user/sven/linux.git/fs/proc/array.c, branch v3.18.100

ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

2016-04-12T21:06:22Z

[ Upstream commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 ] By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its credentials. To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g. in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set. The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass. While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access check is reused for things in procfs. In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely on ptrace access checks: /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in this scenario: lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar drwx------ root root /root drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file, this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access (through /proc/$pid/cwd). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Al Viro Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2014-08-06T15:06:39Z

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "In this release: - PKCS#7 parser for the key management subsystem from David Howells - appoint Kees Cook as seccomp maintainer - bugfixes and general maintenance across the subsystem" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (94 commits) X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key() netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structs netlabel: fix the catmap walking functions netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bit PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1 tpm: simplify code by using %*phN specifier tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts tpm: missing tpm_chip_put in tpm_get_random() tpm: Properly clean sysfs entries in error path tpm: Add missing tpm_do_selftest to ST33 I2C driver PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key() Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()" X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning KEYS: revert encrypted key change ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware firmware_class: perform new LSM checks security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h ...

CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes

2014-07-24T11:53:47Z

This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744 plus fixing it a different way... We found, when trying to run an application from an application which had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status. Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4 capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are undefined future capabilities. The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl() we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So the 'parent' will look something like: CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapBnd: ffffffc000000000 All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do... So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does. They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls execve() the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't have. The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity. The solution here: 1) stop hiding capability bits in status This makes debugging easier! 2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init and you won't get them in any other task either. This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other things) 3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use ~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility. This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run. 4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward compatibility. This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Cc: Andrew Vagin Cc: Andrew G. Morgan Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Steve Grubb Cc: Dan Walsh Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris

sched: Make task->real_start_time nanoseconds based

2014-07-23T17:18:05Z

Simplify the only user of this data by removing the timespec conversion. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: John Stultz

wait: swap EXIT_ZOMBIE and EXIT_DEAD to hide EXIT_TRACE from user-space

2014-04-07T23:36:06Z

get_task_state() uses the most significant bit to report the state to user-space, this means that EXIT_ZOMBIE->EXIT_TRACE->EXIT_DEAD transition can be noticed via /proc as Z -> X -> Z change. Note that this was possible even before EXIT_TRACE was introduced. This is not really bad but imho it make sense to hide EXIT_TRACE from user-space completely. So the patch simply swaps EXIT_ZOMBIE and EXIT_DEAD, this way EXIT_TRACE will be seen as EXIT_ZOMBIE by user-space. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Jan Kratochvil Cc: Michal Schmidt Cc: Al Viro Cc: Lennart Poettering Cc: Roland McGrath Cc: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/proc/array.c: change do_task_stat() to use while_each_thread()

2014-01-24T00:37:02Z

Change the remaining next_thread (ab)users to use while_each_thread(). The last user which should be changed is next_tid(), but we can't do this now. __exit_signal() and complete_signal() are fine, they actually need next_thread() logic. This patch (of 3): do_task_stat() can use while_each_thread(), no changes in the compiled code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro Cc: Al Viro Cc: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Sameer Nanda Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: cleanup/simplify get_task_state/task_state_array

2014-01-24T00:37:01Z

get_task_state() and task_state_array[] look confusing and suboptimal, it is not clear what it can actually report to user-space and task_state_array[] blows .data for no reason. 1. state = (tsk->state & TASK_REPORT) | tsk->exit_state is not clear. TASK_REPORT is self-documenting but it is not clear what ->exit_state can add. Move the potential exit_state's (EXIT_ZOMBIE and EXIT_DEAD) into TASK_REPORT and use it to calculate the final result. 2. With the change above it is obvious that task_state_array[] has the unused entries just to make BUILD_BUG_ON() happy. Change this BUILD_BUG_ON() to use TASK_REPORT rather than TASK_STATE_MAX and shrink task_state_array[]. 3. Turn the "while (state)" loop into fls(state). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: David Laight Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

sched/numa: Report a NUMA task group ID

2013-10-09T12:47:49Z

It is desirable to model from userspace how the scheduler groups tasks over time. This patch adds an ID to the numa_group and reports it via /proc/PID/status. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Srikar Dronamraju Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381141781-10992-45-git-send-email-mgorman@suse.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

kthread: Prevent unpark race which puts threads on the wrong cpu

2013-04-12T12:18:43Z

The smpboot threads rely on the park/unpark mechanism which binds per cpu threads on a particular core. Though the functionality is racy: CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 unpark(T) wake_up_process(T) clear(SHOULD_PARK) T runs leave parkme() due to !SHOULD_PARK bind_to(CPU2) BUG_ON(wrong CPU) We cannot let the tasks move themself to the target CPU as one of those tasks is actually the migration thread itself, which requires that it starts running on the target cpu right away. The solution to this problem is to prevent wakeups in park mode which are not from unpark(). That way we can guarantee that the association of the task to the target cpu is working correctly. Add a new task state (TASK_PARKED) which prevents other wakeups and use this state explicitly for the unpark wakeup. Peter noticed: Also, since the task state is visible to userspace and all the parked tasks are still in the PID space, its a good hint in ps and friends that these tasks aren't really there for the moment. The migration thread has another related issue. CPU0 CPU1 Bring up CPU2 create_thread(T) park(T) wait_for_completion() parkme() complete() sched_set_stop_task() schedule(TASK_PARKED) The sched_set_stop_task() call is issued while the task is on the runqueue of CPU1 and that confuses the hell out of the stop_task class on that cpu. So we need the same synchronizaion before sched_set_stop_task(). Reported-by: Dave Jones Reported-and-tested-by: Dave Hansen Reported-and-tested-by: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra Cc: Srivatsa S. Bhat Cc: dhillf@gmail.com Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1304091635430.21884@ionos Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner

cputime: Use accessors to read task cputime stats

2013-01-27T18:23:31Z

This is in preparation for the full dynticks feature. While remotely reading the cputime of a task running in a full dynticks CPU, we'll need to do some extra-computation. This way we can account the time it spent tickless in userspace since its last cputime snapshot. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Li Zhong Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Paul E. McKenney Cc: Paul Gortmaker Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Thomas Gleixner