user/sven/linux.git, branch v6.1.84

Linux 6.1.84

2024-04-03T13:19:55Z

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401152530.237785232@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: SeongJae Park Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Kelsey Steele Tested-by: Ron Economos Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Mark Brown Tested-by: Mateusz Jończyk Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso Tested-by: Yann Sionneau Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tools/resolve_btfids: fix build with musl libc

2024-04-03T13:19:55Z

commit 62248b22d01e96a4d669cde0d7005bd51ebf9e76 upstream. Include the header that defines u32. This fixes build of 6.6.23 and 6.1.83 kernels for Alpine Linux, which uses musl libc. I assume that GNU libc indirecly pulls in linux/types.h. Fixes: 9707ac4fe2f5 ("tools/resolve_btfids: Refactor set sorting with types from btf_ids.h") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218647 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Natanael Copa Tested-by: Greg Thelen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328110103.28734-1-ncopa@alpinelinux.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

USB: core: Fix deadlock in usb_deauthorize_interface()

2024-04-03T13:19:55Z

commit 80ba43e9f799cbdd83842fc27db667289b3150f5 upstream. Among the attribute file callback routines in drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c, the interface_authorized_store() function is the only one which acquires a device lock on an ancestor device: It calls usb_deauthorize_interface(), which locks the interface's parent USB device. The will lead to deadlock if another process already owns that lock and tries to remove the interface, whether through a configuration change or because the device has been disconnected. As part of the removal procedure, device_del() waits for all ongoing sysfs attribute callbacks to complete. But usb_deauthorize_interface() can't complete until the device lock has been released, and the lock won't be released until the removal has finished. The mechanism provided by sysfs to prevent this kind of deadlock is to use the sysfs_break_active_protection() function, which tells sysfs not to wait for the attribute callback. Reported-and-tested by: Yue Sun Reported by: xingwei lee Signed-off-by: Alan Stern Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/CAEkJfYO6jRVC8Tfrd_R=cjO0hguhrV31fDPrLrNOOHocDkPoAA@mail.gmail.com/#r Fixes: 310d2b4124c0 ("usb: interface authorization: SysFS part of USB interface authorization") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1c37eea1-9f56-4534-b9d8-b443438dc869@rowland.harvard.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/sev: Skip ROM range scans and validation for SEV-SNP guests

2024-04-03T13:19:55Z

commit 0f4a1e80989aca185d955fcd791d7750082044a2 upstream. SEV-SNP requires encrypted memory to be validated before access. Because the ROM memory range is not part of the e820 table, it is not pre-validated by the BIOS. Therefore, if a SEV-SNP guest kernel wishes to access this range, the guest must first validate the range. The current SEV-SNP code does indeed scan the ROM range during early boot and thus attempts to validate the ROM range in probe_roms(). However, this behavior is neither sufficient nor necessary for the following reasons: * With regards to sufficiency, if EFI_CONFIG_TABLES are not enabled and CONFIG_DMI_SCAN_MACHINE_NON_EFI_FALLBACK is set, the kernel will attempt to access the memory at SMBIOS_ENTRY_POINT_SCAN_START (which falls in the ROM range) prior to validation. For example, Project Oak Stage 0 provides a minimal guest firmware that currently meets these configuration conditions, meaning guests booting atop Oak Stage 0 firmware encounter a problematic call chain during dmi_setup() -> dmi_scan_machine() that results in a crash during boot if SEV-SNP is enabled. * With regards to necessity, SEV-SNP guests generally read garbage (which changes across boots) from the ROM range, meaning these scans are unnecessary. The guest reads garbage because the legacy ROM range is unencrypted data but is accessed via an encrypted PMD during early boot (where the PMD is marked as encrypted due to potentially mapping actually-encrypted data in other PMD-contained ranges). In one exceptional case, EISA probing treats the ROM range as unencrypted data, which is inconsistent with other probing. Continuing to allow SEV-SNP guests to use garbage and to inconsistently classify ROM range encryption status can trigger undesirable behavior. For instance, if garbage bytes appear to be a valid signature, memory may be unnecessarily reserved for the ROM range. Future code or other use cases may result in more problematic (arbitrary) behavior that should be avoided. While one solution would be to overhaul the early PMD mapping to always treat the ROM region of the PMD as unencrypted, SEV-SNP guests do not currently rely on data from the ROM region during early boot (and even if they did, they would be mostly relying on garbage data anyways). As a simpler solution, skip the ROM range scans (and the otherwise- necessary range validation) during SEV-SNP guest early boot. The potential SEV-SNP guest crash due to lack of ROM range validation is thus avoided by simply not accessing the ROM range. In most cases, skip the scans by overriding problematic x86_init functions during sme_early_init() to SNP-safe variants, which can be likened to x86_init overrides done for other platforms (ex: Xen); such overrides also avoid the spread of cc_platform_has() checks throughout the tree. In the exceptional EISA case, still use cc_platform_has() for the simplest change, given (1) checks for guest type (ex: Xen domain status) are already performed here, and (2) these checks occur in a subsys initcall instead of an x86_init function. [ bp: Massage commit message, remove "we"s. ] Fixes: 9704c07bf9f7 ("x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active") Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313121546.2964854-1-kevinloughlin@google.com Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: libsas: Fix disk not being scanned in after being removed

2024-04-03T13:19:54Z

commit 8e68a458bcf5b5cb9c3624598bae28f08251601f upstream. As of commit d8649fc1c5e4 ("scsi: libsas: Do discovery on empty PHY to update PHY info"), do discovery will send a new SMP_DISCOVER and update phy->phy_change_count. We found that if the disk is reconnected and phy change_count changes at this time, the disk scanning process will not be triggered. Therefore, call sas_set_ex_phy() to update the PHY info with the results of the last query. And because the previous phy info will be used when calling sas_unregister_devs_sas_addr(), sas_unregister_devs_sas_addr() should be called before sas_set_ex_phy(). Fixes: d8649fc1c5e4 ("scsi: libsas: Do discovery on empty PHY to update PHY info") Signed-off-by: Xingui Yang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307141413.48049-3-yangxingui@huawei.com Reviewed-by: John Garry Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: libsas: Add a helper sas_get_sas_addr_and_dev_type()

2024-04-03T13:19:54Z

commit a57345279fd311ba679b8083feb0eec5272c7729 upstream. Add a helper to get attached_sas_addr and device type from disc_resp. Suggested-by: John Garry Signed-off-by: Xingui Yang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307141413.48049-2-yangxingui@huawei.com Reviewed-by: John Garry Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: lpfc: Correct size for wqe for memset()

2024-04-03T13:19:54Z

commit 28d41991182c210ec1654f8af2e140ef4cc73f20 upstream. The wqe is of type lpfc_wqe128. It should be memset with the same type. Fixes: 6c621a2229b0 ("scsi: lpfc: Separate NVMET RQ buffer posting from IO resources SGL/iocbq/context") Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240304090649.833953-1-usama.anjum@collabora.com Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno Reviewed-by: Justin Tee Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: lpfc: Correct size for cmdwqe/rspwqe for memset()

2024-04-03T13:19:54Z

commit 16cc2ba71b9f6440805aef7f92ba0f031f79b765 upstream. The cmdwqe and rspwqe are of type lpfc_wqe128. They should be memset() with the same type. Fixes: 61910d6a5243 ("scsi: lpfc: SLI path split: Refactor CT paths") Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240304091119.847060-1-usama.anjum@collabora.com Reviewed-by: Justin Tee Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption

2024-04-03T13:19:54Z

commit 13114dc5543069f7b97991e3b79937b6da05f5b0 upstream. When the decrypt request goes to the backlog and crypto_aead_decrypt returns -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption will wait until all async decryptions have completed. If one of them fails, tls_do_decryption will return -EBADMSG and tls_decrypt_sg jumps to the error path, releasing all the pages. But the pages have been passed to the async callback, and have already been released by tls_decrypt_done. The only true async case is when crypto_aead_decrypt returns -EINPROGRESS. With -EBUSY, we already waited so we can tell tls_sw_recvmsg that the data is available for immediate copy, but we need to notify tls_decrypt_sg (via the new ->async_done flag) that the memory has already been released. Fixes: 859054147318 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4755dd8d9bebdefaa19ce1439b833d6199d4364c.1709132643.git.sd@queasysnail.net Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/cpu: Enable STIBP on AMD if Automatic IBRS is enabled

2024-04-03T13:19:54Z

commit fd470a8beed88440b160d690344fbae05a0b9b1b upstream. Unlike Intel's Enhanced IBRS feature, AMD's Automatic IBRS does not provide protection to processes running at CPL3/user mode, see section "Extended Feature Enable Register (EFER)" in the APM v2 at https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=304652 Explicitly enable STIBP to protect against cross-thread CPL3 branch target injections on systems with Automatic IBRS enabled. Also update the relevant documentation. Fixes: e7862eda309e ("x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS") Reported-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230720194727.67022-1-kim.phillips@amd.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman