user/sven/linux.git/drivers/usb/core/devio.c, branch v4.9.74

USB: usbfs: Filter flags passed in from user space

2017-12-09T21:01:57Z

commit 446f666da9f019ce2ffd03800995487e79a91462 upstream. USBDEVFS_URB_ISO_ASAP must be accepted only for ISO endpoints. Improve sanity checking. Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum Acked-by: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

USB: devio: Prevent integer overflow in proc_do_submiturb()

2017-12-09T21:01:57Z

commit 57999d1107c1e60c2ca7088f2ac0f819e2f554b3 upstream. There used to be an integer overflow check in proc_do_submiturb() but we removed it. It turns out that it's still required. The uurb->buffer_length variable is a signed integer and it's controlled by the user. It can lead to an integer overflow when we do: num_sgs = DIV_ROUND_UP(uurb->buffer_length, USB_SG_SIZE); If we strip away the macro then that line looks like this: num_sgs = (uurb->buffer_length + USB_SG_SIZE - 1) / USB_SG_SIZE; ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ It's the first addition which can overflow. Fixes: 1129d270cbfb ("USB: Increase usbfs transfer limit") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Acked-by: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

USB: Increase usbfs transfer limit

2017-12-09T21:01:57Z

commit 1129d270cbfbb7e2b1ec3dede4a13930bdd10e41 upstream. Promote a variable keeping track of USB transfer memory usage to a wider data type and allow for higher bandwidth transfers from a large number of USB devices connected to a single host. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Berezecki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

USB: usbfs: compute urb->actual_length for isochronous

2017-11-21T08:23:29Z

commit 2ef47001b3ee3ded579b7532ebdcf8680e4d8c54 upstream. The USB kerneldoc says that the actual_length field "is read in non-iso completion functions", but the usbfs driver uses it for all URB types in processcompl(). Since not all of the host controller drivers set actual_length for isochronous URBs, programs using usbfs with some host controllers don't work properly. For example, Minas reports that a USB camera controlled by libusb doesn't work properly with a dwc2 controller. It doesn't seem worthwhile to change the HCDs and the documentation, since the in-kernel USB class drivers evidently don't rely on actual_length for isochronous transfers. The easiest solution is for usbfs to calculate the actual_length value for itself, by adding up the lengths of the individual packets in an isochronous transfer. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern CC: Minas Harutyunyan Reported-and-tested-by: wlf Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

USB: devio: Revert "USB: devio: Don't corrupt user memory"

2017-10-27T08:38:05Z

commit 845d584f41eac3475c21e4a7d5e88d0f6e410cf7 upstream. Taking the uurb->buffer_length userspace passes in as a maximum for the actual urbs transfer_buffer_length causes 2 serious issues: 1) It breaks isochronous support for all userspace apps using libusb, as existing libusb versions pass in 0 for uurb->buffer_length, relying on the kernel using the lenghts of the usbdevfs_iso_packet_desc descriptors passed in added together as buffer length. This for example causes redirection of USB audio and Webcam's into virtual machines using qemu-kvm to no longer work. This is a userspace ABI break and as such must be reverted. Note that the original commit does not protect other users / the kernels memory, it only stops the userspace process making the call from shooting itself in the foot. 2) It may cause the kernel to program host controllers to DMA over random memory. Just as the devio code used to only look at the iso_packet_desc lenghts, the host drivers do the same, relying on the submitter of the urbs to make sure the entire buffer is large enough and not checking transfer_buffer_length. But the "USB: devio: Don't corrupt user memory" commit now takes the userspace provided uurb->buffer_length for the buffer-size while copying over the user-provided iso_packet_desc lengths 1:1, allowing the user to specify a small buffer size while programming the host controller to dma a lot more data. (Atleast the ohci, uhci, xhci and fhci drivers do not check transfer_buffer_length for isoc transfers.) This reverts commit fa1ed74eb1c2 ("USB: devio: Don't corrupt user memory") fixing both these issues. Cc: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Acked-by: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

USB: devio: Don't corrupt user memory

2017-10-12T09:51:17Z

commit fa1ed74eb1c233be6131ec92df21ab46499a15b6 upstream. The user buffer has "uurb->buffer_length" bytes. If the kernel has more information than that, we should truncate it instead of writing past the end of the user's buffer. I added a WARN_ONCE() to help the user debug the issue. Reported-by: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Acked-by: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

USB: core: Avoid race of async_completed() w/ usbdev_release()

2017-09-09T15:39:37Z

commit ed62ca2f4f51c17841ea39d98c0c409cb53a3e10 upstream. While running reboot tests w/ a specific set of USB devices (and slub_debug enabled), I found that once every few hours my device would be crashed with a stack that looked like this: [ 14.012445] BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#0, modprobe/2091 [ 14.012460] lock: 0xffffffc0cb055978, .magic: ffffffc0, .owner: cryption contexts: %lu/%lu [ 14.012460] /1025536097, .owner_cpu: 0 [ 14.012466] CPU: 0 PID: 2091 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.4.79 #352 [ 14.012468] Hardware name: Google Kevin (DT) [ 14.012471] Call trace: [ 14.012483] [<....>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x160 [ 14.012487] [<....>] show_stack+0x20/0x28 [ 14.012494] [<....>] dump_stack+0xb4/0xf0 [ 14.012500] [<....>] spin_dump+0x8c/0x98 [ 14.012504] [<....>] spin_bug+0x30/0x3c [ 14.012508] [<....>] do_raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x164 [ 14.012515] [<....>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x64/0x74 [ 14.012521] [<....>] __wake_up+0x2c/0x60 [ 14.012528] [<....>] async_completed+0x2d0/0x300 [ 14.012534] [<....>] __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0xc4/0x138 [ 14.012538] [<....>] usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x54/0xf0 [ 14.012544] [<....>] xhci_irq+0x1314/0x1348 [ 14.012548] [<....>] usb_hcd_irq+0x40/0x50 [ 14.012553] [<....>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1b4/0x3f0 [ 14.012556] [<....>] handle_irq_event+0x4c/0x7c [ 14.012561] [<....>] handle_fasteoi_irq+0x158/0x1c8 [ 14.012564] [<....>] generic_handle_irq+0x30/0x44 [ 14.012568] [<....>] __handle_domain_irq+0x90/0xbc [ 14.012572] [<....>] gic_handle_irq+0xcc/0x18c Investigation using kgdb() found that the wait queue that was passed into wake_up() had been freed (it was filled with slub_debug poison). I analyzed and instrumented the code and reproduced. My current belief is that this is happening: 1. async_completed() is called (from IRQ). Moves "as" onto the completed list. 2. On another CPU, proc_reapurbnonblock_compat() calls async_getcompleted(). Blocks on spinlock. 3. async_completed() releases the lock; keeps running; gets blocked midway through wake_up(). 4. proc_reapurbnonblock_compat() => async_getcompleted() gets the lock; removes "as" from completed list and frees it. 5. usbdev_release() is called. Frees "ps". 6. async_completed() finally continues running wake_up(). ...but wake_up() has a pointer to the freed "ps". The instrumentation that led me to believe this was based on adding some trace_printk() calls in a select few functions and then using kdb's "ftdump" at crash time. The trace follows (NOTE: in the trace below I cheated a little bit and added a udelay(1000) in async_completed() after releasing the spinlock because I wanted it to trigger quicker): <...>-2104 0d.h2 13759034us!: async_completed at start: as=ffffffc0cc638200 mtpd-2055 3.... 13759356us : async_getcompleted before spin_lock_irqsave mtpd-2055 3d..1 13759362us : async_getcompleted after list_del_init: as=ffffffc0cc638200 mtpd-2055 3.... 13759371us+: proc_reapurbnonblock_compat: free_async(ffffffc0cc638200) mtpd-2055 3.... 13759422us+: async_getcompleted before spin_lock_irqsave mtpd-2055 3.... 13759479us : usbdev_release at start: ps=ffffffc0cc042080 mtpd-2055 3.... 13759487us : async_getcompleted before spin_lock_irqsave mtpd-2055 3.... 13759497us!: usbdev_release after kfree(ps): ps=ffffffc0cc042080 <...>-2104 0d.h2 13760294us : async_completed before wake_up(): as=ffffffc0cc638200 To fix this problem we can just move the wake_up() under the ps->lock. There should be no issues there that I'm aware of. Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson Acked-by: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

USB: core: replace %p with %pK

2017-05-25T13:44:30Z

commit 2f964780c03b73de269b08d12aff96a9618d13f3 upstream. Format specifier %p can leak kernel addresses while not valuing the kptr_restrict system settings. When kptr_restrict is set to (1), kernel pointers printed using the %pK format specifier will be replaced with Zeros. Debugging Note : &pK prints only Zeros as address. If you need actual address information, write 0 to kptr_restrict. echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict [Found by poking around in a random vendor kernel tree, it would be nice if someone would actually send these types of patches upstream - gkh] Signed-off-by: Vamsi Krishna Samavedam Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestamps

2016-09-28T01:06:21Z

CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps. Use current_time() instead. CURRENT_TIME is also not y2038 safe. This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them y2038 safe. As part of the effort current_time() will be extended to do range checks. Hence, it is necessary for all file system timestamps to use current_time(). Also, current_time() will be transitioned along with vfs to be y2038 safe. Note that whenever a single call to current_time() is used to change timestamps in different inodes, it is because they share the same time granularity. Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Felipe Balbi Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi Acked-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Al Viro

USB: avoid left shift by -1

2016-08-23T20:35:20Z

UBSAN complains about a left shift by -1 in proc_do_submiturb(). This can occur when an URB is submitted for a bulk or control endpoint on a high-speed device, since the code doesn't bother to check the endpoint type; normally only interrupt or isochronous endpoints have a nonzero bInterval value. Aside from the fact that the operation is illegal, it shouldn't matter because the result isn't used. Still, in theory it could cause a hardware exception or other problem, so we should work around it. This patch avoids doing the left shift unless the shift amount is >= 0. The same piece of code has another problem. When checking the device speed (the exponential encoding for interrupt endpoints is used only by high-speed or faster devices), we need to look for speed >= USB_SPEED_SUPER as well as speed == USB_SPEED HIGH. The patch adds this check. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern Reported-by: Vittorio Zecca Tested-by: Vittorio Zecca Suggested-by: Bjørn Mork CC: Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman