user/sven/linux.git/fs/proc/array.c, branch v4.4

fs/proc/array.c: set overflow flag in case of error

2015-11-07T01:50:42Z

For now in task_name() we ignore the return code of string_escape_str() call. This is not good if buffer suddenly becomes not big enough. Do the proper error handling there. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Alexander Viro Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/proc, core/debug: Don't expose absolute kernel addresses via wchan

2015-10-01T10:55:34Z

So the /proc/PID/stat 'wchan' field (the 30th field, which contains the absolute kernel address of the kernel function a task is blocked in) leaks absolute kernel addresses to unprivileged user-space: seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', wchan); The absolute address might also leak via /proc/PID/wchan as well, if KALLSYMS is turned off or if the symbol lookup fails for some reason: static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { unsigned long wchan; char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN]; wchan = get_wchan(task); if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0) { if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) return 0; seq_printf(m, "%lu", wchan); } else { seq_printf(m, "%s", symname); } return 0; } This isn't ideal, because for example it trivially leaks the KASLR offset to any local attacker: fomalhaut:~> printf "%016lx\n" $(cat /proc/$$/stat | cut -d' ' -f35) ffffffff8123b380 Most real-life uses of wchan are symbolic: ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm and procps uses /proc/PID/wchan, not the absolute address in /proc/PID/stat: triton:~/tip> strace -f ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm 2>&1 | grep wchan | tail -1 open("/proc/30833/wchan", O_RDONLY) = 6 There's one compatibility quirk here: procps relies on whether the absolute value is non-zero - and we can provide that functionality by outputing "0" or "1" depending on whether the task is blocked (whether there's a wchan address). These days there appears to be very little legitimate reason user-space would be interested in the absolute address. The absolute address is mostly historic: from the days when we didn't have kallsyms and user-space procps had to do the decoding itself via the System.map. So this patch sets all numeric output to "0" or "1" and keeps only symbolic output, in /proc/PID/wchan. ( The absolute sleep address can generally still be profiled via perf, by tasks with sufficient privileges. ) Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Linus Torvalds Cc: Cc: Al Viro Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Kostya Serebryany Cc: Mike Galbraith Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Sasha Levin Cc: kasan-dev Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150930135917.GA3285@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

capabilities: ambient capabilities

2015-09-04T23:54:41Z

Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based on Christoph's patch. ===== The status quo ===== On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that they hold. Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP), inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify what capabilities can be in pE. Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI. If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it can remove capabilities from X. Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1]. If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP) and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2]. File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them. A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are: pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) X is unchanged For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently (primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP are empty and fE is false. As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set, LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc. This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged program to change its security state in a way that persists cross execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped programs to be exploited for privilege escalation. ===== The problem ===== Capability inheritance is basically useless. If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated capabilities if you aren't root. On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems. If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with secure exec rules, breaking many things. This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use capabilities for anything useful. ===== The proposed change ===== This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA). pA does what most people expect pI to do. pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore, setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can re-add bits to pA afterwards. The capability evolution rules are changed: pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA) pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA' pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA') X is unchanged If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah! Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace) and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less impossible. Hallelujah! You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch. Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping privileges will still work. It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker *already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though -- setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so, and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more paranoid route. We can revisit this later. An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities (CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than it is with this patch. ===== Footnotes ===== [1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false. The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason. [2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask; it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who has tried to use file capabilities. [3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly discarded. Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2 Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality (from Christoph): /* * Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell * that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities. * * (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter * Released under: GPL v3 or later. * * * Compile using: * * gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng * * This program must have the following capabilities to run properly: * Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE * * A command to equip the binary with the right caps is: * * setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test * * * To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes: * * ./ambient_test /bin/bash * * * Verifying that it works: * * From the bash spawed by ambient_test run * * cat /proc/$$/status * * and have a look at the capabilities. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed * when the /usr/include files have these defined. */ #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 static void set_ambient_cap(int cap) { int rc; capng_get_caps_process(); rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap); if (rc) { printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n"); exit(2); } capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS); /* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */ if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) { perror("Cannot set cap"); exit(1); } } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc; set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW); set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN); set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE); printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n"); if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1)) perror("Cannot exec"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter # Original author Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Aaron Jones Cc: Ted Ts'o Cc: Andrew G. Morgan Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn Cc: Markku Savela Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: James Morris Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs, proc: introduce CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN

2015-06-26T00:00:37Z

Commit 818411616baf ("fs, proc: introduce /proc//task//children entry") introduced the children entry for checkpoint restore and the file is only available on kernels configured with CONFIG_EXPERT and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. This is available in most distributions (Fedora, Debian, Ubuntu, CoreOS) because they usually enable CONFIG_EXPERT and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. But Arch does not enable CONFIG_EXPERT or CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. However, the children proc file is useful outside of checkpoint restore. I would like to use it in rkt. The rkt process exec() another program it does not control, and that other program will fork()+exec() a child process. I would like to find the pid of the child process from an external tool without iterating in /proc over all processes to find which one has a parent pid equal to rkt. This commit introduces CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN and makes CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE select it. This allows enabling /proc//task//children without needing to enable CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and CONFIG_EXPERT. Alban tested that /proc//task//children is present when the kernel is configured with CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN=y but without CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE Signed-off-by: Iago López Galeiras Tested-by: Alban Crequy Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: Serge Hallyn Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Djalal Harouni Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

procfs: treat parked tasks as sleeping for task state

2015-06-25T00:49:40Z

Allowing watchdog threads to be parked means that we now have the opportunity of actually seeing persistent parked threads in the output of /proc//stat and /proc//status. The existing code reported such threads as "Running", which is kind-of true if you think of the case where we park them as part of taking cpus offline. But if we allow parking them indefinitely, "Running" is pretty misleading, so we report them as "Sleeping" instead. We could simply report them with a new string, "Parked", but it feels like it's a bit risky for userspace to see unexpected new values; the output is already documented in Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt, and it seems like a mistake to change that lightly. The scheduler does report parked tasks with a "P" in debugging output from sched_show_task() or dump_cpu_task(), but that's a different API. Similarly, the trace_ctxwake_* routines report a "P" for parked tasks, but again, different API. This change seemed slightly cleaner than updating the task_state_array to have additional rows. TASK_DEAD should be subsumed by the exit_state bits; TASK_WAKEKILL is just a modifier; and TASK_WAKING can very reasonably be reported as "Running" (as it is now). Only TASK_PARKED shows up with unreasonable output here. Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf Cc: Don Zickus Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Ulrich Obergfell Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Frederic Weisbecker Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: remove use of seq_printf return value

2015-04-15T23:35:25Z

The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41c03da ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

lib/string_helpers.c: change semantics of string_escape_mem

2015-04-15T23:35:24Z

The current semantics of string_escape_mem are inadequate for one of its current users, vsnprintf(). If that is to honour its contract, it must know how much space would be needed for the entire escaped buffer, and string_escape_mem provides no way of obtaining that (short of allocating a large enough buffer (~4 times input string) to let it play with, and that's definitely a big no-no inside vsnprintf). So change the semantics for string_escape_mem to be more snprintf-like: Return the size of the output that would be generated if the destination buffer was big enough, but of course still only write to the part of dst it is allowed to, and (contrary to snprintf) don't do '\0'-termination. It is then up to the caller to detect whether output was truncated and to append a '\0' if desired. Also, we must output partial escape sequences, otherwise a call such as snprintf(buf, 3, "%1pE", "\123") would cause printf to write a \0 to buf[2] but leaving buf[0] and buf[1] with whatever they previously contained. This also fixes a bug in the escaped_string() helper function, which used to unconditionally pass a length of "end-buf" to string_escape_mem(); since the latter doesn't check osz for being insanely large, it would happily write to dst. For example, kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "something and then %pE", ...); is an easy way to trigger an oops. In test-string_helpers.c, the -ENOMEM test is replaced with testing for getting the expected return value even if the buffer is too small. We also ensure that nothing is written (by relying on a NULL pointer deref) if the output size is 0 by passing NULL - this has to work for kasprintf("%pE") to work. In net/sunrpc/cache.c, I think qword_add still has the same semantics. Someone should definitely double-check this. In fs/proc/array.c, I made the minimum possible change, but longer-term it should stop poking around in seq_file internals. [andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: simplify qword_add] [andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: add missed curly braces] Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

/proc/PID/status: show all sets of pid according to ns

2015-04-15T23:35:22Z

If some issues occurred inside a container guest, host user could not know which process is in trouble just by guest pid: the users of container guest only knew the pid inside containers. This will bring obstacle for trouble shooting. This patch adds four fields: NStgid, NSpid, NSpgid and NSsid: a) In init_pid_ns, nothing changed; b) In one pidns, will tell the pid inside containers: NStgid: 21776 5 1 NSpid: 21776 5 1 NSpgid: 21776 5 1 NSsid: 21729 1 0 ** Process id is 21776 in level 0, 5 in level 1, 1 in level 2. c) If pidns is nested, it depends on which pidns are you in. NStgid: 5 1 NSpid: 5 1 NSpgid: 5 1 NSsid: 1 0 ** Views from level 1 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add CONFIG_PID_NS ifdef] Signed-off-by: Chen Hanxiao Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Tested-by: Serge Hallyn Tested-by: Nathan Scott Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: use %*pb[l] to print bitmaps including cpumasks and nodemasks

2015-02-14T05:21:38Z

printk and friends can now format bitmaps using '%*pb[l]'. cpumask and nodemask also provide cpumask_pr_args() and nodemask_pr_args() respectively which can be used to generate the two printf arguments necessary to format the specified cpu/nodemask. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/proc/array.c: convert to use string_escape_str()

2015-02-13T02:54:12Z

Instead of custom approach let's use string_escape_str() to escape a given string (task_name in this case). Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Oleg Nesterov Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds