user/sven/linux.git/crypto, branch v6.1.116

crypto: simd - Do not call crypto_alloc_tfm during registration

2024-10-17T13:21:39Z

[ Upstream commit 3c44d31cb34ce4eb8311a2e73634d57702948230 ] Algorithm registration is usually carried out during module init, where as little work as possible should be carried out. The SIMD code violated this rule by allocating a tfm, this then triggers a full test of the algorithm which may dead-lock in certain cases. SIMD is only allocating the tfm to get at the alg object, which is in fact already available as it is what we are registering. Use that directly and remove the crypto_alloc_tfm call. Also remove some obsolete and unused SIMD API. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KEYS: prevent NULL pointer dereference in find_asymmetric_key()

2024-10-17T13:21:17Z

commit 70fd1966c93bf3bfe3fe6d753eb3d83a76597eef upstream. In find_asymmetric_key(), if all NULLs are passed in the id_{0,1,2} arguments, the kernel will first emit WARN but then have an oops because id_2 gets dereferenced anyway. Add the missing id_2 check and move WARN_ON() to the final else branch to avoid duplicate NULL checks. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static analysis tool. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.17+ Fixes: 7d30198ee24f ("keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID") Suggested-by: Sergey Shtylyov Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: xor - fix template benchmarking

2024-10-17T13:20:36Z

[ Upstream commit ab9a244c396aae4aaa34b2399b82fc15ec2df8c1 ] Commit c055e3eae0f1 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking") switched from using jiffies to ktime-based performance benchmarking. This works nicely on machines which have a fine-grained ktime() clocksource as e.g. x86 machines with TSC. But other machines, e.g. my 4-way HP PARISC server, don't have such fine-grained clocksources, which is why it seems that 800 xor loops take zero seconds, which then shows up in the logs as: xor: measuring software checksum speed 8regs : -1018167296 MB/sec 8regs_prefetch : -1018167296 MB/sec 32regs : -1018167296 MB/sec 32regs_prefetch : -1018167296 MB/sec Fix this with some small modifications to the existing code to improve the algorithm to always produce correct results without introducing major delays for architectures with a fine-grained ktime() clocksource: a) Delay start of the timing until ktime() just advanced. On machines with a fast ktime() this should be just one additional ktime() call. b) Count the number of loops. Run at minimum 800 loops and finish earliest when the ktime() counter has progressed. With that the throughput can now be calculated more accurately under all conditions. Fixes: c055e3eae0f1 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking") Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Tested-by: John David Anglin v2: - clean up coding style (noticed & suggested by Herbert Xu) - rephrased & fixed typo in commit message Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after use

2024-07-11T10:47:05Z

[ Upstream commit 23e4099bdc3c8381992f9eb975c79196d6755210 ] I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that previously held the private key. Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: ecdh - explicitly zeroize private_key

2024-07-05T07:31:49Z

[ Upstream commit 73e5984e540a76a2ee1868b91590c922da8c24c9 ] private_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the caller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key. However, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly generated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that scenario, some key material from the previous key would not be overwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire private_key array first. Note that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function: previously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would remain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is consistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid fails. Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: ecrdsa - Fix module auto-load on add_key

2024-06-16T11:41:37Z

commit eb5739a1efbc9ff216271aeea0ebe1c92e5383e5 upstream. Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for RSA-related and other algorithms. The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names "crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance, when using the `add_key` function, the hash algorithm is typically loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not. Steps to test: 1. Cert is generated usings ima-evm-utils test suite with `gen-keys.sh`, example cert is provided below: $ base64 -d >test-gost2012_512-A.cer < Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov Tested-by: Stefan Berger Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: ecdsa - Fix module auto-load on add-key

2024-06-16T11:41:37Z

commit 48e4fd6d54f54d0ceab5a952d73e47a9454a6ccb upstream. Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for RSA-related and other algorithms. The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names "crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance, when using the `add_key` function, the hash algorithm is typically loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not. Steps to test: 1. Create certificate openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey ec \ -pkeyopt "ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1" -keyout key.pem -days 365 \ -subj '/CN=test' -nodes -outform der -out nist-p384.der 2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module & 3. Trigger add_key call for the cert: # keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u < nist-p384.der 641069229 # lsmod | head -2 Module Size Used by ecdsa_generic 16384 0 Fixes: c12d448ba939 ("crypto: ecdsa - Register NIST P384 and extend test suite") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: asymmetric: Add missing dependencies of FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST

2024-06-12T09:02:58Z

commit 9d2fd8bdc12f403a5c35c971936a0e1d5cb5108e upstream. Since the signature self-test uses RSA and SHA-256, it must only be enabled when those algorithms are enabled. Otherwise it fails and panics the kernel on boot-up. Reported-by: kernel test robot Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202404221528.51d75177-lkp@intel.com Fixes: 3cde3174eb91 ("certs: Add FIPS selftests") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Simo Sorce Cc: David Howells Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "crypto: api - Disallow identical driver names"

2024-05-02T14:29:27Z

This reverts commit 680eb0a99336f7b21ff149bc57579d059421c5de which is commit 27016f75f5ed47e2d8e0ca75a8ff1f40bc1a5e27 upstream. It is reported to cause problems in older kernels due to some crypto drivers having the same name, so revert it here to fix the problems. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aceda6e2-cefb-4146-aef8-ff4bafa56e56@roeck-us.net Reported-by: Guenter Roeck Cc: Ovidiu Panait Cc: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: jitter - fix CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY help text

2024-03-26T22:20:50Z

[ Upstream commit e63df1ec9a16dd9e13e9068243e64876de06f795 ] Correct various small problems in the help text: a. change 2 spaces to ", " b. finish an incomplete sentence c. change non-working URL to working URL Fixes: a9a98d49da52 ("crypto: Kconfig - simplify compression/RNG entries") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218458 Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Cc: Bagas Sanjaya Cc: Robert Elliott Cc: Christoph Biedl Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Bagas Sanjaya Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin