user/sven/linux.git/crypto, branch v5.0.16

crypto: lrw - Fix atomic sleep when walking skcipher

2019-05-02T08:02:44Z

commit b257b48cd5830c5b1d0c347eb281f9c28056f881 upstream. When we perform a walk in the completion function, we need to ensure that it is atomic. Fixes: ac3c8f36c31d ("crypto: lrw - Do not use auxiliary buffer") Cc: Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: xts - Fix atomic sleep when walking skcipher

2019-05-02T08:02:44Z

commit 44427c0fbc09b448b22410978a4ef6ee37599d25 upstream. When we perform a walk in the completion function, we need to ensure that it is atomic. Reported-by: syzbot+6f72c20560060c98b566@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 78105c7e769b ("crypto: xts - Drop use of auxiliary buffer") Cc: Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: x86/poly1305 - fix overflow during partial reduction

2019-04-27T07:37:41Z

commit 678cce4019d746da6c680c48ba9e6d417803e127 upstream. The x86_64 implementation of Poly1305 produces the wrong result on some inputs because poly1305_4block_avx2() incorrectly assumes that when partially reducing the accumulator, the bits carried from limb 'd4' to limb 'h0' fit in a 32-bit integer. This is true for poly1305-generic which processes only one block at a time. However, it's not true for the AVX2 implementation, which processes 4 blocks at a time and therefore can produce intermediate limbs about 4x larger. Fix it by making the relevant calculations use 64-bit arithmetic rather than 32-bit. Note that most of the carries already used 64-bit arithmetic, but the d4 -> h0 carry was different for some reason. To be safe I also made the same change to the corresponding SSE2 code, though that only operates on 1 or 2 blocks at a time. I don't think it's really needed for poly1305_block_sse2(), but it doesn't hurt because it's already x86_64 code. It *might* be needed for poly1305_2block_sse2(), but overflows aren't easy to reproduce there. This bug was originally detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz algorithms against their generic implementation. But also add a test vector which reproduces it directly (in the AVX2 case). Fixes: b1ccc8f4b631 ("crypto: poly1305 - Add a four block AVX2 variant for x86_64") Fixes: c70f4abef07a ("crypto: poly1305 - Add a SSE2 SIMD variant for x86_64") Cc: # v4.3+ Cc: Martin Willi Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Martin Willi Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: testmgr - skip crc32c context test for ahash algorithms

2019-03-23T19:11:16Z

commit eb5e6730db98fcc4b51148b4a819fa4bf864ae54 upstream. Instantiating "cryptd(crc32c)" causes a crypto self-test failure because the crypto_alloc_shash() in alg_test_crc32c() fails. This is because cryptd(crc32c) is an ahash algorithm, not a shash algorithm; so it can only be accessed through the ahash API, unlike shash algorithms which can be accessed through both the ahash and shash APIs. As the test is testing the shash descriptor format which is only applicable to shash algorithms, skip it for ahash algorithms. (Note that it's still important to fix crypto self-test failures even for weird algorithm instantiations like cryptd(crc32c) that no one would really use; in fips_enabled mode unprivileged users can use them to panic the kernel, and also they prevent treating a crypto self-test failure as a bug when fuzzing the kernel.) Fixes: 8e3ee85e68c5 ("crypto: crc32c - Test descriptor context format") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: skcipher - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails

2019-03-23T19:11:16Z

commit b1f6b4bf416b49f00f3abc49c639371cdecaaad1 upstream. Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key. For example, in lrw.c, if gf128mul_init_64k_bbe() fails due to lack of memory, then priv::table will be left NULL. After that, encryption with that tfm will cause a NULL pointer dereference. It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails and the algorithm requires a key, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set. [Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed" states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.] Fixes: f8d33fac8480 ("crypto: skcipher - prevent using skciphers without setting key") Cc: # v4.16+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: pcbc - remove bogus memcpy()s with src == dest

2019-03-23T19:11:16Z

commit 251b7aea34ba3c4d4fdfa9447695642eb8b8b098 upstream. The memcpy()s in the PCBC implementation use walk->iv as both the source and destination, which has undefined behavior. These memcpy()'s are actually unneeded, because walk->iv is already used to hold the previous plaintext block XOR'd with the previous ciphertext block. Thus, walk->iv is already updated to its final value. So remove the broken and unnecessary memcpy()s. Fixes: 91652be5d1b9 ("[CRYPTO] pcbc: Add Propagated CBC template") Cc: # v2.6.21+ Cc: David Howells Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: morus - fix handling chunked inputs

2019-03-23T19:11:15Z

commit d644f1c8746ed24f81075480f9e9cb3777ae8d65 upstream. The generic MORUS implementations all fail the improved AEAD tests because they produce the wrong result with some data layouts. The issue is that they assume that if the skcipher_walk API gives 'nbytes' not aligned to the walksize (a.k.a. walk.stride), then it is the end of the data. In fact, this can happen before the end. Fix them. Fixes: 396be41f16fd ("crypto: morus - Add generic MORUS AEAD implementations") Cc: # v4.18+ Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: hash - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails

2019-03-23T19:11:15Z

commit ba7d7433a0e998c902132bd47330e355a1eaa894 upstream. Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key. It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails and the algorithm requires a key, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set. Note: we can't set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY for OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, so ->setkey() for those must nevertheless be atomic. That's fine for now since only the crc32 and crc32c algorithms set OPTIONAL_KEY, and it's not intended that OPTIONAL_KEY be used much. [Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed" states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.] Fixes: 9fa68f620041 ("crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: aegis - fix handling chunked inputs

2019-03-23T19:11:15Z

commit 0f533e67d26f228ea5dfdacc8a4bdeb487af5208 upstream. The generic AEGIS implementations all fail the improved AEAD tests because they produce the wrong result with some data layouts. The issue is that they assume that if the skcipher_walk API gives 'nbytes' not aligned to the walksize (a.k.a. walk.stride), then it is the end of the data. In fact, this can happen before the end. Fix them. Fixes: f606a88e5823 ("crypto: aegis - Add generic AEGIS AEAD implementations") Cc: # v4.18+ Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: aead - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails

2019-03-23T19:11:15Z

commit 6ebc97006b196aafa9df0497fdfa866cf26f259b upstream. Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key. For example, in gcm.c, if the kzalloc() fails due to lack of memory, then the CTR part of GCM will have the new key but GHASH will not. It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set. [Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed" states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.] Fixes: dc26c17f743a ("crypto: aead - prevent using AEADs without setting key") Cc: # v4.16+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman