<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/drivers/block, branch v3.4.70</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.4.70</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.4.70'/>
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<updated>2013-10-13T22:42:47Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>cciss: fix info leak in cciss_ioctl32_passthru()</title>
<updated>2013-10-13T22:42:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-24T22:27:45Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f845e0c5753347df5331b6251da8ea7ddbf59ae9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 58f09e00ae095e46ef9edfcf3a5fd9ccdfad065e upstream.

The arg64 struct has a hole after -&gt;buf_size which isn't cleared.  Or if
any of the calls to copy_from_user() fail then that would cause an
information leak as well.

This was assigned CVE-2013-2147.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mike Miller &lt;mike.miller@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpqarray: fix info leak in ida_locked_ioctl()</title>
<updated>2013-10-13T22:42:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-24T22:27:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dd7c44612de48b6bbd2f81d4b6e83a9801a902a6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 627aad1c01da6f881e7f98d71fd928ca0c316b1a upstream.

The pciinfo struct has a two byte hole after -&gt;dev_fn so stack
information could be leaked to the user.

This was assigned CVE-2013-2147.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mike Miller &lt;mike.miller@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD</title>
<updated>2013-08-04T08:25:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-01-16T16:33:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8f5a2856d99634204cf68605b8c70fcd92c47d47</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 604c499cbbcc3d5fe5fb8d53306aa0fae1990109 upstream.

We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.

This fixes CVE-2013-2140.

Acked-by: Jan Beulich &lt;JBeulich@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ian Campbell &lt;Ian.Campbell@citrix.com&gt;
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>block: do not pass disk names as format strings</title>
<updated>2013-07-13T18:03:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-03T22:01:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a8139b5b8b1355c4909d90afa58b055aabe1a272</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ffc8b30866879ed9ba62bd0a86fecdbd51cd3d19 upstream.

Disk names may contain arbitrary strings, so they must not be
interpreted as format strings.  It seems that only md allows arbitrary
strings to be used for disk names, but this could allow for a local
memory corruption from uid 0 into ring 0.

CVE-2013-2851

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cciss: fix broken mutex usage in ioctl</title>
<updated>2013-06-20T18:58:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen M. Cameron</name>
<email>scameron@beardog.cce.hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-12T21:04:47Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7aaa3421174ff9197d2f9e5f937b0faed738c951</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 03f47e888daf56c8e9046c674719a0bcc644eed5 upstream.

If a new logical drive is added and the CCISS_REGNEWD ioctl is invoked
(as is normal with the Array Configuration Utility) the process will
hang as below.  It attempts to acquire the same mutex twice, once in
do_ioctl() and once in cciss_unlocked_open().  The BKL was recursive,
the mutex isn't.

  Linux version 3.10.0-rc2 (scameron@localhost.localdomain) (gcc version 4.4.7 20120313 (Red Hat 4.4.7-3) (GCC) ) #1 SMP Fri May 24 14:32:12 CDT 2013
  [...]
  acu             D 0000000000000001     0  3246   3191 0x00000080
  Call Trace:
    schedule+0x29/0x70
    schedule_preempt_disabled+0xe/0x10
    __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x17b/0x220
    mutex_lock+0x2b/0x50
    cciss_unlocked_open+0x2f/0x110 [cciss]
    __blkdev_get+0xd3/0x470
    blkdev_get+0x5c/0x1e0
    register_disk+0x182/0x1a0
    add_disk+0x17c/0x310
    cciss_add_disk+0x13a/0x170 [cciss]
    cciss_update_drive_info+0x39b/0x480 [cciss]
    rebuild_lun_table+0x258/0x370 [cciss]
    cciss_ioctl+0x34f/0x470 [cciss]
    do_ioctl+0x49/0x70 [cciss]
    __blkdev_driver_ioctl+0x28/0x30
    blkdev_ioctl+0x200/0x7b0
    block_ioctl+0x3c/0x40
    do_vfs_ioctl+0x89/0x350
    SyS_ioctl+0xa1/0xb0
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

This mutex usage was added into the ioctl path when the big kernel lock
was removed.  As it turns out, these paths are all thread safe anyway
(or can easily be made so) and we don't want ioctl() to be single
threaded in any case.

Signed-off-by: Stephen M. Cameron &lt;scameron@beardog.cce.hp.com&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Mike Miller &lt;mike.miller@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers/block/brd.c: fix brd_lookup_page() race</title>
<updated>2013-06-07T19:49:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Brian Behlendorf</name>
<email>behlendorf1@llnl.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2013-05-24T22:55:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:60e255daee832c39d2099d8f942cbb901d9cb36f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dfd20b2b174d3a9b258ea3b7a35ead33576587b1 upstream.

The index on the page must be set before it is inserted in the radix
tree.  Otherwise there is a small race which can occur during lookup
where the page can be found with the incorrect index.  This will trigger
the BUG_ON() in brd_lookup_page().

Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf &lt;behlendorf1@llnl.gov&gt;
Reported-by: Chris Wedgwood &lt;cw@f00f.org&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drbd: fix for deadlock when using automatic split-brain-recovery</title>
<updated>2013-05-19T17:54:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Philipp Reisner</name>
<email>philipp.reisner@linbit.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-27T13:08:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=2e0bc33ad782e6dfc69796c4dcbbfa7338019548'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2e0bc33ad782e6dfc69796c4dcbbfa7338019548</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7c689e63a847316c1b2500f86891b0a574ce7e69 upstream.

With an automatic after split-brain recovery policy of
"after-sb-1pri call-pri-lost-after-sb",
when trying to drbd_set_role() to R_SECONDARY,
we run into a deadlock.

This was first recognized and supposedly fixed by
2009-06-10 "Fixed a deadlock when using automatic split brain recovery when both nodes are"
replacing drbd_set_role() with drbd_change_state() in that code-path,
but the first hunk of that patch forgets to remove the drbd_set_role().

We apparently only ever tested the "two primaries" case.

Signed-off-by: Philipp Reisner &lt;philipp.reisner@linbit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lars Ellenberg &lt;lars.ellenberg@linbit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi &lt;jhbird.choi@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "xen/blkback: Don't trust the handle from the frontend."</title>
<updated>2013-04-05T17:04:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-03T17:05:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=29fcbcb3e028d63c3bb8a396bd696f82803f8053'/>
<id>urn:sha1:29fcbcb3e028d63c3bb8a396bd696f82803f8053</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit c93c85196e2c7001daa8a04b83a9d6dd4febfb59 which is
commit 01c681d4c70d64cb72142a2823f27c4146a02e63 upstream.

It shouldn't have been applied to the 3.4-stable tree, sorry about that.

Reported-by: William Dauchy &lt;wdauchy@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Ian Campbell &lt;ian.campbell@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>aoe: reserve enough headroom on skbs</title>
<updated>2013-04-05T17:04:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-27T18:28:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d97bcfae8bae32b72c12781fea0cf2ac1fd26776</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 91c5746425aed8f7188a351f1224a26aa232e4b3 ]

Some network drivers use a non default hard_header_len

Transmitted skb should take into account dev-&gt;hard_header_len, or risk
crashes or expensive reallocations.

In the case of aoe, lets reserve MAX_HEADER bytes.

David reported a crash in defxx driver, solved by this patch.

Reported-by: David Oostdyk &lt;daveo@ll.mit.edu&gt;
Tested-by: David Oostdyk &lt;daveo@ll.mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ed Cashin &lt;ecashin@coraid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>loop: prevent bdev freeing while device in use</title>
<updated>2013-04-05T17:04:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Anatol Pomozov</name>
<email>anatol.pomozov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-01T16:47:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ccb3d567d5c7aef76879349a192339569da94c17'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ccb3d567d5c7aef76879349a192339569da94c17</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c1681bf8a7b1b98edee8b862a42c19c4e53205fd upstream.

struct block_device lifecycle is defined by its inode (see fs/block_dev.c) -
block_device allocated first time we access /dev/loopXX and deallocated on
bdev_destroy_inode. When we create the device "losetup /dev/loopXX afile"
we want that block_device stay alive until we destroy the loop device
with "losetup -d".

But because we do not hold /dev/loopXX inode its counter goes 0, and
inode/bdev can be destroyed at any moment. Usually it happens at memory
pressure or when user drops inode cache (like in the test below). When later in
loop_clr_fd() we want to use bdev we have use-after-free error with following
stack:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000280
  bd_set_size+0x10/0xa0
  loop_clr_fd+0x1f8/0x420 [loop]
  lo_ioctl+0x200/0x7e0 [loop]
  lo_compat_ioctl+0x47/0xe0 [loop]
  compat_blkdev_ioctl+0x341/0x1290
  do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
  compat_sys_ioctl+0xc1/0xf20
  do_sys_open+0x16e/0x1d0
  sysenter_dispatch+0x7/0x1a

To prevent use-after-free we need to grab the device in loop_set_fd()
and put it later in loop_clr_fd().

The issue is reprodusible on current Linus head and v3.3. Here is the test:

  dd if=/dev/zero of=loop.file bs=1M count=1
  while [ true ]; do
    losetup /dev/loop0 loop.file
    echo 2 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
    losetup -d /dev/loop0
  done

[ Doing bdgrab/bput in loop_set_fd/loop_clr_fd is safe, because every
  time we call loop_set_fd() we check that loop_device-&gt;lo_state is
  Lo_unbound and set it to Lo_bound If somebody will try to set_fd again
  it will get EBUSY.  And if we try to loop_clr_fd() on unbound loop
  device we'll get ENXIO.

  loop_set_fd/loop_clr_fd (and any other loop ioctl) is called under
  loop_device-&gt;lo_ctl_mutex. ]

Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov &lt;anatol.pomozov@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
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