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<title>user/sven/linux.git/Documentation/admin-guide, branch v6.12.46</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2025-07-10T14:05:14Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Add a Transient Scheduler Attacks mitigation</title>
<updated>2025-07-10T14:05:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-11T08:53:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7a0395f6607a5d01e2b2a86355596b3f1224acbd</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit d8010d4ba43e9f790925375a7de100604a5e2dba upstream.

Add the required features detection glue to bugs.c et all in order to
support the TSA mitigation.

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Rename MDS machinery to something more generic</title>
<updated>2025-07-10T14:05:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-11T03:13:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0720e436e594d330bc10851889d90f6b48a2b32d</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit f9af88a3d384c8b55beb5dc5483e5da0135fadbd upstream.

It will be used by other x86 mitigations.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Make spectre user default depend on MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2</title>
<updated>2025-05-29T09:02:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Breno Leitao</name>
<email>leitao@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-31T11:06:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e7e30a4a37d1e5fd0bae01a51ef738c17606f9f8</id>
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[ Upstream commit 98fdaeb296f51ef08e727a7cc72e5b5c864c4f4d ]

Change the default value of spectre v2 in user mode to respect the
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 config option.

Currently, user mode spectre v2 is set to auto
(SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO) by default, even if
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 is disabled.

Set the spectre_v2 value to auto (SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO) if the
Spectre v2 config (CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) is enabled, otherwise
set the value to none (SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE).

Important to say the command line argument "spectre_v2_user" overwrites
the default value in both cases.

When CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 is not set, users have the flexibility
to opt-in for specific mitigations independently. In this scenario,
setting spectre_v2= will not enable spectre_v2_user=, and command line
options spectre_v2_user and spectre_v2 are independent when
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2=n.

Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: David Kaplan &lt;David.Kaplan@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241031-x86_bugs_last_v2-v2-2-b7ff1dab840e@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/its: Add support for RSB stuffing mitigation</title>
<updated>2025-05-18T06:24:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-02T20:07:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9f132c0397df9cc073172560b6e4c975a4746c0e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit facd226f7e0c8ca936ac114aba43cb3e8b94e41e upstream.

When retpoline mitigation is enabled for spectre-v2, enabling
call-depth-tracking and RSB stuffing also mitigates ITS. Add cmdline option
indirect_target_selection=stuff to allow enabling RSB stuffing mitigation.

When retpoline mitigation is not enabled, =stuff option is ignored, and
default mitigation for ITS is deployed.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs</title>
<updated>2025-05-18T06:24:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-18T17:53:12Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4dc1902fdee72dd9474c9878c7153cf3769f8294</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2665281a07e19550944e8354a2024635a7b2714a upstream.

Ice Lake generation CPUs are not affected by guest/host isolation part of
ITS. If a user is only concerned about KVM guests, they can now choose a
new cmdline option "vmexit" that will not deploy the ITS mitigation when
CPU is not affected by guest/host isolation. This saves the performance
overhead of ITS mitigation on Ice Lake gen CPUs.

When "vmexit" option selected, if the CPU is affected by ITS guest/host
isolation, the default ITS mitigation is deployed.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/its: Enable Indirect Target Selection mitigation</title>
<updated>2025-05-18T06:24:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-22T03:23:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:68d59e9ba38424389168eddf8791265818f67292</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f4818881c47fd91fcb6d62373c57c7844e3de1c0 upstream.

Indirect Target Selection (ITS) is a bug in some pre-ADL Intel CPUs with
eIBRS. It affects prediction of indirect branch and RETs in the
lower half of cacheline. Due to ITS such branches may get wrongly predicted
to a target of (direct or indirect) branch that is located in the upper
half of the cacheline.

Scope of impact
===============

Guest/host isolation
--------------------
When eIBRS is used for guest/host isolation, the indirect branches in the
VMM may still be predicted with targets corresponding to branches in the
guest.

Intra-mode
----------
cBPF or other native gadgets can be used for intra-mode training and
disclosure using ITS.

User/kernel isolation
---------------------
When eIBRS is enabled user/kernel isolation is not impacted.

Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
-----------------------------------------
After an IBPB, indirect branches may be predicted with targets
corresponding to direct branches which were executed prior to IBPB. This is
mitigated by a microcode update.

Add cmdline parameter indirect_target_selection=off|on|force to control the
mitigation to relocate the affected branches to an ITS-safe thunk i.e.
located in the upper half of cacheline. Also add the sysfs reporting.

When retpoline mitigation is deployed, ITS safe-thunks are not needed,
because retpoline sequence is already ITS-safe. Similarly, when call depth
tracking (CDT) mitigation is deployed (retbleed=stuff), ITS safe return
thunk is not used, as CDT prevents RSB-underflow.

To not overcomplicate things, ITS mitigation is not supported with
spectre-v2 lfence;jmp mitigation. Moreover, it is less practical to deploy
lfence;jmp mitigation on ITS affected parts anyways.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: x86/bugs/its: Add ITS documentation</title>
<updated>2025-05-18T06:24:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-11T22:36:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:76f847655bcbbeca672a4d5413a087fcf1d73e4e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1ac116ce6468670eeda39345a5585df308243dca upstream.

Add the admin-guide for Indirect Target Selection (ITS).

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ata: libata-core: Add 'external' to the libata.force kernel parameter</title>
<updated>2025-04-20T08:15:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Niklas Cassel</name>
<email>cassel@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-01-30T13:35:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b1e0b4f494c5c3aec775fb6afa91cb84b2f12afc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit deca423213cb33feda15e261e7b5b992077a6a08 ]

Commit ae1f3db006b7 ("ata: ahci: do not enable LPM on external ports")
changed so that LPM is not enabled on external ports (hotplug-capable or
eSATA ports).

This is because hotplug and LPM are mutually exclusive, see 7.3.1 Hot Plug
Removal Detection and Power Management Interaction in AHCI 1.3.1.

This does require that firmware has set the appropate bits (HPCP or ESP)
in PxCMD (which is a per port register in the AHCI controller).

If the firmware has failed to mark a port as hotplug-capable or eSATA in
PxCMD, then there is currently not much a user can do.

If LPM is enabled on the port, hotplug insertions and removals will not be
detected on that port.

In order to allow a user to fix up broken firmware, add 'external' to the
libata.force kernel parameter.

libata.force can be specified either on the kernel command line, or as a
kernel module parameter.

For more information, see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt.

Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal &lt;dlemoal@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130133544.219297-4-cassel@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel &lt;cassel@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>coredump: Only sort VMAs when core_sort_vma sysctl is set</title>
<updated>2025-03-13T12:02:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-19T19:53:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5481dee296f60d94f7b5317158a336f8d722d000</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 39ec9eaaa165d297d008d1fa385748430bd18e4d ]

The sorting of VMAs by size in commit 7d442a33bfe8 ("binfmt_elf: Dump
smaller VMAs first in ELF cores") breaks elfutils[1]. Instead, sort
based on the setting of the new sysctl, core_sort_vma, which defaults
to 0, no sorting.

Reported-by: Michael Stapelberg &lt;michael@stapelberg.ch&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250218085407.61126-1-michael@stapelberg.de/ [1]
Fixes: 7d442a33bfe8 ("binfmt_elf: Dump smaller VMAs first in ELF cores")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/writeback: convert wbc_account_cgroup_owner to take a folio</title>
<updated>2025-01-17T12:40:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pankaj Raghav</name>
<email>p.raghav@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-26T14:01:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f40881bde8f64d5c237424ea571e6ddd92209ab2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 30dac24e14b52e1787572d1d4e06eeabe8a63630 ]

Most of the callers of wbc_account_cgroup_owner() are converting a folio
to page before calling the function. wbc_account_cgroup_owner() is
converting the page back to a folio to call mem_cgroup_css_from_folio().

Convert wbc_account_cgroup_owner() to take a folio instead of a page,
and convert all callers to pass a folio directly except f2fs.

Convert the page to folio for all the callers from f2fs as they were the
only callers calling wbc_account_cgroup_owner() with a page. As f2fs is
already in the process of converting to folios, these call sites might
also soon be calling wbc_account_cgroup_owner() with a folio directly in
the future.

No functional changes. Only compile tested.

Signed-off-by: Pankaj Raghav &lt;p.raghav@samsung.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240926140121.203821-1-kernel@pankajraghav.com
Acked-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 51d20d1dacbe ("iomap: fix zero padding data issue in concurrent append writes")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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