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<title>user/sven/linux.git/fs/binfmt_script.c, branch v4.9.24</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2014-12-13T20:42:51Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>syscalls: implement execveat() system call</title>
<updated>2014-12-13T20:42:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Drysdale</name>
<email>drysdale@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-13T00:57:29Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:51f39a1f0cea1cacf8c787f652f26dfee9611874</id>
<content type='text'>
This patchset adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd
Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528).

The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an
implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc filesystem,
at least for executables (rather than scripts).  The current glibc version
of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which causes problems in sandboxed
or otherwise restricted environments.

Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA suggested
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2) syscall would be
an appropriate generalization.

Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument without
back-compatibility concerns.  The current implementation just defines the
AT_EMPTY_PATH and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags, but other flags could be
added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces (as suggested at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474).

Related history:
 - https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone
   realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment.
 - http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered
   documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to
   "prevent other people from wasting their time".
 - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a
   problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve()
   because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since
   been fixed.

This patch (of 4):

Add a new execveat(2) system call.  execveat() is to execve() as openat()
is to open(): it takes a file descriptor that refers to a directory, and
resolves the filename relative to that.

In addition, if the filename is empty and AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified,
execveat() executes the file to which the file descriptor refers.  This
replicates the functionality of fexecve(), which is a system call in other
UNIXen, but in Linux glibc it depends on opening "/proc/self/fd/&lt;fd&gt;" (and
so relies on /proc being mounted).

The filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] (or the name of the
script fed to a script interpreter) will be of the form "/dev/fd/&lt;fd&gt;"
(for an empty filename) or "/dev/fd/&lt;fd&gt;/&lt;filename&gt;", effectively
reflecting how the executable was found.  This does however mean that
execution of a script in a /proc-less environment won't work; also, script
execution via an O_CLOEXEC file descriptor fails (as the file will not be
accessible after exec).

Based on patches by Meredydd Luff.

Signed-off-by: David Drysdale &lt;drysdale@google.com&gt;
Cc: Meredydd Luff &lt;meredydd@senatehouse.org&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah.kh@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@aerifal.cx&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: do not leave bprm-&gt;interp on stack</title>
<updated>2012-12-21T01:40:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-20T23:05:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b66c5984017533316fd1951770302649baf1aa33</id>
<content type='text'>
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.

Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm-&gt;buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules.  Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted.  They leave bprm-&gt;interp
pointing to their local stack.  This means on restart bprm-&gt;interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.

After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules.  As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.

This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm-&gt;interp.  To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is.  Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.

For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:

   http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: halfdog &lt;me@halfdog.net&gt;
Cc: P J P &lt;ppandit@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: use -ELOOP for max recursion depth</title>
<updated>2012-12-18T01:15:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-18T00:03:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d740269867021faf4ce38a449353d2b986c34a67</id>
<content type='text'>
To avoid an explosion of request_module calls on a chain of abusive
scripts, fail maximum recursion with -ELOOP instead of -ENOEXEC. As soon
as maximum recursion depth is hit, the error will fail all the way back
up the chain, aborting immediately.

This also has the side-effect of stopping the user's shell from attempting
to reexecute the top-level file as a shell script. As seen in the
dash source:

        if (cmd != path_bshell &amp;&amp; errno == ENOEXEC) {
                *argv-- = cmd;
                *argv = cmd = path_bshell;
                goto repeat;
        }

The above logic was designed for running scripts automatically that lacked
the "#!" header, not to re-try failed recursion. On a legitimate -ENOEXEC,
things continue to behave as the shell expects.

Additionally, when tracking recursion, the binfmt handlers should not be
involved. The recursion being tracked is the depth of calls through
search_binary_handler(), so that function should be exclusively responsible
for tracking the depth.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: halfdog &lt;me@halfdog.net&gt;
Cc: P J P &lt;ppandit@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>get rid of pt_regs argument of -&gt;load_binary()</title>
<updated>2012-11-29T02:53:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-21T02:00:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:71613c3b871c5a9f27cc48f124251bcd3aa23be1</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>get rid of pt_regs argument of search_binary_handler()</title>
<updated>2012-11-29T02:53:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-21T01:53:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3c456bfc4ba66e9cda210da7bc4fb0ba9fcc6972</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>__register_binfmt() made void</title>
<updated>2012-03-21T01:29:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-17T07:05:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8fc3dc5a3a17aa2b353886422bd89420619af211</id>
<content type='text'>
Just don't pass NULL to it - nobody does, anyway.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer</title>
<updated>2010-08-18T01:07:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-08-17T22:52:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d7627467b7a8dd6944885290a03a07ceb28c10eb</id>
<content type='text'>
Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer so that kernel_execve() compiles
correctly on ARM:

arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:88: warning: passing argument 1 of 'do_execve' discards qualifiers from pointer target type

This also requires the argv and envp arguments to be consted twice, once for
the pointer array and once for the strings the array points to.  This is
because do_execve() passes a pointer to the filename (now const) to
copy_strings_kernel().  A simpler alternative would be to cast the filename
pointer in do_execve() when it's passed to copy_strings_kernel().

do_execve() may not change any of the strings it is passed as part of the argv
or envp lists as they are some of them in .rodata, so marking these strings as
const should be fine.

Further kernel_execve() and sys_execve() need to be changed to match.

This has been test built on x86_64, frv, arm and mips.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Acked-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h</title>
<updated>2010-03-30T13:02:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2010-03-24T08:04:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5a0e3ad6af8660be21ca98a971cd00f331318c05</id>
<content type='text'>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files.  percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.

percpu.h -&gt; slab.h dependency is about to be removed.  Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability.  As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.

  http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py

The script does the followings.

* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
  only the necessary includes are there.  ie. if only gfp is used,
  gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.

* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
  blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
  to its surrounding.  It's put in the include block which contains
  core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
  alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
  doesn't seem to be any matching order.

* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
  because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
  an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
  file.

The conversion was done in the following steps.

1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
   over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
   and ~3000 slab.h inclusions.  The script emitted errors for ~400
   files.

2. Each error was manually checked.  Some didn't need the inclusion,
   some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
   embedding .c file was more appropriate for others.  This step added
   inclusions to around 150 files.

3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
   from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.

4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
   e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
   APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.

5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
   editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
   files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell.  Most gfp.h
   inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
   wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros.  Each
   slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
   necessary.

6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.

7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
   were fixed.  CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
   distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
   more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
   build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).

   * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
   * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * ia64 SMP allmodconfig
   * s390 SMP allmodconfig
   * alpha SMP allmodconfig
   * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig

8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
   a separate patch and serve as bisection point.

Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn &lt;Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Allow recursion in binfmt_script and binfmt_misc</title>
<updated>2008-10-16T18:21:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill@shutemov.name</email>
</author>
<published>2008-10-16T05:02:39Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:bf2a9a39639b8b51377905397a5005f444e9a892</id>
<content type='text'>
binfmt_script and binfmt_misc disallow recursion to avoid stack overflow
using sh_bang and misc_bang.  It causes problem in some cases:

$ echo '#!/bin/ls' &gt; /tmp/t0
$ echo '#!/tmp/t0' &gt; /tmp/t1
$ echo '#!/tmp/t1' &gt; /tmp/t2
$ chmod +x /tmp/t*
$ /tmp/t2
zsh: exec format error: /tmp/t2

Similar problem with binfmt_misc.

This patch introduces field 'recursion_depth' into struct linux_binprm to
track recursion level in binfmt_misc and binfmt_script.  If recursion
level more then BINPRM_MAX_RECURSION it generates -ENOEXEC.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make linux_binprm.recursion_depth a uint]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binfmt_misc.c: avoid potential kernel stack overflow</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Emelyanov</name>
<email>xemul@openvz.org</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T07:59:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3a2e7f47d71e1df86acc1dda6826890b6546a4e1</id>
<content type='text'>
This can be triggered with root help only, but...

Register the ":text:E::txt::/root/cat.txt:' rule in binfmt_misc (by root) and
try launching the cat.txt file (by anyone) :) The result is - the endless
recursion in the load_misc_binary -&gt; open_exec -&gt; load_misc_binary chain and
stack overflow.

There's a similar problem with binfmt_script, and there's a sh_bang memner on
linux_binprm structure to handle this, but simply raising this in binfmt_misc
may break some setups when the interpreter of some misc binaries is a script.

So the proposal is to turn sh_bang into a bit, add a new one (the misc_bang)
and raise it in load_misc_binary.  After this, even if we set up the misc -&gt;
script -&gt; misc loop for binfmts one of them will step on its own bang and
exit.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
