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<title>user/sven/linux.git/Documentation, branch v4.4.245</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2020-11-22T08:56:58Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses</title>
<updated>2020-11-22T08:56:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-20T00:07:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f579da2a8c318e5fd1bef6ad5c300386eff9fe7d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before
it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible
for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method,
since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures
to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the
attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel
user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of
Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility
it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the
privileged code to construct an attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries
of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry</title>
<updated>2020-11-22T08:56:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-20T00:06:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4a1e90af718d1489ffcecc8f52486c4f5dc0f7a6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 upstream.

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before
it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible
for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method,
since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures
to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the
attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel
user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of
Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility
it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the
privileged code to construct an attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries
of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:25:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-03T16:22:37Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:732d4f2eb4160cae14978b15d5b01f0d59915a32</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e99502f76271d6bc4e374fe368c50c67a1fd3070 upstream.

In case rogue guests are sending events at high frequency it might
happen that xen_evtchn_do_upcall() won't stop processing events in
dom0. As this is done in irq handling a crash might be the result.

In order to avoid that, delay further inter-domain events after some
time in xen_evtchn_do_upcall() by forcing eoi processing into a
worker on the same cpu, thus inhibiting new events coming in.

The time after which eoi processing is to be delayed is configurable
via a new module parameter "event_loop_timeout" which specifies the
maximum event loop time in jiffies (default: 2, the value was chosen
after some tests showing that a value of 2 was the lowest with an
only slight drop of dom0 network throughput while multiple guests
performed an event storm).

How long eoi processing will be delayed can be specified via another
parameter "event_eoi_delay" (again in jiffies, default 10, again the
value was chosen after testing with different delay values).

This is part of XSA-332.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu &lt;wl@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>icmp: randomize the global rate limiter</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T08:03:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-15T18:42:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a9d0ba6aa7485aabed7b8f2ed5a3975684847e0b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b38e7819cae946e2edf869e604af1e65a5d241c5 ]

Keyu Man reported that the ICMP rate limiter could be used
by attackers to get useful signal. Details will be provided
in an upcoming academic publication.

Our solution is to add some noise, so that the attackers
no longer can get help from the predictable token bucket limiter.

Fixes: 4cdf507d5452 ("icmp: add a global rate limitation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Keyu Man &lt;kman001@ucr.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ata: make qc_prep return ata_completion_errors</title>
<updated>2020-10-01T09:11:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Slaby</name>
<email>jslaby@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-31T09:59:45Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6002dcd35aa356a3ea79d106f94733e7a298f040</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 95364f36701e62dd50eee91e1303187fd1a9f567 upstream.

In case a driver wants to return an error from qc_prep, return enum
ata_completion_errors. sata_mv is one of those drivers -- see the next
patch. Other drivers return the newly defined AC_ERR_OK.

[v2] use enum ata_completion_errors and AC_ERR_OK.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: linux-ide@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dt-bindings: sound: wm8994: Correct required supplies based on actual implementaion</title>
<updated>2020-10-01T09:11:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Krzysztof Kozlowski</name>
<email>krzk@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-01T13:35:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:61cc6d51e907410346942fbfb8904821aeba0b4d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8c149b7d75e53be47648742f40fc90d9fc6fa63a ]

The required supplies in bindings were actually not matching
implementation making the bindings incorrect and misleading.  The Linux
kernel driver requires all supplies to be present.  Also for wlf,wm8994
uses just DBVDD-supply instead of DBVDDn-supply (n: &lt;1,3&gt;).

Reported-by: Jonathan Bakker &lt;xc-racer2@live.ca&gt;
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzk@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200501133534.6706-1-krzk@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>affs: fix basic permission bits to actually work</title>
<updated>2020-09-12T09:45:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Max Staudt</name>
<email>max@enpas.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-27T15:49:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1b4a82a834b43ccdc8599df0f1094577fe423af6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d3a84a8d0dde4e26bc084b36ffcbdc5932ac85e2 ]

The basic permission bits (protection bits in AmigaOS) have been broken
in Linux' AFFS - it would only set bits, but never delete them.
Also, contrary to the documentation, the Archived bit was not handled.

Let's fix this for good, and set the bits such that Linux and classic
AmigaOS can coexist in the most peaceful manner.

Also, update the documentation to represent the current state of things.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Max Staudt &lt;max@enpas.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iio: improve IIO_CONCENTRATION channel type description</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T08:53:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tomasz Duszynski</name>
<email>tomasz.duszynski@octakon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-01T16:15:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b147dc87d3dd31b119efef830987f827eb16e116</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit df16c33a4028159d1ba8a7061c9fa950b58d1a61 ]

IIO_CONCENTRATION together with INFO_RAW specifier is used for reporting
raw concentrations of pollutants. Raw value should be meaningless
before being properly scaled. Because of that description shouldn't
mention raw value unit whatsoever.

Fix this by rephrasing existing description so it follows conventions
used throughout IIO ABI docs.

Fixes: 8ff6b3bc94930 ("iio: chemical: Add IIO_CONCENTRATION channel type")
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Duszynski &lt;tomasz.duszynski@octakon.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matt Ranostay &lt;matt.ranostay@konsulko.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron &lt;Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:21:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-27T18:46:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8a782408e080b4129bd2c14b08a6b921afa2669a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3798cc4d106e91382bfe016caa2edada27c2bb3f upstream

Make the docs match the code.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T07:21:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Gross</name>
<email>mgross@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-28T14:58:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7c4a0a19590ac80744f6037c86df340f9b098339</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream

Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.

 [ bp: Massage.
   jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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