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<title>user/sven/linux.git/fs/ecryptfs, branch v4.9.243</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.243</id>
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<updated>2020-03-11T06:53:06Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: Fix up bad backport of fe2e082f5da5b4a0a92ae32978f81507ef37ec66</title>
<updated>2020-03-11T06:53:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nathan Chancellor</name>
<email>natechancellor@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-02T20:39:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4fc0da550f0c114e588248b813436285aca0e9a1</id>
<content type='text'>
When doing the 4.9 merge into certain Android trees, I noticed a warning
from Android's deprecated GCC 4.9.4, which causes a build failure in
those trees due to basically -Werror:

fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'ecryptfs_parse_packet_set':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1357:2: warning: 'auth_tok_list_item' may be used
uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
  memset(auth_tok_list_item, 0,
  ^
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1260:38: note: 'auth_tok_list_item' was declared
here
  struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item;
                                      ^

GCC 9.2.0 was not able to pick up this warning when I tested it.

Turns out that Clang warns as well when -Wuninitialized is used, which
is not the case in older stable trees at the moment (but shows value in
potentially backporting the various warning fixes currently in upstream
to get more coverage).

fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1284:6: warning: variable 'auth_tok_list_item' is
used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true
[-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
        if (data[(*packet_size)++] != ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE) {
            ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1360:4: note: uninitialized use occurs here
                        auth_tok_list_item);
                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1284:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is
always false
        if (data[(*packet_size)++] != ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE) {
        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1260:56: note: initialize the variable
'auth_tok_list_item' to silence this warning
        struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item;
                                                              ^
                                                               = NULL
1 warning generated.

Somehow, commit fe2e082f5da5 ("ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in
parse_tag_1_packet()") upstream was not applied in the correct if block
in 4.4.215, 4.9.215, and 4.14.172, which will indeed lead to use of
uninitialized memory. Fix it up by undoing the bad backport in those
trees then reapplying the patch in the proper location.

Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: replace BUG_ON with error handling code</title>
<updated>2020-02-28T14:42:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Aditya Pakki</name>
<email>pakki001@umn.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-14T18:21:01Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:61faa537979103e4a55714a4c0e17153485e9d39</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2c2a7552dd6465e8fde6bc9cccf8d66ed1c1eb72 upstream.

In crypt_scatterlist, if the crypt_stat argument is not set up
correctly, the kernel crashes. Instead, by returning an error code
upstream, the error is handled safely.

The issue is detected via a static analysis tool written by us.

Fixes: 237fead619984 (ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig)
Signed-off-by: Aditya Pakki &lt;pakki001@umn.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;code@tyhicks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in ecryptfs_init_messaging()</title>
<updated>2020-02-28T14:42:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wenwen Wang</name>
<email>wenwen@cs.uga.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-20T05:33:54Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2aa170c82efdc8795a6dbe8fabd8b533fe66ddd3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b4a81b87a4cfe2bb26a4a943b748d96a43ef20e8 upstream.

In ecryptfs_init_messaging(), if the allocation for 'ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr'
fails, the previously allocated 'ecryptfs_daemon_hash' is not deallocated,
leading to a memory leak bug. To fix this issue, free
'ecryptfs_daemon_hash' before returning the error.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 88b4a07e6610 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key transport mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang &lt;wenwen@cs.uga.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1_packet()</title>
<updated>2020-02-28T14:42:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wenwen Wang</name>
<email>wenwen@cs.uga.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-20T05:16:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f3ee3badcb78007c71e11deb6a9d5ddd7266f03a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fe2e082f5da5b4a0a92ae32978f81507ef37ec66 upstream.

In parse_tag_1_packet(), if tag 1 packet contains a key larger than
ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES, no cleanup is executed, leading to a
memory leak on the allocated 'auth_tok_list_item'. To fix this issue, go to
the label 'out_free' to perform the cleanup work.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dddfa461fc89 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management")
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang &lt;wenwen@cs.uga.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry-&gt;d_parent is not stable either</title>
<updated>2019-11-25T08:51:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-03T18:55:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5772d851bcb5594316df1e80a3d8c886125f605a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 762c69685ff7ad5ad7fee0656671e20a0c9c864d upstream.

We need to get the underlying dentry of parent; sure, absent the races
it is the parent of underlying dentry, but there's nothing to prevent
losing a timeslice to preemtion in the middle of evaluation of
lower_dentry-&gt;d_parent-&gt;d_inode, having another process move lower_dentry
around and have its (ex)parent not pinned anymore and freed on memory
pressure.  Then we regain CPU and try to fetch -&gt;d_inode from memory
that is freed by that point.

dentry-&gt;d_parent *is* stable here - it's an argument of -&gt;lookup() and
we are guaranteed that it won't be moved anywhere until we feed it
to d_add/d_splice_alias.  So we safely go that way to get to its
underlying dentry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # since 2009 or so
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry-&gt;d_inode is not stable</title>
<updated>2019-11-25T08:51:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-03T18:45:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:99eef2576e1906c4e1ce3b859ce3dc42b47c26e4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e72b9dd6a5f17d0fb51f16f8685f3004361e83d0 upstream.

lower_dentry can't go from positive to negative (we have it pinned),
but it *can* go from negative to positive.  So fetching -&gt;d_inode
into a local variable, doing a blocking allocation, checking that
now -&gt;d_inode is non-NULL and feeding the value we'd fetched
earlier to a function that won't accept NULL is not a good idea.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: fix a couple type promotion bugs</title>
<updated>2019-08-04T07:33:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-04T09:35:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e23504dda096ff0b7cf6d1ed43d10181a823f9ea</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0bdf8a8245fdea6f075a5fede833a5fcf1b3466c upstream.

ECRYPTFS_SIZE_AND_MARKER_BYTES is type size_t, so if "rc" is negative
that gets type promoted to a high positive value and treated as success.

Fixes: 778aeb42a708 ("eCryptfs: Cleanup and optimize ecryptfs_lookup_interpose()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
[tyhicks: Use "if/else if" rather than "if/if"]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>do d_instantiate/unlock_new_inode combinations safely</title>
<updated>2018-05-30T05:50:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-04T12:23:01Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2d2d3f1ee7c4a1fe3bc43b685e16a1439e6821d5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1e2e547a93a00ebc21582c06ca3c6cfea2a309ee upstream.

For anything NFS-exported we do _not_ want to unlock new inode
before it has grown an alias; original set of fixes got the
ordering right, but missed the nasty complication in case of
lockdep being enabled - unlock_new_inode() does
	lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(inode)
which can only be done before anyone gets a chance to touch
-&gt;i_mutex.  Unfortunately, flipping the order and doing
unlock_new_inode() before d_instantiate() opens a window when
mkdir can race with open-by-fhandle on a guessed fhandle, leading
to multiple aliases for a directory inode and all the breakage
that follows from that.

	Correct solution: a new primitive (d_instantiate_new())
combining these two in the right order - lockdep annotate, then
d_instantiate(), then the rest of unlock_new_inode().  All
combinations of d_instantiate() with unlock_new_inode() should
be converted to that.

Cc: stable@kernel.org	# 2.6.29 and later
Tested-by: Mike Marshall &lt;hubcap@omnibond.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: use after free in ecryptfs_release_messaging()</title>
<updated>2017-11-30T08:39:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-22T20:41:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7d00fdbc494306fa3a8cdaf8659ca2ab591f5830</id>
<content type='text'>
commit db86be3a12d0b6e5c5b51c2ab2a48f06329cb590 upstream.

We're freeing the list iterator so we should be using the _safe()
version of hlist_for_each_entry().

Fixes: 88b4a07e6610 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key transport mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T08:49:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-09T19:51:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4b86c486e628e7b4804f279b35ffba096e37f279</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f66665c09ab489a11ca490d6a82df57cfc1bea3e upstream.

In eCryptfs, we failed to verify that the authentication token keys are
not revoked before dereferencing their payloads, which is problematic
because the payload of a revoked key is NULL.  request_key() *does* skip
revoked keys, but there is still a window where the key can be revoked
before we acquire the key semaphore.

Fix it by updating ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to return
-EKEYREVOKED if the key payload is NULL.  For completeness we check this
for "encrypted" keys as well as "user" keys, although encrypted keys
cannot be revoked currently.

Alternatively we could use key_validate(), but since we'll also need to
fix ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to validate the payload length, it
seems appropriate to just check the payload pointer.

Fixes: 237fead61998 ("[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig")
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


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