user/sven/linux.git/fs/ext4, branch v5.4.2

ext4: add more paranoia checking in ext4_expand_extra_isize handling

2019-12-04T21:31:05Z

commit 4ea99936a1630f51fc3a2d61a58ec4a1c4b7d55a upstream. It's possible to specify a non-zero s_want_extra_isize via debugging option, and this can cause bad things(tm) to happen when using a file system with an inode size of 128 bytes. Add better checking when the file system is mounted, as well as when we are actually doing the trying to do the inode expansion. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191110121510.GH23325@mit.edu Reported-by: syzbot+f8d6f8386ceacdbfff57@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+33d7ea72e47de3bdf4e1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+44b6763edfc17144296f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge branch 'entropy'

2019-09-30T02:25:39Z

Merge active entropy generation updates. This is admittedly partly "for discussion". We need to have a way forward for the boot time deadlocks where user space ends up waiting for more entropy, but no entropy is forthcoming because the system is entirely idle just waiting for something to happen. While this was triggered by what is arguably a user space bug with GDM/gnome-session asking for secure randomness during early boot, when they didn't even need any such truly secure thing, the issue ends up being that our "getrandom()" interface is prone to that kind of confusion, because people don't think very hard about whether they want to block for sufficient amounts of entropy. The approach here-in is to decide to not just passively wait for entropy to happen, but to start actively collecting it if it is missing. This is not necessarily always possible, but if the architecture has a CPU cycle counter, there is a fair amount of noise in the exact timings of reasonably complex loads. We may end up tweaking the load and the entropy estimates, but this should be at least a reasonable starting point. As part of this, we also revert the revert of the ext4 IO pattern improvement that ended up triggering the reported lack of external entropy. * getrandom() active entropy waiting: Revert "Revert "ext4: make __ext4_get_inode_loc plug"" random: try to actively add entropy rather than passively wait for it

Revert "Revert "ext4: make __ext4_get_inode_loc plug""

2019-09-30T00:59:23Z

This reverts commit 72dbcf72156641fde4d8ea401e977341bfd35a05. Instead of waiting forever for entropy that may just not happen, we now try to actively generate entropy when required, and are thus hopefully avoiding the problem that caused the nice ext4 IO pattern fix to be reverted. So revert the revert. Cc: Ahmed S. Darwish Cc: Ted Ts'o Cc: Willy Tarreau Cc: Alexander E. Patrakov Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4

2019-09-21T20:37:39Z

Pull ext4 updates from Ted Ts'o: "Added new ext4 debugging ioctls to allow userspace to get information about the state of the extent status cache. Dropped workaround for pre-1970 dates which were encoded incorrectly in pre-4.4 kernels. Since both the kernel correctly generates, and e2fsck detects and fixes this issue for the past four years, it'e time to drop the workaround. (Also, it's not like files with dates in the distant past were all that common in the first place.) A lot of miscellaneous bug fixes and cleanups, including some ext4 Documentation fixes. Also included are two minor bug fixes in fs/unicode" * tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: (21 commits) unicode: make array 'token' static const, makes object smaller unicode: Move static keyword to the front of declarations ext4: add missing bigalloc documentation. ext4: fix kernel oops caused by spurious casefold flag ext4: fix integer overflow when calculating commit interval ext4: use percpu_counters for extent_status cache hits/misses ext4: fix potential use after free after remounting with noblock_validity jbd2: add missing tracepoint for reserved handle ext4: fix punch hole for inline_data file systems ext4: rework reserved cluster accounting when invalidating pages ext4: documentation fixes ext4: treat buffers with write errors as containing valid data ext4: fix warning inside ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio ext4: set error return correctly when ext4_htree_store_dirent fails ext4: drop legacy pre-1970 encoding workaround ext4: add new ioctl EXT4_IOC_GET_ES_CACHE ext4: add a new ioctl EXT4_IOC_GETSTATE ext4: add a new ioctl EXT4_IOC_CLEAR_ES_CACHE jbd2: flush_descriptor(): Do not decrease buffer head's ref count ext4: remove unnecessary error check ...

Merge tag 'y2038-vfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground

2019-09-19T16:42:37Z

Pull y2038 vfs updates from Arnd Bergmann: "Add inode timestamp clamping. This series from Deepa Dinamani adds a per-superblock minimum/maximum timestamp limit for a file system, and clamps timestamps as they are written, to avoid random behavior from integer overflow as well as having different time stamps on disk vs in memory. At mount time, a warning is now printed for any file system that can represent current timestamps but not future timestamps more than 30 years into the future, similar to the arbitrary 30 year limit that was added to settimeofday(). This was picked as a compromise to warn users to migrate to other file systems (e.g. ext4 instead of ext3) when they need the file system to survive beyond 2038 (or similar limits in other file systems), but not get in the way of normal usage" * tag 'y2038-vfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground: ext4: Reduce ext4 timestamp warnings isofs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges pstore: fs superblock limits fs: omfs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: hpfs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: ceph: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: sysv: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: affs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: fat: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: cifs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges fs: nfs: Initialize filesystem timestamp ranges ext4: Initialize timestamps limits 9p: Fill min and max timestamps in sb fs: Fill in max and min timestamps in superblock utimes: Clamp the timestamps before update mount: Add mount warning for impending timestamp expiry timestamp_truncate: Replace users of timespec64_trunc vfs: Add timestamp_truncate() api vfs: Add file timestamp range support

Merge tag 'fsverity-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt

2019-09-18T23:59:14Z

Pull fs-verity support from Eric Biggers: "fs-verity is a filesystem feature that provides Merkle tree based hashing (similar to dm-verity) for individual readonly files, mainly for the purpose of efficient authenticity verification. This pull request includes: (a) The fs/verity/ support layer and documentation. (b) fs-verity support for ext4 and f2fs. Compared to the original fs-verity patchset from last year, the UAPI to enable fs-verity on a file has been greatly simplified. Lots of other things were cleaned up too. fs-verity is planned to be used by two different projects on Android; most of the userspace code is in place already. Another userspace tool ("fsverity-utils"), and xfstests, are also available. e2fsprogs and f2fs-tools already have fs-verity support. Other people have shown interest in using fs-verity too. I've tested this on ext4 and f2fs with xfstests, both the existing tests and the new fs-verity tests. This has also been in linux-next since July 30 with no reported issues except a couple minor ones I found myself and folded in fixes for. Ted and I will be co-maintaining fs-verity" * tag 'fsverity-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt: f2fs: add fs-verity support ext4: update on-disk format documentation for fs-verity ext4: add fs-verity read support ext4: add basic fs-verity support fs-verity: support builtin file signatures fs-verity: add SHA-512 support fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl fs-verity: add data verification hooks for ->readpages() fs-verity: add the hook for file ->setattr() fs-verity: add the hook for file ->open() fs-verity: add inode and superblock fields fs-verity: add Kconfig and the helper functions for hashing fs: uapi: define verity bit for FS_IOC_GETFLAGS fs-verity: add UAPI header fs-verity: add MAINTAINERS file entry fs-verity: add a documentation file

Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt

2019-09-18T23:08:52Z

Pull fscrypt updates from Eric Biggers: "This is a large update to fs/crypto/ which includes: - Add ioctls that add/remove encryption keys to/from a filesystem-level keyring. These fix user-reported issues where e.g. an encrypted home directory can break NetworkManager, sshd, Docker, etc. because they don't get access to the needed keyring. These ioctls also provide a way to lock encrypted directories that doesn't use the vm.drop_caches sysctl, so is faster, more reliable, and doesn't always need root. - Add a new encryption policy version ("v2") which switches to a more standard, secure, and flexible key derivation function, and starts verifying that the correct key was supplied before using it. The key derivation improvement is needed for its own sake as well as for ongoing feature work for which the current way is too inflexible. Work is in progress to update both Android and the 'fscrypt' userspace tool to use both these features. (Working patches are available and just need to be reviewed+merged.) Chrome OS will likely use them too. This has also been tested on ext4, f2fs, and ubifs with xfstests -- both the existing encryption tests, and the new tests for this. This has also been in linux-next since Aug 16 with no reported issues. I'm also using an fscrypt v2-encrypted home directory on my personal desktop" * tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt: (27 commits) ext4 crypto: fix to check feature status before get policy fscrypt: document the new ioctls and policy version ubifs: wire up new fscrypt ioctls f2fs: wire up new fscrypt ioctls ext4: wire up new fscrypt ioctls fscrypt: require that key be added when setting a v2 encryption policy fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS ioctl fscrypt: allow unprivileged users to add/remove keys for v2 policies fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementation fscrypt: add FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS ioctl fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl fscrypt: rename keyinfo.c to keysetup.c fscrypt: move v1 policy key setup to keysetup_v1.c fscrypt: refactor key setup code in preparation for v2 policies fscrypt: rename fscrypt_master_key to fscrypt_direct_key fscrypt: add ->ci_inode to fscrypt_info fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_* definitions, not FS_* fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants ...

Revert "ext4: make __ext4_get_inode_loc plug"

2019-09-15T19:32:03Z

This reverts commit b03755ad6f33b7b8cd7312a3596a2dbf496de6e7. This is sad, and done for all the wrong reasons. Because that commit is good, and does exactly what it says: avoids a lot of small disk requests for the inode table read-ahead. However, it turns out that it causes an entirely unrelated problem: the getrandom() system call was introduced back in 2014 by commit c6e9d6f38894 ("random: introduce getrandom(2) system call"), and people use it as a convenient source of good random numbers. But part of the current semantics for getrandom() is that it waits for the entropy pool to fill at least partially (unlike /dev/urandom). And at least ArchLinux apparently has a systemd that uses getrandom() at boot time, and the improvements in IO patterns means that existing installations suddenly start hanging, waiting for entropy that will never happen. It seems to be an unlucky combination of not _quite_ enough entropy, together with a particular systemd version and configuration. Lennart says that the systemd-random-seed process (which is what does this early access) is supposed to not block any other boot activity, but sadly that doesn't actually seem to be the case (possibly due bogus dependencies on cryptsetup for encrypted swapspace). The correct fix is to fix getrandom() to not block when it's not appropriate, but that fix is going to take a lot more discussion. Do we just make it act like /dev/urandom by default, and add a new flag for "wait for entropy"? Do we add a boot-time option? Or do we just limit the amount of time it will wait for entropy? So in the meantime, we do the revert to give us time to discuss the eventual fix for the fundamental problem, at which point we can re-apply the ext4 inode table access optimization. Reported-by: Ahmed S. Darwish Cc: Ted Ts'o Cc: Willy Tarreau Cc: Alexander E. Patrakov Cc: Lennart Poettering Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ext4: Reduce ext4 timestamp warnings

2019-09-04T20:54:53Z

When ext4 file systems were created intentionally with 128 byte inodes, the rate-limited warning of eventual possible timestamp overflow are still emitted rather frequently. Remove the warning for now. Discussion for whether any warning is needed, and where it should be emitted, can be found at https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1567523922.5576.57.camel@lca.pw/. I can post a separate follow-up patch after the conclusion. Reported-by: Qian Cai Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann

ext4: fix kernel oops caused by spurious casefold flag

2019-09-03T05:43:17Z

If an directory has the a casefold flag set without the casefold feature set, s_encoding will not be initialized, and this will cause the kernel to dereference a NULL pointer. In addition to adding checks to avoid these kernel oops, attempts to load inodes with the casefold flag when the casefold feature is not enable will cause the file system to be declared corrupted. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o