<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/Documentation, branch v4.19.280</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.280</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.280'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2023-04-05T09:15:32Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>intel-ethernet: rename i40evf to iavf</title>
<updated>2023-04-05T09:15:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jesse Brandeburg</name>
<email>jesse.brandeburg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-15T00:37:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0b7c849c2c00c3c596922ded9b80bddf154789da'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0b7c849c2c00c3c596922ded9b80bddf154789da</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8062b2263a9fc294ddeb4024b113e8e26b82d5de ]

Rename the Intel Ethernet Adaptive Virtual Function driver
(i40evf) to a new name (iavf) that is more consistent with
the ongoing maintenance of the driver as the universal VF driver
for multiple product lines.

This first patch fixes up the directory names and the .ko name,
intentionally ignoring the function names inside the driver
for now.  Basically this is the simplest patch that gets
the rename done and will be followed by other patches that
rename the internal functions.

This patch also addresses a couple of string/name issues
and updates the Copyright year.

Also, made sure to add a MODULE_ALIAS to the old name.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Brandeburg &lt;jesse.brandeburg@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers &lt;andrewx.bowers@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher &lt;jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 32d57f667f87 ("iavf: fix inverted Rx hash condition leading to disabled hash")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation/hw-vuln: Document the interaction between IBRS and STIBP</title>
<updated>2023-03-11T15:31:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>KP Singh</name>
<email>kpsingh@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-27T06:05:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=dfd3801d53acd1db630bbc5b48b224bed4c72fdd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dfd3801d53acd1db630bbc5b48b224bed4c72fdd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e02b50ca442e88122e1302d4dbc1b71a4808c13f upstream.

Explain why STIBP is needed with legacy IBRS as currently implemented
(KERNEL_IBRS) and why STIBP is not needed when enhanced IBRS is enabled.

Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230227060541.1939092-2-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>docs/scripts/gdb: add necessary make scripts_gdb step</title>
<updated>2023-03-11T15:31:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakob Koschel</name>
<email>jkl820.git@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-19T23:23:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7f00d922570be19e73902423dbcc7e6cfd464a58'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7f00d922570be19e73902423dbcc7e6cfd464a58</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6b219431037bf98c9efd49716aea9b68440477a3 ]

In order to debug the kernel successfully with gdb you need to run
'make scripts_gdb' nowadays.

This was changed with the following commit:

Commit 67274c083438340ad16c ("scripts/gdb: delay generation of gdb
constants.py")

In order to have a complete guide for beginners this remark
should be added to the offial documentation.

Signed-off-by: Jakob Koschel &lt;jkl820.git@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112-documentation-gdb-v2-1-292785c43dc9@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>docs: Fix path paste-o for /sys/kernel/warn_count</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:49:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-03T00:27:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6c960e335bb83a7a19a906a1066d9f5da1b17870'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6c960e335bb83a7a19a906a1066d9f5da1b17870</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 00dd027f721e0458418f7750d8a5a664ed3e5994 upstream.

Running "make htmldocs" shows that "/sys/kernel/oops_count" was
duplicated. This should have been "warn_count":

  Warning: /sys/kernel/oops_count is defined 2 times:
  ./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count:0
  ./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count:0

Fix the typo.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/202212110529.A3Qav8aR-lkp@intel.com
Fixes: 8b05aa263361 ("panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs")
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:49:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-03T00:27:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4d00e68cfcfd91d3a8c794d47617429a96d623ed'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4d00e68cfcfd91d3a8c794d47617429a96d623ed</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8b05aa26336113c4cea25f1c333ee8cd4fc212a6 upstream.

Since Warn count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
the entry /sys/kernel/warn_count to expose it to userspace.

Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: tangmeng &lt;tangmeng@uniontech.com&gt;
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-6-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>panic: Introduce warn_limit</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:49:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-03T00:27:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a40af7cd60635230aec5c29c1b2a714bf53fbdc0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a40af7cd60635230aec5c29c1b2a714bf53fbdc0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9fc9e278a5c0b708eeffaf47d6eb0c82aa74ed78 upstream.

Like oops_limit, add warn_limit for limiting the number of warnings when
panic_on_warn is not set.

Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Baolin Wang &lt;baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Huang Ying &lt;ying.huang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: tangmeng &lt;tangmeng@uniontech.com&gt;
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Cc: Tiezhu Yang &lt;yangtiezhu@loongson.cn&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-5-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:49:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-03T00:27:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=326716f32f3baa395cc6b0bbaeaba0cee3f3120b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:326716f32f3baa395cc6b0bbaeaba0cee3f3120b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit de92f65719cd672f4b48397540b9f9eff67eca40 upstream.

In preparation for keeping oops_limit logic in sync with warn_limit,
have oops_limit == 0 disable checking the Oops counter.

Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Baolin Wang &lt;baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Huang Ying &lt;ying.huang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:49:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-03T00:27:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bad855964ec4805e2c9adbe85277bb0ac7e24af6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bad855964ec4805e2c9adbe85277bb0ac7e24af6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9db89b41117024f80b38b15954017fb293133364 upstream.

Since Oops count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
the entry /sys/kernel/oops_count to expose it to userspace.

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:49:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-03T00:27:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ebf39c590a1e8b4d536b123e604d58d285e564ba'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ebf39c590a1e8b4d536b123e604d58d285e564ba</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d4ccd54d28d3c8598e2354acc13e28c060961dbb upstream.

Many Linux systems are configured to not panic on oops; but allowing an
attacker to oops the system **really** often can make even bugs that look
completely unexploitable exploitable (like NULL dereferences and such) if
each crash elevates a refcount by one or a lock is taken in read mode, and
this causes a counter to eventually overflow.

The most interesting counters for this are 32 bits wide (like open-coded
refcounts that don't use refcount_t). (The ldsem reader count on 32-bit
platforms is just 16 bits, but probably nobody cares about 32-bit platforms
that much nowadays.)

So let's panic the system if the kernel is constantly oopsing.

The speed of oopsing 2^32 times probably depends on several factors, like
how long the stack trace is and which unwinder you're using; an empirically
important one is whether your console is showing a graphical environment or
a text console that oopses will be printed to.
In a quick single-threaded benchmark, it looks like oopsing in a vfork()
child with a very short stack trace only takes ~510 microseconds per run
when a graphical console is active; but switching to a text console that
oopses are printed to slows it down around 87x, to ~45 milliseconds per
run.
(Adding more threads makes this faster, but the actual oops printing
happens under &amp;die_lock on x86, so you can maybe speed this up by a factor
of around 2 and then any further improvement gets eaten up by lock
contention.)

It looks like it would take around 8-12 days to overflow a 32-bit counter
with repeated oopsing on a multi-core X86 system running a graphical
environment; both me (in an X86 VM) and Seth (with a distro kernel on
normal hardware in a standard configuration) got numbers in that ballpark.

12 days aren't *that* short on a desktop system, and you'd likely need much
longer on a typical server system (assuming that people don't run graphical
desktop environments on their servers), and this is a *very* noisy and
violent approach to exploiting the kernel; and it also seems to take orders
of magnitude longer on some machines, probably because stuff like EFI
pstore will slow it down a ton if that's active.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221107201317.324457-1-jannh@google.com
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>docs: Fix the docs build with Sphinx 6.0</title>
<updated>2023-01-18T10:30:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonathan Corbet</name>
<email>corbet@lwn.net</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-04T17:47:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a0ff7115444b41ca83694f710564b15cdca75386'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a0ff7115444b41ca83694f710564b15cdca75386</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0283189e8f3d0917e2ac399688df85211f48447b upstream.

Sphinx 6.0 removed the execfile_() function, which we use as part of the
configuration process.  They *did* warn us...  Just open-code the
functionality as is done in Sphinx itself.

Tested (using SPHINX_CONF, since this code is only executed with an
alternative config file) on various Sphinx versions from 2.5 through 6.0.

Reported-by: Martin Liška &lt;mliska@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
