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<title>user/sven/linux.git/Documentation/security, branch v6.0.18</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2022-12-21T16:41:15Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data</title>
<updated>2022-12-21T16:41:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nikolaus Voss</name>
<email>nikolaus.voss@haag-streit.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-19T16:38:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e6a4c98a4c143f24a02e70e186cf5b3849472736</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5adedd42245af0860ebda8fe0949f24f5204c1b1 upstream.

Commit cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with
user-provided decrypted data") added key instantiation with user
provided decrypted data.  The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was
just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. Fix this to use hex2bin instead.

Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl
pipe" are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted
data the old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be
done with a small shell script, e.g.:

BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa
NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32)
keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u
keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u

However, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were
specified, a brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only
need to try at most 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long.

The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input
range to hex-ascii and using memcpy() instead of hex2bin(). It could
have been fixed either by allowing binary input or using hex2bin() (and
doubling the ascii input key length). This patch implements the latter.

The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been
fixed (see link below).

Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20221006081709.92303897@mail.steuer-voss.de/
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss &lt;nikolaus.voss@haag-streit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: siphash: Fix typo in the name of offsetofend macro</title>
<updated>2022-07-13T20:01:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dov Murik</name>
<email>dovmurik@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-12T10:44:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:12fe434314c8572c8043c6eee6799d2ccac99f26</id>
<content type='text'>
The siphash documentation misspelled "offsetendof" instead of
"offsetofend".

Fixes: 2c956a60778cbb ("siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF")
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik &lt;dovmurik@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712104455.1408150-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: KVM: update amd-memory-encryption.rst references</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T19:09:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mauro Carvalho Chehab</name>
<email>mchehab@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-26T09:10:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7ac3945d8e22cfa4f32ec5b7f81a68d2afe4e38e</id>
<content type='text'>
Changeset daec8d408308 ("Documentation: KVM: add separate directories for architecture-specific documentation")
renamed: Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
to: Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst.

Update the cross-references accordingly.

Fixes: daec8d408308 ("Documentation: KVM: add separate directories for architecture-specific documentation")
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fd80db889e34aae87a4ca88cad94f650723668f4.1656234456.git.mchehab@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: update watch_queue.rst references</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T19:09:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mauro Carvalho Chehab</name>
<email>mchehab@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-26T09:10:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c02b872a7ca7842e4cdbbf621f77607d0a655f83</id>
<content type='text'>
Changeset f5461124d59b ("Documentation: move watch_queue to core-api")
renamed: Documentation/watch_queue.rst
to: Documentation/core-api/watch_queue.rst.

Update the cross-references accordingly.

Fixes: f5461124d59b ("Documentation: move watch_queue to core-api")
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1c220de9c58f35e815a3df9458ac2bea323c8bfb.1656234456.git.mchehab@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T20:50:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-24T20:50:39Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0350785b0a092c99c5ddd2ace0260dbe7b3f919f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "New is IMA support for including fs-verity file digests and signatures
  in the IMA measurement list as well as verifying the fs-verity file
  digest based signatures, both based on policy.

  In addition, are two bug fixes:

   - avoid reading UEFI variables, which cause a page fault, on Apple
     Macs with T2 chips.

   - remove the original "ima" template Kconfig option to address a boot
     command line ordering issue.

  The rest is a mixture of code/documentation cleanup"

* tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handler
  evm: Clean up some variables
  evm: Return INTEGRITY_PASS for enum integrity_status value '0'
  efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
  fsverity: update the documentation
  ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures
  ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list
  ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates
  fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest
  ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations
  ima: fix 'd-ng' comments and documentation
  ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig option
  ima: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'file'.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T20:16:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-24T20:16:50Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7cf6a8a17f5b134b7e783c2d45c53298faef82a7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:

 - Tightened validation of key hashes for SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST. An
   invalid hash format causes a compilation error. Previously, they got
   included to the kernel binary but were silently ignored at run-time.

 - Allow root user to append new hashes to the blacklist keyring.

 - Trusted keys backed with Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance
   Module (CAAM), which part of some of the new NXP's SoC's. Now there
   is total three hardware backends for trusted keys: TPM, ARM TEE and
   CAAM.

 - A scattered set of fixes and small improvements for the TPM driver.

* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
  MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM
  doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source
  KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
  crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator
  crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap
  KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material
  KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support
  tpm: Add field upgrade mode support for Infineon TPM2 modules
  tpm: Fix buffer access in tpm2_get_tpm_pt()
  char: tpm: cr50_i2c: Suppress duplicated error message in .remove()
  tpm: cr50: Add new device/vendor ID 0x504a6666
  tpm: Remove read16/read32/write32 calls from tpm_tis_phy_ops
  tpm: ibmvtpm: Correct the return value in tpm_ibmvtpm_probe()
  tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: Return true/false (not 1/0) from bool functions
  certs: Explain the rationale to call panic()
  certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
  certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
  certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
  certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
  tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'landlock-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T20:09:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-24T20:09:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=cb44e4f061e16be65b8a16505e121490c66d30d0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cb44e4f061e16be65b8a16505e121490c66d30d0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull Landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün:

 - improve the path_rename LSM hook implementations for RENAME_EXCHANGE;

 - fix a too-restrictive filesystem control for a rare corner case;

 - set the nested sandbox limitation to 16 layers;

 - add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right to properly handle
   file reparenting (i.e. full rename and link support);

 - add new tests and documentation;

 - format code with clang-format to make it easier to maintain and
   contribute.

* tag 'landlock-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: (30 commits)
  landlock: Explain how to support Landlock
  landlock: Add design choices documentation for filesystem access rights
  landlock: Document good practices about filesystem policies
  landlock: Document LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER and ABI versioning
  samples/landlock: Add support for file reparenting
  selftests/landlock: Add 11 new test suites dedicated to file reparenting
  landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
  LSM: Remove double path_rename hook calls for RENAME_EXCHANGE
  landlock: Move filesystem helpers and add a new one
  landlock: Fix same-layer rule unions
  landlock: Create find_rule() from unmask_layers()
  landlock: Reduce the maximum number of layers to 16
  landlock: Define access_mask_t to enforce a consistent access mask size
  selftests/landlock: Test landlock_create_ruleset(2) argument check ordering
  landlock: Change landlock_restrict_self(2) check ordering
  landlock: Change landlock_add_rule(2) argument check ordering
  selftests/landlock: Add tests for O_PATH
  selftests/landlock: Fully test file rename with "remove" access
  selftests/landlock: Extend access right tests to directories
  selftests/landlock: Add tests for unknown access rights
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi</title>
<updated>2022-05-23T18:27:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-23T18:27:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bf2431021c8cfe52c866d7bf640ced03a35ebe91'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bf2431021c8cfe52c866d7bf640ced03a35ebe91</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:

 - Allow runtime services to be re-enabled at boot on RT kernels.

 - Provide access to secrets injected into the boot image by CoCo
   hypervisors (COnfidential COmputing)

 - Use DXE services on x86 to make the boot image executable after
   relocation, if needed.

 - Prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations.

 - Only randomize the placement of the kernel image on arm64 if the
   loader has not already done so.

 - Add support for obtaining the boot hartid from EFI on RISC-V.

* tag 'efi-next-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
  riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
  efi: stub: prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations
  efi/arm64: libstub: run image in place if randomized by the loader
  efi: libstub: pass image handle to handle_kernel_image()
  efi: x86: Set the NX-compatibility flag in the PE header
  efi: libstub: ensure allocated memory to be executable
  efi: libstub: declare DXE services table
  efi: Add missing prototype for efi_capsule_setup_info
  docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
  efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
  virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
  efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
  efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source</title>
<updated>2022-05-23T15:47:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ahmad Fatoum</name>
<email>a.fatoum@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-13T14:57:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5002426e426166f57e1636b936666b275e6b3d2f</id>
<content type='text'>
Update documentation for trusted key use with the Cryptographic
Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), an IP on NXP SoCs.

Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta &lt;pankaj.gupta@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum &lt;a.fatoum@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material</title>
<updated>2022-05-23T15:47:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ahmad Fatoum</name>
<email>a.fatoum@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-13T14:57:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fcd7c26901c83681532c6daac599e53d4df11738</id>
<content type='text'>
The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG,
but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also
generate the random key material. However, both users and future
backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust
source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy
pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources.

Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter,
that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up
to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use,
maintaining the existing behavior.

Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Sumit Garg &lt;sumit.garg@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta &lt;pankaj.gupta@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Gstir &lt;david@sigma-star.at&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta &lt;pankaj.gupta@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta &lt;pankaj.gupta@nxp.com&gt;
Tested-by: Michael Walle &lt;michael@walle.cc&gt; # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg &lt;john.ernberg@actia.se&gt; # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum &lt;a.fatoum@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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