user/sven/linux.git/arch/x86/kernel/module.c, branch v4.9.2

x86/asm: Stop depending on ptrace.h in alternative.h

2016-04-29T09:56:40Z

alternative.h pulls in ptrace.h, which means that alternatives can't be used in anything referenced from ptrace.h, which is a mess. Break the dependency by pulling text patching helpers into their own header. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/99b93b13f2c9eb671f5c98bba4c2cbdc061293a2.1461698311.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/mm/KASLR: Propagate KASLR status to kernel proper

2015-04-03T13:26:15Z

Commit: e2b32e678513 ("x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address") made module base address randomization unconditional and didn't regard disabled KKASLR due to CONFIG_HIBERNATION and command line option "nokaslr". For more info see (now reverted) commit: f47233c2d34f ("x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation") In order to propagate KASLR status to kernel proper, we need a single bit in boot_params.hdr.loadflags and we've chosen bit 1 thus leaving the top-down allocated bits for bits supposed to be used by the bootloader. Originally-From: Jiri Kosina Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

Revert "x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation"

2015-03-16T10:18:21Z

This reverts commit: f47233c2d34f ("x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation") The main reason for the revert is that the new boot flag does not work at all currently, and in order to make this work, we need non-trivial changes to the x86 boot code which we didn't manage to get done in time for merging. And even if we did, they would've been too risky so instead of rushing things and break booting 4.1 on boxes left and right, we will be very strict and conservative and will take our time with this to fix and test it properly. Reported-by: Yinghai Lu Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Baoquan He Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Josh Triplett Cc: Junjie Mao Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Matt Fleming Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150316100628.GD22995@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2015-02-21T18:41:29Z

Pull misc x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: "This contains: - EFI fixes - a boot printout fix - ASLR/kASLR fixes - intel microcode driver fixes - other misc fixes Most of the linecount comes from an EFI revert" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm/ASLR: Avoid PAGE_SIZE redefinition for UML subarch x86/microcode/intel: Handle truncated microcode images more robustly x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems x86/mm/init: Fix incorrect page size in init_memory_mapping() printks x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation Documentation/x86: Fix path in zero-page.txt x86/apic: Fix the devicetree build in certain configs Revert "efi/libstub: Call get_memory_map() to obtain map and desc sizes" x86/efi: Avoid triple faults during EFI mixed mode calls

x86/mm/ASLR: Avoid PAGE_SIZE redefinition for UML subarch

2015-02-20T09:55:32Z

Commit f47233c2d34 ("x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation") causes PAGE_SIZE redefinition warnings for UML subarch builds. This is caused by added includes that were leftovers from previous patch versions are are not actually needed (especially page_types.h inlcude in module.c). Drop those stray includes. Reported-by: kbuild test robot Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Kees Cook Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LNX.2.00.1502201017240.28769@pobox.suse.cz Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation

2015-02-19T10:38:54Z

Commit: e2b32e678513 ("x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address") makes the base address for module to be unconditionally randomized in case when CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is defined and "nokaslr" option isn't present on the commandline. This is not consistent with how choose_kernel_location() decides whether it will randomize kernel load base. Namely, CONFIG_HIBERNATION disables kASLR (unless "kaslr" option is explicitly specified on kernel commandline), which makes the state space larger than what module loader is looking at. IOW CONFIG_HIBERNATION && CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is a valid config option, kASLR wouldn't be applied by default in that case, but module loader is not aware of that. Instead of fixing the logic in module.c, this patch takes more generic aproach. It introduces a new bootparam setup data_type SETUP_KASLR and uses that to pass the information whether kaslr has been applied during kernel decompression, and sets a global 'kaslr_enabled' variable accordingly, so that any kernel code (module loading, livepatching, ...) can make decisions based on its value. x86 module loader is converted to make use of this flag. Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LNX.2.00.1502101411280.10719@pobox.suse.cz [ Always dump correct kaslr status when panicking ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov

kasan: enable instrumentation of global variables

2015-02-14T05:21:42Z

This feature let us to detect accesses out of bounds of global variables. This will work as for globals in kernel image, so for globals in modules. Currently this won't work for symbols in user-specified sections (e.g. __init, __read_mostly, ...) The idea of this is simple. Compiler increases each global variable by redzone size and add constructors invoking __asan_register_globals() function. Information about global variable (address, size, size with redzone ...) passed to __asan_register_globals() so we could poison variable's redzone. This patch also forces module_alloc() to return 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned address making shadow memory handling ( kasan_module_alloc()/kasan_module_free() ) more simple. Such alignment guarantees that each shadow page backing modules address space correspond to only one module_alloc() allocation. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Konstantin Serebryany Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Yuri Gribov Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: Sasha Levin Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: David Rientjes Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: vmalloc: pass additional vm_flags to __vmalloc_node_range()

2015-02-14T05:21:42Z

For instrumenting global variables KASan will shadow memory backing memory for modules. So on module loading we will need to allocate memory for shadow and map it at address in shadow that corresponds to the address allocated in module_alloc(). __vmalloc_node_range() could be used for this purpose, except it puts a guard hole after allocated area. Guard hole in shadow memory should be a problem because at some future point we might need to have a shadow memory at address occupied by guard hole. So we could fail to allocate shadow for module_alloc(). Now we have VM_NO_GUARD flag disabling guard page, so we need to pass into __vmalloc_node_range(). Add new parameter 'vm_flags' to __vmalloc_node_range() function. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Konstantin Serebryany Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Yuri Gribov Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: Sasha Levin Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: David Rientjes Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

x86, kaslr: fix module lock ordering problem

2014-03-24T17:18:26Z

There was a potential lock ordering problem with the module kASLR patch ("x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address"). This patch removes the usage of the module_mutex and creates a new mutex to protect the module base address offset value. Chain exists of: text_mutex --> kprobe_insn_slots.mutex --> module_mutex [ 0.515561] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 0.515561] [ 0.515561] CPU0 CPU1 [ 0.515561] ---- ---- [ 0.515561] lock(module_mutex); [ 0.515561] lock(kprobe_insn_slots.mutex); [ 0.515561] lock(module_mutex); [ 0.515561] lock(text_mutex); [ 0.515561] [ 0.515561] *** DEADLOCK *** Reported-by: Fengguang Wu Signed-off-by: Andy Honig Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin

x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address

2014-02-26T01:07:26Z

Randomize the load address of modules in the kernel to make kASLR effective for modules. Modules can only be loaded within a particular range of virtual address space. This patch adds 10 bits of entropy to the load address by adding 1-1024 * PAGE_SIZE to the beginning range where modules are loaded. The single base offset was chosen because randomizing each module load ends up wasting/fragmenting memory too much. Prior approaches to minimizing fragmentation while doing randomization tend to result in worse entropy than just doing a single base address offset. Example kASLR boot without this change, with a single module loaded: ---[ Modules ]--- 0xffffffffc0000000-0xffffffffc0001000 4K ro GLB x pte 0xffffffffc0001000-0xffffffffc0002000 4K ro GLB NX pte 0xffffffffc0002000-0xffffffffc0004000 8K RW GLB NX pte 0xffffffffc0004000-0xffffffffc0200000 2032K pte 0xffffffffc0200000-0xffffffffff000000 1006M pmd ---[ End Modules ]--- Example kASLR boot after this change, same module loaded: ---[ Modules ]--- 0xffffffffc0000000-0xffffffffc0200000 2M pmd 0xffffffffc0200000-0xffffffffc03bf000 1788K pte 0xffffffffc03bf000-0xffffffffc03c0000 4K ro GLB x pte 0xffffffffc03c0000-0xffffffffc03c1000 4K ro GLB NX pte 0xffffffffc03c1000-0xffffffffc03c3000 8K RW GLB NX pte 0xffffffffc03c3000-0xffffffffc0400000 244K pte 0xffffffffc0400000-0xffffffffff000000 1004M pmd ---[ End Modules ]--- Signed-off-by: Andy Honig Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140226005916.GA27083@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin