user/sven/linux.git/fs/exec.c, branch v5.4.38

signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits

2020-04-17T08:50:12Z

commit d1e7fd6462ca9fc76650fbe6ca800e35b24267da upstream. Replace the 32bit exec_id with a 64bit exec_id to make it impossible to wrap the exec_id counter. With care an attacker can cause exec_id wrap and send arbitrary signals to a newly exec'd parent. This bypasses the signal sending checks if the parent changes their credentials during exec. The severity of this problem can been seen that in my limited testing of a 32bit exec_id it can take as little as 19s to exec 65536 times. Which means that it can take as little as 14 days to wrap a 32bit exec_id. Adam Zabrocki has succeeded wrapping the self_exe_id in 7 days. Even my slower timing is in the uptime of a typical server. Which means self_exec_id is simply a speed bump today, and if exec gets noticably faster self_exec_id won't even be a speed bump. Extending self_exec_id to 64bits introduces a problem on 32bit architectures where reading self_exec_id is no longer atomic and can take two read instructions. Which means that is is possible to hit a window where the read value of exec_id does not match the written value. So with very lucky timing after this change this still remains expoiltable. I have updated the update of exec_id on exec to use WRITE_ONCE and the read of exec_id in do_notify_parent to use READ_ONCE to make it clear that there is no locking between these two locations. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl Fixes: 2.3.23pre2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

exit/exec: Seperate mm_release()

2019-11-29T09:10:10Z

commit 4610ba7ad877fafc0a25a30c6c82015304120426 upstream. mm_release() contains the futex exit handling. mm_release() is called from do_exit()->exit_mm() and from exec()->exec_mm(). In the exit_mm() case PF_EXITING and the futex state is updated. In the exec_mm() case these states are not touched. As the futex exit code needs further protections against exit races, this needs to be split into two functions. Preparatory only, no functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.240518241@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sched/membarrier: Fix p->mm->membarrier_state racy load

2019-09-25T15:42:30Z

The membarrier_state field is located within the mm_struct, which is not guaranteed to exist when used from runqueue-lock-free iteration on runqueues by the membarrier system call. Copy the membarrier_state from the mm_struct into the scheduler runqueue when the scheduler switches between mm. When registering membarrier for mm, after setting the registration bit in the mm membarrier state, issue a synchronize_rcu() to ensure the scheduler observes the change. In order to take care of the case where a runqueue keeps executing the target mm without swapping to other mm, iterate over each runqueue and issue an IPI to copy the membarrier_state from the mm_struct into each runqueue which have the same mm which state has just been modified. Move the mm membarrier_state field closer to pgd in mm_struct to use a cache line already touched by the scheduler switch_mm. The membarrier_execve() (now membarrier_exec_mmap) hook now needs to clear the runqueue's membarrier state in addition to clear the mm membarrier state, so move its implementation into the scheduler membarrier code so it can access the runqueue structure. Add memory barrier in membarrier_exec_mmap() prior to clearing the membarrier state, ensuring memory accesses executed prior to exec are not reordered with the stores clearing the membarrier state. As suggested by Linus, move all membarrier.c RCU read-side locks outside of the for each cpu loops. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Eric W. Biederman Cc: Kirill Tkhai Cc: Mike Galbraith Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Paul E. McKenney Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Russell King - ARM Linux admin Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190919173705.2181-5-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

sched/fair: Don't free p->numa_faults with concurrent readers

2019-07-25T13:37:04Z

When going through execve(), zero out the NUMA fault statistics instead of freeing them. During execve, the task is reachable through procfs and the scheduler. A concurrent /proc/*/sched reader can read data from a freed ->numa_faults allocation (confirmed by KASAN) and write it back to userspace. I believe that it would also be possible for a use-after-free read to occur through a race between a NUMA fault and execve(): task_numa_fault() can lead to task_numa_compare(), which invokes task_weight() on the currently running task of a different CPU. Another way to fix this would be to make ->numa_faults RCU-managed or add extra locking, but it seems easier to wipe the NUMA fault statistics on execve. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Petr Mladek Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Will Deacon Fixes: 82727018b0d3 ("sched/numa: Call task_numa_free() from do_execve()") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190716152047.14424-1-jannh@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

Merge branch 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

2019-07-09T04:48:15Z

Pull force_sig() argument change from Eric Biederman: "A source of error over the years has been that force_sig has taken a task parameter when it is only safe to use force_sig with the current task. The force_sig function is built for delivering synchronous signals such as SIGSEGV where the userspace application caused a synchronous fault (such as a page fault) and the kernel responded with a signal. Because the name force_sig does not make this clear, and because the force_sig takes a task parameter the function force_sig has been abused for sending other kinds of signals over the years. Slowly those have been fixed when the oopses have been tracked down. This set of changes fixes the remaining abusers of force_sig and carefully rips out the task parameter from force_sig and friends making this kind of error almost impossible in the future" * 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (27 commits) signal/x86: Move tsk inside of CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE in do_sigbus signal: Remove the signal number and task parameters from force_sig_info signal: Factor force_sig_info_to_task out of force_sig_info signal: Generate the siginfo in force_sig signal: Move the computation of force into send_signal and correct it. signal: Properly set TRACE_SIGNAL_LOSE_INFO in __send_signal signal: Remove the task parameter from force_sig_fault signal: Use force_sig_fault_to_task for the two calls that don't deliver to current signal: Explicitly call force_sig_fault on current signal/unicore32: Remove tsk parameter from __do_user_fault signal/arm: Remove tsk parameter from __do_user_fault signal/arm: Remove tsk parameter from ptrace_break signal/nds32: Remove tsk parameter from send_sigtrap signal/riscv: Remove tsk parameter from do_trap signal/sh: Remove tsk parameter from force_sig_info_fault signal/um: Remove task parameter from send_sigtrap signal/x86: Remove task parameter from send_sigtrap signal: Remove task parameter from force_sig_mceerr signal: Remove task parameter from force_sig signal: Remove task parameter from force_sigsegv ...

signal: Remove task parameter from force_sigsegv

2019-05-27T14:36:28Z

The function force_sigsegv is always called on the current task so passing in current is redundant and not passing in current makes this fact obvious. This also makes it clear force_sigsegv always calls force_sig on the current task. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for missed files

2019-05-21T08:50:45Z

Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which: - Have no license information of any form - Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the initial scan/conversion to ignore the file These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fs/exec.c: move ->recursion_depth out of critical sections

2019-05-15T02:52:50Z

->recursion_depth is changed only by current, therefore decrementing can be done without taking any locks. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417213150.GA26474@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

exec: increase BINPRM_BUF_SIZE to 256

2019-03-08T02:32:01Z

Large enterprise clients often run applications out of networked file systems where the IT mandated layout of project volumes can end up leading to paths that are longer than 128 characters. Bumping this up to the next order of two solves this problem in all but the most egregious case while still fitting into a 512b slab. [oleg@redhat.com: update comment, per Kees] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181112160956.GA28472@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Reported-by: Ben Woodard Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Acked-by: Michal Hocko Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/exec.c: replace opencoded set_mask_bits()

2019-03-08T02:32:01Z

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548275584-18096-2-git-send-email-vgupta@synopsys.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/20150807115710.GA16897@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta Reviewed-by: Anthony Yznaga Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Chris Wilson Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Jani Nikula Cc: Miklos Szeredi Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds