user/sven/linux.git/drivers/block, branch v6.17.10

nbd: override creds to kernel when calling sock_{send,recv}msg()

2025-10-29T13:10:28Z

[ Upstream commit 81ccca31214e11ea2b537fd35d4f66d7cf46268e ] sock_{send,recv}msg() internally calls security_socket_{send,recv}msg(), which does security checks (e.g. SELinux) for socket access against the current task. However, _sock_xmit() in drivers/block/nbd.c may be called indirectly from a userspace syscall, where the NBD socket access would be incorrectly checked against the calling userspace task (which simply tries to read/write a file that happens to reside on an NBD device). To fix this, temporarily override creds to kernel ones before calling the sock_*() functions. This allows the security modules to recognize this as internal access by the kernel, which will normally be allowed. A way to trigger the issue is to do the following (on a system with SELinux set to enforcing): ### Create nbd device: truncate -s 256M /tmp/testfile nbd-server localhost:10809 /tmp/testfile ### Connect to the nbd server: nbd-client localhost ### Create mdraid array mdadm --create -l 1 -n 2 /dev/md/testarray /dev/nbd0 missing After these steps, assuming the SELinux policy doesn't allow the unexpected access pattern, errors will be visible on the kernel console: [ 142.204243] nbd0: detected capacity change from 0 to 524288 [ 165.189967] md: async del_gendisk mode will be removed in future, please upgrade to mdadm-4.5+ [ 165.252299] md/raid1:md127: active with 1 out of 2 mirrors [ 165.252725] md127: detected capacity change from 0 to 522240 [ 165.255434] block nbd0: Send control failed (result -13) [ 165.255718] block nbd0: Request send failed, requeueing [ 165.256006] block nbd0: Dead connection, failed to find a fallback [ 165.256041] block nbd0: Receive control failed (result -32) [ 165.256423] block nbd0: shutting down sockets [ 165.257196] I/O error, dev nbd0, sector 2048 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 2 [ 165.257736] Buffer I/O error on dev md127, logical block 0, async page read [ 165.258263] I/O error, dev nbd0, sector 2048 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 2 [ 165.259376] Buffer I/O error on dev md127, logical block 0, async page read [ 165.259920] I/O error, dev nbd0, sector 2048 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 2 [ 165.260628] Buffer I/O error on dev md127, logical block 0, async page read [ 165.261661] ldm_validate_partition_table(): Disk read failed. [ 165.262108] I/O error, dev nbd0, sector 2048 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 2 [ 165.262769] Buffer I/O error on dev md127, logical block 0, async page read [ 165.263697] I/O error, dev nbd0, sector 2048 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 2 [ 165.264412] Buffer I/O error on dev md127, logical block 0, async page read [ 165.265412] I/O error, dev nbd0, sector 2048 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 2 [ 165.265872] Buffer I/O error on dev md127, logical block 0, async page read [ 165.266378] I/O error, dev nbd0, sector 2048 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 2 [ 165.267168] Buffer I/O error on dev md127, logical block 0, async page read [ 165.267564] md127: unable to read partition table [ 165.269581] I/O error, dev nbd0, sector 0 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 2 [ 165.269960] Buffer I/O error on dev nbd0, logical block 0, async page read [ 165.270316] I/O error, dev nbd0, sector 0 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 2 [ 165.270913] Buffer I/O error on dev nbd0, logical block 0, async page read [ 165.271253] I/O error, dev nbd0, sector 0 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 2 [ 165.271809] Buffer I/O error on dev nbd0, logical block 0, async page read [ 165.272074] ldm_validate_partition_table(): Disk read failed. [ 165.272360] nbd0: unable to read partition table [ 165.289004] ldm_validate_partition_table(): Disk read failed. [ 165.289614] nbd0: unable to read partition table The corresponding SELinux denial on Fedora/RHEL will look like this (assuming it's not silenced): type=AVC msg=audit(1758104872.510:116): avc: denied { write } for pid=1908 comm="mdadm" laddr=::1 lport=32772 faddr=::1 fport=10809 scontext=system_u:system_r:mdadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=tcp_socket permissive=0 The respective backtrace looks like this: @security[mdadm, -13, handshake_exit+221615650 handshake_exit+221615650 handshake_exit+221616465 security_socket_sendmsg+5 sock_sendmsg+106 handshake_exit+221616150 sock_sendmsg+5 __sock_xmit+162 nbd_send_cmd+597 nbd_handle_cmd+377 nbd_queue_rq+63 blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+653 __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+184 __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+333 blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+38 blk_mq_run_hw_queue+239 blk_mq_dispatch_plug_list+382 blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.0+55 __blk_flush_plug+241 __submit_bio+353 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+364 submit_bio_wait+84 __blkdev_direct_IO_simple+232 blkdev_read_iter+162 vfs_read+591 ksys_read+95 do_syscall_64+92 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+120 ]: 1 The issue has started to appear since commit 060406c61c7c ("block: add plug while submitting IO"). Cc: Ming Lei Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2348878 Fixes: 060406c61c7c ("block: add plug while submitting IO") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Reviewed-by: Ming Lei Tested-by: Ming Lei Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

loop: fix backing file reference leak on validation error

2025-10-19T14:37:28Z

commit 98b7bf54338b797e3a11e8178ce0e806060d8fa3 upstream. loop_change_fd() and loop_configure() call loop_check_backing_file() to validate the new backing file. If validation fails, the reference acquired by fget() was not dropped, leaking a file reference. Fix this by calling fput(file) before returning the error. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Markus Elfring CC: Yang Erkun Cc: Ming Lei Cc: Yu Kuai Fixes: f5c84eff634b ("loop: Add sanity check for read/write_iter") Signed-off-by: Li Chen Reviewed-by: Ming Lei Reviewed-by: Yang Erkun Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

nbd: restrict sockets to TCP and UDP

2025-10-15T10:03:27Z

[ Upstream commit 9f7c02e031570e8291a63162c6c046dc15ff85b0 ] Recently, syzbot started to abuse NBD with all kinds of sockets. Commit cf1b2326b734 ("nbd: verify socket is supported during setup") made sure the socket supported a shutdown() method. Explicitely accept TCP and UNIX stream sockets. Fixes: cf1b2326b734 ("nbd: verify socket is supported during setup") Reported-by: syzbot+e1cd6bd8493060bd701d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iJ+76eE3A_8S_zTpSyW5hvPRn6V57458hCZGY5hbH_bFA@mail.gmail.com/T/#m081036e8747cd7e2626c1da5d78c8b9d1e55b154 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Mike Christie Cc: Richard W.M. Jones Cc: Jens Axboe Cc: Yu Kuai Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org Cc: nbd@other.debian.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

null_blk: Fix the description of the cache_size module argument

2025-10-15T10:03:26Z

[ Upstream commit 7942b226e6b84df13b46b76c01d3b6e07a1b349e ] When executing modinfo null_blk, there is an error in the description of module parameter mbps, and the output information of cache_size is incomplete.The output of modinfo before and after applying this patch is as follows: Before: [...] parm: cache_size:ulong [...] parm: mbps:Cache size in MiB for memory-backed device. Default: 0 (none) (uint) [...] After: [...] parm: cache_size:Cache size in MiB for memory-backed device. Default: 0 (none) (ulong) [...] parm: mbps:Limit maximum bandwidth (in MiB/s). Default: 0 (no limit) (uint) [...] Fixes: 058efe000b31 ("null_blk: add module parameters for 4 options") Signed-off-by: Genjian Zhang Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Merge tag 'block-6.17-20250918' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux

2025-09-19T19:26:20Z

Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe: "A set of fixes for an issue with md array assembly and drbd for devices supporting write zeros" * tag 'block-6.17-20250918' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux: drbd: init queue_limits->max_hw_wzeroes_unmap_sectors parameter md: init queue_limits->max_hw_wzeroes_unmap_sectors parameter

drbd: init queue_limits->max_hw_wzeroes_unmap_sectors parameter

2025-09-17T14:20:49Z

The parameter max_hw_wzeroes_unmap_sectors in queue_limits should be equal to max_write_zeroes_sectors if it is set to a non-zero value. However, when the backend bdev is specified, this parameter is initialized to UINT_MAX during the call to blk_set_stacking_limits(), while only max_write_zeroes_sectors is adjusted. Therefore, this discrepancy triggers a value check failure in blk_validate_limits(). Since the drvd driver doesn't yet support unmap write zeroes, so fix this failure by explicitly setting max_hw_wzeroes_unmap_sectors to zero. Fixes: 0c40d7cb5ef3 ("block: introduce max_{hw|user}_wzeroes_unmap_sectors to queue limits") Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe

zram: fix slot write race condition

2025-09-16T03:01:45Z

Parallel concurrent writes to the same zram index result in leaked zsmalloc handles. Schematically we can have something like this: CPU0 CPU1 zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() compress compress handle = zs_malloc() handle = zs_malloc() zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock Either CPU0 or CPU1 zsmalloc handle will leak because zs_free() is done too early. In fact, we need to reset zram entry right before we set its new handle, all under the same slot lock scope. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250909045150.635345-1-senozhatsky@chromium.org Fixes: 71268035f5d7 ("zram: free slot memory early during write") Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky Reported-by: Changhui Zhong Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAGVVp+UtpGoW5WEdEU7uVTtsSCjPN=ksN6EcvyypAtFDOUf30A@mail.gmail.com/ Tested-by: Changhui Zhong Cc: Jens Axboe Cc: Minchan Kim Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton

ublk: avoid ublk_io_release() called after ublk char dev is closed

2025-08-28T13:56:57Z

When running test_stress_04.sh, the following warning is triggered: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 135 at drivers/block/ublk_drv.c:1933 ublk_ch_release+0x423/0x4b0 [ublk_drv] This happens when the daemon is abruptly killed: - some references may still be held, because registering IO buffer doesn't grab ublk char device reference OR - io->task_registered_buffers won't be cleared because io buffer is released from non-daemon context For zero-copy and auto buffer register modes, I/O reference crosses syscalls, so IO reference may not be dropped naturally when ublk server is killed abruptly. However, when releasing io_uring context, it is guaranteed that the reference is dropped finally, see io_sqe_buffers_unregister() from io_ring_ctx_free(). Fix this by adding ublk_drain_io_references() that: - Waits for active I/O references dropped in async way by scheduling work function, for avoiding ublk dev and io_uring file's release dependency - Reinitializes io->ref and io->task_registered_buffers to clean state This ensures the reference count state is clean when ublk_queue_reinit() is called, preventing the warning and potential use-after-free. Fixes: 1f6540e2aabb ("ublk: zc register/unregister bvec") Fixes: 1ceeedb59749 ("ublk: optimize UBLK_IO_UNREGISTER_IO_BUF on daemon task") Fixes: 8a8fe42d765b ("ublk: optimize UBLK_IO_REGISTER_IO_BUF on daemon task") Signed-off-by: Ming Lei Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250827121602.2619736-2-ming.lei@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe

loop: fix zero sized loop for block special file

2025-08-25T13:46:57Z

By default, /dev/sda is block special file from devtmpfs, getattr will return file size as zero, causing loop failed for raw block device. We can add bdev_statx() to return device size, however this may introduce changes that are not acknowledged by user. Fix this problem by reverting changes for block special file, file mapping host is set to bdev inode while opening, and use i_size_read() directly to get device size. Fixes: 47b71abd5846 ("loop: use vfs_getattr_nosec for accurate file size") Reported-by: kernel test robot Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202508200409.b2459c02-lkp@intel.com Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai Reviewed-by: Ming Lei Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250825093205.3684121-1-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com [axboe: fix spelling error] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe

loop: use vfs_getattr_nosec for accurate file size

2025-08-18T19:10:35Z

Use vfs_getattr_nosec() in lo_calculate_size() for getting the file size, rather than just read the cached inode size via i_size_read(). This provides better results than cached inode data, particularly for network filesystems where metadata may be stale. Signed-off-by: Rajeev Mishra Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250818184821.115033-3-rajeevm@hpe.com [axboe: massage commit message] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe