user/sven/linux.git/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c, branch v3.2.10

Merge branch 'akpm' (Andrew's incoming - part two)

2011-11-02T23:07:27Z

Says Andrew: "60 patches. That's good enough for -rc1 I guess. I have quite a lot of detritus to be rechecked, work through maintainers, etc. - most of the remains of MM - rtc - various misc - cgroups - memcg - cpusets - procfs - ipc - rapidio - sysctl - pps - w1 - drivers/misc - aio" * akpm: (60 commits) memcg: replace ss->id_lock with a rwlock aio: allocate kiocbs in batches drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c: fix typo in code comment drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c: determine page allocation flag can_sleep outside loop w1: disable irqs in critical section drivers/w1/w1_int.c: multiple masters used same init_name drivers/power/ds2780_battery.c: fix deadlock upon insertion and removal drivers/power/ds2780_battery.c: add a nolock function to w1 interface drivers/power/ds2780_battery.c: create central point for calling w1 interface w1: ds2760 and ds2780, use ida for id and ida_simple_get() to get it pps gpio client: add missing dependency pps: new client driver using GPIO pps: default echo function include/linux/dma-mapping.h: add dma_zalloc_coherent() sysctl: make CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL default to n sysctl: add support for poll() RapidIO: documentation update drivers/net/rionet.c: fix ethernet address macros for LE platforms RapidIO: fix potential null deref in rio_setup_device() RapidIO: add mport driver for Tsi721 bridge ...

sysctl: add support for poll()

2011-11-02T23:07:02Z

Adding support for poll() in sysctl fs allows userspace to receive notifications of changes in sysctl entries. This adds a infrastructure to allow files in sysctl fs to be pollable and implements it for hostname and domainname. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/declare/define/ for definitions] Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi Cc: Greg KH Cc: Kay Sievers Cc: Al Viro Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

procfs: report EISDIR when reading sysctl dirs in proc

2011-11-02T23:07:00Z

On reading sysctl dirs we should return -EISDIR instead of -EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

filesystems: add missing nlink wrappers

2011-11-02T11:53:43Z

Replace direct i_nlink updates with the respective updater function (inc_nlink, drop_nlink, clear_nlink, inode_dec_link_count). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi

->permission() sanitizing: don't pass flags to ->permission()

2011-07-20T05:43:24Z

not used by the instances anymore. Signed-off-by: Al Viro

->permission() sanitizing: MAY_NOT_BLOCK

2011-07-20T05:43:18Z

Duplicate the flags argument into mask bitmap. Signed-off-by: Al Viro

proc_sys_permission() is OK in RCU mode

2011-06-20T14:45:25Z

nothing blocking there, since all instances of sysctl ->permissions() method are non-blocking - both of them, that is. Signed-off-by: Al Viro

Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

2011-03-15T22:41:17Z

unfuck proc_sysctl ->d_compare()

2011-03-08T07:22:27Z

a) struct inode is not going to be freed under ->d_compare(); however, the thing PROC_I(inode)->sysctl points to just might. Fortunately, it's enough to make freeing that sucker delayed, provided that we don't step on its ->unregistering, clear the pointer to it in PROC_I(inode) before dropping the reference and check if it's NULL in ->d_compare(). b) I'm not sure that we *can* walk into NULL inode here (we recheck dentry->seq between verifying that it's still hashed / fetching dentry->d_inode and passing it to ->d_compare() and there's no negative hashed dentries in /proc/sys/*), but if we can walk into that, we really should not have ->d_compare() return 0 on it! Said that, I really suspect that this check can be simply killed. Nick? Signed-off-by: Al Viro

security/selinux: fix /proc/sys/ labeling

2011-02-01T16:53:54Z

This fixes an old (2007) selinux regression: filesystem labeling for /proc/sys returned -r--r--r-- unknown /proc/sys/fs/file-nr instead of -r--r--r-- system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t:s0 /proc/sys/fs/file-nr Events that lead to breaking of /proc/sys/ selinux labeling: 1) sysctl was reimplemented to route all calls through /proc/sys/ commit 77b14db502cb85a031fe8fde6c85d52f3e0acb63 [PATCH] sysctl: reimplement the sysctl proc support 2) proc_dir_entry was removed from ctl_table: commit 3fbfa98112fc3962c416452a0baf2214381030e6 [PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tables 3) selinux still walked the proc_dir_entry tree to apply labeling. Because ctl_tables don't have a proc_dir_entry, we did not label /proc/sys/ inodes any more. To achieve this the /proc/sys/ inodes were marked private and private inodes were ignored by selinux. commit bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962 [PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes commit 86a71dbd3e81e8870d0f0e56b87875f57e58222b [PATCH] sysctl: hide the sysctl proc inodes from selinux Access control checks have been done by means of a special sysctl hook that was called for read/write accesses to any /proc/sys/ entry. We don't have to do this because, instead of walking the proc_dir_entry tree we can walk the dentry tree (as done in this patch). With this patch: * we don't mark /proc/sys/ inodes as private * we don't need the sysclt security hook * we walk the dentry tree to find the path to the inode. We have to strip the PID in /proc/PID/ entries that have a proc_dir_entry because selinux does not know how to label paths like '/1/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and defaults to 'proc_t' labeling). Selinux does know of '/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and applies the 'sysctl_rpc_t' label). PID stripping from the path was done implicitly in the previous code because the proc_dir_entry tree had the root in '/net' in the example from above. The dentry tree has the root in '/1'. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu Signed-off-by: Eric Paris