<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/fs/proc, branch v4.14.45</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.45</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.45'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2018-05-30T05:52:23Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c: fix potential page fault while unregistering sysctl table</title>
<updated>2018-05-30T05:52:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Danilo Krummrich</name>
<email>danilokrummrich@dk-develop.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-10T23:31:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=9c9844d9c9d042df472dddae5a042d963cfc603f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9c9844d9c9d042df472dddae5a042d963cfc603f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a0b0d1c345d0317efe594df268feb5ccc99f651e ]

proc_sys_link_fill_cache() does not take currently unregistering sysctl
tables into account, which might result into a page fault in
sysctl_follow_link() - add a check to fix it.

This bug has been present since v3.4.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180228013506.4915-1-danilokrummrich@dk-develop.de
Fixes: 0e47c99d7fe25 ("sysctl: Replace root_list with links between sysctl_table_sets")
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich &lt;danilokrummrich@dk-develop.de&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: Use underscores for SSBD in 'status'</title>
<updated>2018-05-22T16:54:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-09T19:41:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=43c47eb2a274fa12029ac5485ae4360048a398af'/>
<id>urn:sha1:43c47eb2a274fa12029ac5485ae4360048a398af</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e96f46ee8587607a828f783daa6eb5b44d25004d upstream

The style for the 'status' file is CamelCase or this. _.

Fixes: fae1fa0fc ("proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations")
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>prctl: Add force disable speculation</title>
<updated>2018-05-22T16:54:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-03T20:09:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=20d036a2e223a5c4327bcf432ef995f59f51d1d1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:20d036a2e223a5c4327bcf432ef995f59f51d1d1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 356e4bfff2c5489e016fdb925adbf12a1e3950ee upstream

For certain use cases it is desired to enforce mitigations so they cannot
be undone afterwards. That's important for loader stubs which want to
prevent a child from disabling the mitigation again. Will also be used for
seccomp(). The extra state preserving of the prctl state for SSB is a
preparatory step for EBPF dymanic speculation control.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations</title>
<updated>2018-05-22T16:54:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-01T22:31:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=dd88d569eeff59a03b897ba0168547a465091aca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dd88d569eeff59a03b897ba0168547a465091aca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fae1fa0fc6cca8beee3ab8ed71d54f9a78fa3f64 upstream

As done with seccomp and no_new_privs, also show speculation flaw
mitigation state in /proc/$pid/status.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: do not access cmdline nor environ from file-backed areas</title>
<updated>2018-05-19T08:20:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-11T06:11:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5c9a9508de30d4d27a270047c7ab5f2817b1366d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5c9a9508de30d4d27a270047c7ab5f2817b1366d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7f7ccc2ccc2e70c6054685f5e3522efa81556830 upstream.

proc_pid_cmdline_read() and environ_read() directly access the target
process' VM to retrieve the command line and environment. If this
process remaps these areas onto a file via mmap(), the requesting
process may experience various issues such as extra delays if the
underlying device is slow to respond.

Let's simply refuse to access file-backed areas in these functions.
For this we add a new FOLL_ANON gup flag that is passed to all calls
to access_remote_vm(). The code already takes care of such failures
(including unmapped areas). Accesses via /proc/pid/mem were not
changed though.

This was assigned CVE-2018-1120.

Note for stable backports: the patch may apply to kernels prior to 4.11
but silently miss one location; it must be checked that no call to
access_remote_vm() keeps zero as the last argument.

Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs/proc/kcore, x86/mm/kcore: Fix SMAP fault when dumping vsyscall user page</title>
<updated>2018-04-26T09:02:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jia Zhang</name>
<email>zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-12T14:44:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f4d6e4598a29f6f7df6937d943c01e1eeb9ee871'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f4d6e4598a29f6f7df6937d943c01e1eeb9ee871</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 595dd46ebfc10be041a365d0a3fa99df50b6ba73 ]

Commit:

  df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data")

... introduced a bounce buffer to work around CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y.
However, accessing the vsyscall user page will cause an SMAP fault.

Replace memcpy() with copy_from_user() to fix this bug works, but adding
a common way to handle this sort of user page may be useful for future.

Currently, only vsyscall page requires KCORE_USER.

Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang &lt;zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518446694-21124-2-git-send-email-zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: fix /proc/*/map_files lookup</title>
<updated>2018-04-26T09:02:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-06T23:36:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=05e52e5bd103a335288415d5399cdb120a05a5e4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:05e52e5bd103a335288415d5399cdb120a05a5e4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ac7f1061c2c11bb8936b1b6a94cdb48de732f7a4 ]

Current code does:

	if (sscanf(dentry-&gt;d_name.name, "%lx-%lx", start, end) != 2)

However sscanf() is broken garbage.

It silently accepts whitespace between format specifiers
(did you know that?).

It silently accepts valid strings which result in integer overflow.

Do not use sscanf() for any even remotely reliable parsing code.

	OK
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/55a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
	/lib/systemd/systemd

	broken
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/               55a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
	/lib/systemd/systemd

	broken
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/55a23af39000-55a23b05b000    '
	/lib/systemd/systemd

	very broken
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/1000000000000000055a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
	/lib/systemd/systemd

Andrei said:

: This patch breaks criu.  It was a bug in criu.  And this bug is on a minor
: path, which works when memfd_create() isn't available.  It is a reason why
: I ask to not backport this patch to stable kernels.
:
: In CRIU this bug can be triggered, only if this patch will be backported
: to a kernel which version is lower than v3.16.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171120212706.GA14325@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/proc/kcore.c: use probe_kernel_read() instead of memcpy()</title>
<updated>2018-02-16T19:23:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Heiko Carstens</name>
<email>heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-06T23:37:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7e54b58285e1e5b3f2430342d40f98a53401bb91'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7e54b58285e1e5b3f2430342d40f98a53401bb91</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d0290bc20d4739b7a900ae37eb5d4cc3be2b393f upstream.

Commit df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext
data") added a bounce buffer to avoid hardened usercopy checks.  Copying
to the bounce buffer was implemented with a simple memcpy() assuming
that it is always valid to read from kernel memory iff the
kern_addr_valid() check passed.

A simple, but pointless, test case like "dd if=/proc/kcore of=/dev/null"
now can easily crash the kernel, since the former execption handling on
invalid kernel addresses now doesn't work anymore.

Also adding a kern_addr_valid() implementation wouldn't help here.  Most
architectures simply return 1 here, while a couple implemented a page
table walk to figure out if something is mapped at the address in
question.

With DEBUG_PAGEALLOC active mappings are established and removed all the
time, so that relying on the result of kern_addr_valid() before
executing the memcpy() also doesn't work.

Therefore simply use probe_kernel_read() to copy to the bounce buffer.
This also allows to simplify read_kcore().

At least on s390 this fixes the observed crashes and doesn't introduce
warnings that were removed with df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add
bounce buffer for ktext data"), even though the generic
probe_kernel_read() implementation uses uaccess functions.

While looking into this I'm also wondering if kern_addr_valid() could be
completely removed...(?)

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171202132739.99971-1-heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Fixes: df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data")
Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: fix coredump vs read /proc/*/stat race</title>
<updated>2018-01-23T18:58:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-19T00:34:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ea5c2944328c46d17cc67879d6bee964c4de9be2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ea5c2944328c46d17cc67879d6bee964c4de9be2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8bb2ee192e482c5d500df9f2b1b26a560bd3026f upstream.

do_task_stat() accesses IP and SP of a task without bumping reference
count of a stack (which became an entity with independent lifetime at
some point).

Steps to reproduce:

    #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/types.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/stat.h&gt;
    #include &lt;fcntl.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/time.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/resource.h&gt;
    #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/wait.h&gt;

    int main(void)
    {
    	setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &amp;(struct rlimit){});

    	while (1) {
    		char buf[64];
    		char buf2[4096];
    		pid_t pid;
    		int fd;

    		pid = fork();
    		if (pid == 0) {
    			*(volatile int *)0 = 0;
    		}

    		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%u/stat", pid);
    		fd = open(buf, O_RDONLY);
    		read(fd, buf2, sizeof(buf2));
    		close(fd);

    		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
    	}
    	return 0;
    }

    BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000003fd8
    IP: do_task_stat+0x8b4/0xaf0
    PGD 800000003d73e067 P4D 800000003d73e067 PUD 3d558067 PMD 0
    Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
    CPU: 0 PID: 1417 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.15.0-rc8-dirty #2
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1.fc27 04/01/2014
    RIP: 0010:do_task_stat+0x8b4/0xaf0
    Call Trace:
     proc_single_show+0x43/0x70
     seq_read+0xe6/0x3b0
     __vfs_read+0x1e/0x120
     vfs_read+0x84/0x110
     SyS_read+0x3d/0xa0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x6c
    RIP: 0033:0x7f4d7928cba0
    RSP: 002b:00007ffddb245158 EFLAGS: 00000246
    Code: 03 b7 a0 01 00 00 4c 8b 4c 24 70 4c 8b 44 24 78 4c 89 74 24 18 e9 91 f9 ff ff f6 45 4d 02 0f 84 fd f7 ff ff 48 8b 45 40 48 89 ef &lt;48&gt; 8b 80 d8 3f 00 00 48 89 44 24 20 e8 9b 97 eb ff 48 89 44 24
    RIP: do_task_stat+0x8b4/0xaf0 RSP: ffffc90000607cc8
    CR2: 0000000000003fd8

John Ogness said: for my tests I added an else case to verify that the
race is hit and correctly mitigated.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180116175054.GA11513@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: "Kohli, Gaurav" &lt;gkohli@codeaurora.org&gt;
Tested-by: John Ogness &lt;john.ogness@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86 / CPU: Always show current CPU frequency in /proc/cpuinfo</title>
<updated>2018-01-10T08:31:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rafael J. Wysocki</name>
<email>rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-15T01:13:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=22af48be826c4193bba2f11112330aabb2568594'/>
<id>urn:sha1:22af48be826c4193bba2f11112330aabb2568594</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7d5905dc14a87805a59f3c5bf70173aac2bb18f8 upstream.

After commit 890da9cf0983 (Revert "x86: do not use cpufreq_quick_get()
for /proc/cpuinfo "cpu MHz"") the "cpu MHz" number in /proc/cpuinfo
on x86 can be either the nominal CPU frequency (which is constant)
or the frequency most recently requested by a scaling governor in
cpufreq, depending on the cpufreq configuration.  That is somewhat
inconsistent and is different from what it was before 4.13, so in
order to restore the previous behavior, make it report the current
CPU frequency like the scaling_cur_freq sysfs file in cpufreq.

To that end, modify the /proc/cpuinfo implementation on x86 to use
aperfmperf_snapshot_khz() to snapshot the APERF and MPERF feedback
registers, if available, and use their values to compute the CPU
frequency to be reported as "cpu MHz".

However, do that carefully enough to avoid accumulating delays that
lead to unacceptable access times for /proc/cpuinfo on systems with
many CPUs.  Run aperfmperf_snapshot_khz() once on all CPUs
asynchronously at the /proc/cpuinfo open time, add a single delay
upfront (if necessary) at that point and simply compute the current
frequency while running show_cpuinfo() for each individual CPU.

Also, to avoid slowing down /proc/cpuinfo accesses too much, reduce
the default delay between consecutive APERF and MPERF reads to 10 ms,
which should be sufficient to get large enough numbers for the
frequency computation in all cases.

Fixes: 890da9cf0983 (Revert "x86: do not use cpufreq_quick_get() for /proc/cpuinfo "cpu MHz"")
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
