused as an order-0 page before reaching wake_up_page()? And on rare occasions, might that reused page already be marked PageWriteback by its new user, and already be waited upon? What would that look like? It would look like BUG_ON(PageWriteback) after wait_on_page_writeback() in write_cache_pages() (though I have never seen that crash myself). Matthew Wilcox explaining this to himself: "page is allocated, added to page cache, dirtied, writeback starts, --- thread A --- filesystem calls end_page_writeback() test_clear_page_writeback() --- context switch to thread B --- truncate_inode_pages_range() finds the page, it doesn't have writeback set, we delete it from the page cache. Page gets reallocated, dirtied, writeback starts again. Then we call write_cache_pages(), see PageWriteback() set, call wait_on_page_writeback() --- context switch back to thread A --- wake_up_page(page, PG_writeback); ... thread B is woken, but because the wakeup was for the old use of the page, PageWriteback is still set. Devious" And prior to 2a9127fcf229 ("mm: rewrite wait_on_page_bit_common() logic") this would have been much less likely: before that, wake_page_function()'s non-exclusive case would stop walking and not wake if it found Writeback already set again; whereas now the non-exclusive case proceeds to wake. I have not thought of a fix that does not add a little overhead: the simplest fix is for end_page_writeback() to get_page() before calling test_clear_page_writeback(), then put_page() after wake_up_page(). Was there a chance of missed wakeups before, since a page freed before reaching wake_up_page() would have PageWaiters cleared? I think not, because each waiter does hold a reference on the page. This bug comes when the old use of the page, the one we do TestClearPageWriteback on, had *no* waiters, so no additional page reference beyond the page cache (and whoever racily freed it). The reuse of the page has a waiter holding a reference, and its own PageWriteback set; but the belated wake_up_page() has woken the reuse to hit that BUG_ON(PageWriteback). Reported-by: syzbot+3622cea378100f45d59f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Qian Cai Fixes: 2a9127fcf229 ("mm: rewrite wait_on_page_bit_common() logic") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.8+ Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

i2c: imx-lpi2c: fix type char overflow issue when calculating the clock cycle

2023-06-28T08:18:42Z

[ Upstream commit e69b9bc170c6d93ee375a5cbfd15f74c0fb59bdd ] Claim clkhi and clklo as integer type to avoid possible calculation errors caused by data overflow. Fixes: a55fa9d0e42e ("i2c: imx-lpi2c: add low power i2c bus driver") Signed-off-by: Clark Wang Signed-off-by: Carlos Song Reviewed-by: Andi Shyti Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/apic: Fix kernel panic when booting with intremap=off and x2apic_phys

2023-06-28T08:18:42Z

[ Upstream commit 85d38d5810e285d5aec7fb5283107d1da70c12a9 ] When booting with "intremap=off" and "x2apic_phys" on the kernel command line, the physical x2APIC driver ends up being used even when x2APIC mode is disabled ("intremap=off" disables x2APIC mode). This happens because the first compound condition check in x2apic_phys_probe() is false due to x2apic_mode == 0 and so the following one returns true after default_acpi_madt_oem_check() having already selected the physical x2APIC driver. This results in the following panic: kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c:2409! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc2-ver4.1rc2 #2 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R6515/07PXPY, BIOS 2.3.6 07/06/2021 RIP: 0010:setup_IO_APIC+0x9c/0xaf0 Call Trace: ? native_read_msr apic_intr_mode_init x86_late_time_init start_kernel x86_64_start_reservations x86_64_start_kernel secondary_startup_64_no_verify which is: setup_IO_APIC: apic_printk(APIC_VERBOSE, "ENABLING IO-APIC IRQs\n"); for_each_ioapic(ioapic) BUG_ON(mp_irqdomain_create(ioapic)); Return 0 to denote that x2APIC has not been enabled when probing the physical x2APIC driver. [ bp: Massage commit message heavily. ] Fixes: 9ebd680bd029 ("x86, apic: Use probe routines to simplify apic selection") Signed-off-by: Dheeraj Kumar Srivastava Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Reviewed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230616212236.1389-1-dheerajkumar.srivastava@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin