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<title>user/sven/linux.git/crypto, branch v4.15.5</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.15.5</id>
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<updated>2018-02-16T19:06:48Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key</title>
<updated>2018-02-16T19:06:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-03T19:16:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:46e8d06e423c4f35eac7a8b677b713b3ec9b0684</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9fa68f620041be04720d0cbfb1bd3ddfc6310b24 upstream.

Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key
has been set before proceeding.  Some algorithms are okay with this and
will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default.
However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using
"hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash
via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow.

A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash
transform with a 'has_key' bool.  However, there are still other places
in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by
name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it
is really unkeyed.  Examples of this include:

    - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension
    - dm-verity
    - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support
    - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given
    - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device)

This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no
privileges to call.

Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the
-&gt;crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform
still needs to be keyed or not.  Then, make the hash init, import, and
digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed.

The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was
previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation.

Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: hash - annotate algorithms taking optional key</title>
<updated>2018-02-16T19:06:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-03T19:16:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cec606a62e0124689331ccb367a845ee1f34110e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a208fa8f33031b9e0aba44c7d1b7e68eb0cbd29e upstream.

We need to consistently enforce that keyed hashes cannot be used without
setting the key.  To do this we need a reliable way to determine whether
a given hash algorithm is keyed or not.  AF_ALG currently does this by
checking for the presence of a -&gt;setkey() method.  However, this is
actually slightly broken because the CRC-32 algorithms implement
-&gt;setkey() but can also be used without a key.  (The CRC-32 "key" is not
actually a cryptographic key but rather represents the initial state.
If not overridden, then a default initial state is used.)

Prepare to fix this by introducing a flag CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY which
indicates that the algorithm has a -&gt;setkey() method, but it is not
required to be called.  Then set it on all the CRC-32 algorithms.

The same also applies to the Adler-32 implementation in Lustre.

Also, the cryptd and mcryptd templates have to pass through the flag
from their underlying algorithm.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: poly1305 - remove -&gt;setkey() method</title>
<updated>2018-02-16T19:06:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-03T19:16:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b5e994037f37e9e8b8ecfc43d6ef8a93f52633e5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a16e772e664b9a261424107784804cffc8894977 upstream.

Since Poly1305 requires a nonce per invocation, the Linux kernel
implementations of Poly1305 don't use the crypto API's keying mechanism
and instead expect the key and nonce as the first 32 bytes of the data.
But -&gt;setkey() is still defined as a stub returning an error code.  This
prevents Poly1305 from being used through AF_ALG and will also break it
completely once we start enforcing that all crypto API users (not just
AF_ALG) call -&gt;setkey() if present.

Fix it by removing crypto_poly1305_setkey(), leaving -&gt;setkey as NULL.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: mcryptd - pass through absence of -&gt;setkey()</title>
<updated>2018-02-16T19:06:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-03T19:16:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a3b6f7d313afb083acec85f3ff513b4daf0d56d6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fa59b92d299f2787e6bae1ff078ee0982e80211f upstream.

When the mcryptd template is used to wrap an unkeyed hash algorithm,
don't install a -&gt;setkey() method to the mcryptd instance.  This change
is necessary for mcryptd to keep working with unkeyed hash algorithms
once we start enforcing that -&gt;setkey() is called when present.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: cryptd - pass through absence of -&gt;setkey()</title>
<updated>2018-02-16T19:06:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-03T19:16:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f034d24fcef862d0fa12adcee1e5817c9ade8f7e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 841a3ff329713f796a63356fef6e2f72e4a3f6a3 upstream.

When the cryptd template is used to wrap an unkeyed hash algorithm,
don't install a -&gt;setkey() method to the cryptd instance.  This change
is necessary for cryptd to keep working with unkeyed hash algorithms
once we start enforcing that -&gt;setkey() is called when present.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: hash - introduce crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey()</title>
<updated>2018-02-16T19:06:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-03T19:16:22Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:927a0dd1c4de3ec57e8d1194bd0383ca757162eb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cd6ed77ad5d223dc6299fb58f62e0f5267f7e2ba upstream.

Templates that use an shash spawn can use crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
to determine whether the underlying algorithm requires a key or not.
But there was no corresponding function for ahash spawns.  Add it.

Note that the new function actually has to support both shash and ahash
algorithms, since the ahash API can be used with either.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: tcrypt - fix S/G table for test_aead_speed()</title>
<updated>2018-02-12T06:07:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Robert Baronescu</name>
<email>robert.baronescu@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-10T10:21:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b78dc24787140e92c506a9cf3e16bd29c6ce84f0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5c6ac1d4f8fbdbed65dbeb8cf149d736409d16a1 upstream.

In case buffer length is a multiple of PAGE_SIZE,
the S/G table is incorrectly generated.
Fix this by handling buflen = k * PAGE_SIZE separately.

Signed-off-by: Robert Baronescu &lt;robert.baronescu@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: af_alg - whitelist mask and type</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:58:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephan Mueller</name>
<email>smueller@chronox.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-02T07:55:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cc5daa4b691b70b2e2f1e815926196449435273a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bb30b8848c85e18ca7e371d0a869e94b3e383bdf upstream.

The user space interface allows specifying the type and mask field used
to allocate the cipher. Only a subset of the possible flags are intended
for user space. Therefore, white-list the allowed flags.

In case the user space caller uses at least one non-allowed flag, EINVAL
is returned.

Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: sha3-generic - fixes for alignment and big endian operation</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:58:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-19T12:04:33Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:66ae99ca89cb3f22ffff81084ce5446d0122abdb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c013cee99d5a18aec8c71fee8f5f41369cd12595 upstream.

Ensure that the input is byte swabbed before injecting it into the
SHA3 transform. Use the get_unaligned() accessor for this so that
we don't perform unaligned access inadvertently on architectures
that do not support that.

Fixes: 53964b9ee63b7075 ("crypto: sha3 - Add SHA-3 hash algorithm")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecdh - fix typo in KPP dependency of CRYPTO_ECDH</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:58:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hauke Mehrtens</name>
<email>hauke@hauke-m.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-25T23:16:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:436bcaa6bc354b0d432aebabf24f922aef48af80</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b5b9007730ce1d90deaf25d7f678511550744bdc upstream.

This fixes a typo in the CRYPTO_KPP dependency of CRYPTO_ECDH.

Fixes: 3c4b23901a0c ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support")
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens &lt;hauke@hauke-m.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
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