<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/fs/proc, branch v4.4.197</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.197</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.197'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2019-06-22T06:18:27Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping</title>
<updated>2019-06-22T06:18:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrea Arcangeli</name>
<email>aarcange@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-19T00:50:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8f6345a11caae324ad36abca8723a5710d099a85'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8f6345a11caae324ad36abca8723a5710d099a85</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a upstream.

The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it.  Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier.  For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:

  https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils

  "Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
   to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
   without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
   misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"

In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.

Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.

Adding mmap_sem for writing around the -&gt;core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.

For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs.  Once -&gt;core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.

Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.

In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.

Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm().  The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Xu &lt;peterx@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) &lt;joel@joelfernandes.org&gt;
[mhocko@suse.com: stable 4.4 backport
 - drop infiniband part because of missing 5f9794dc94f59
 - drop userfaultfd_event_wait_completion hunk because of
   missing 9cd75c3cd4c3d]
 - handle binder_update_page_range because of missing 720c241924046
 - handle mlx5_ib_disassociate_ucontext - akaher@vmware.com
]
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c: Fix a NULL pointer dereference</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:44:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>YueHaibing</name>
<email>yuehaibing@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-26T05:24:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=76c279c7b6f8a65963fdba8391a8bc7d92f579b1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:76c279c7b6f8a65963fdba8391a8bc7d92f579b1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 89189557b47b35683a27c80ee78aef18248eefb4 upstream.

Syzkaller report this:

  sysctl could not get directory: /net//bridge -12
  kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
  kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
  general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 7027 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G         C        5.1.0-rc3+ #8
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:__write_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:220 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:__rb_change_child include/linux/rbtree_augmented.h:144 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:__rb_erase_augmented include/linux/rbtree_augmented.h:186 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:rb_erase+0x5f4/0x19f0 lib/rbtree.c:459
  Code: 00 0f 85 60 13 00 00 48 89 1a 48 83 c4 18 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 f2 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 &lt;80&gt; 3c 02 00 0f 85 75 0c 00 00 4d 85 ed 4c 89 2e 74 ce 4c 89 ea 48
  RSP: 0018:ffff8881bb507778 EFLAGS: 00010206
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8881f224b5b8 RCX: ffffffff818f3f6a
  RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000050 RDI: ffff8881f224b568
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffed10376a0ef4 R09: ffffed10376a0ef4
  R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed10376a0ef4 R12: ffff8881f224b558
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f3e7ce13700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007fd60fbe9398 CR3: 00000001cb55c001 CR4: 00000000007606e0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   erase_entry fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:178 [inline]
   erase_header+0xe3/0x160 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:207
   start_unregistering fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:331 [inline]
   drop_sysctl_table+0x558/0x880 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1631
   get_subdir fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1022 [inline]
   __register_sysctl_table+0xd65/0x1090 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1335
   br_netfilter_init+0x68/0x1000 [br_netfilter]
   do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
   do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
   load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
   __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
   do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
  Modules linked in: br_netfilter(+) backlight comedi(C) hid_sensor_hub max3100 ti_ads8688 udc_core fddi snd_mona leds_gpio rc_streamzap mtd pata_netcell nf_log_common rc_winfast udp_tunnel snd_usbmidi_lib snd_usb_toneport snd_usb_line6 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_hwdep videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common videodev media videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops rc_gadmei_rm008z 8250_of smm665 hid_tmff hid_saitek hwmon_vid rc_ati_tv_wonder_hd_600 rc_core pata_pdc202xx_old dn_rtmsg as3722 ad714x_i2c ad714x snd_soc_cs4265 hid_kensington panel_ilitek_ili9322 drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks ipack cdc_phonet usbcore phonet hid_jabra hid extcon_arizona can_dev industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio adm1031 i2c_mux_ltc4306 i2c_mux ipmi_msghandler mlxsw_core snd_soc_cs35l34 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore gpio_da9055 uio ecdh_generic mdio_thunder of_mdio fixed_phy libphy mdio_cavium iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle
   iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic piix aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd ide_core glue_helper input_leds psmouse intel_agp intel_gtt serio_raw ata_generic i2c_piix4 agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc parport floppy rtc_cmos sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: br_netfilter]
  Dumping ftrace buffer:
     (ftrace buffer empty)
  ---[ end trace 68741688d5fbfe85 ]---

commit 23da9588037e ("fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c: fix NULL pointer
dereference in put_links") forgot to handle start_unregistering() case,
while header-&gt;parent is NULL, it calls erase_header() and as seen in the
above syzkaller call trace, accessing &amp;header-&gt;parent-&gt;root will trigger
a NULL pointer dereference.

As that commit explained, there is also no need to call
start_unregistering() if header-&gt;parent is NULL.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190409153622.28112-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Fixes: 23da9588037e ("fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c: fix NULL pointer dereference in put_links")
Fixes: 0e47c99d7fe25 ("sysctl: Replace root_list with links between sysctl_table_sets")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Reported-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkci@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c: fix NULL pointer dereference in put_links</title>
<updated>2019-04-03T04:23:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>YueHaibing</name>
<email>yuehaibing@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-29T03:44:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6271fa6fc366827c0249864157e8fd18c4eac68a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6271fa6fc366827c0249864157e8fd18c4eac68a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 23da9588037ecdd4901db76a5b79a42b529c4ec3 upstream.

Syzkaller reports:

kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 5373 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:put_links+0x101/0x440 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1599
Code: 00 0f 85 3a 03 00 00 48 8b 43 38 48 89 44 24 20 48 83 c0 38 48 89 c2 48 89 44 24 28 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 &lt;80&gt; 3c 02 00 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 48 8b 74 24 20 48 c7 c7 60 2a 9d 91
RSP: 0018:ffff8881d828f238 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8881e01b1140 RCX: ffffffff8ee98267
RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffffc90001479000 RDI: ffff8881e01b1178
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee27259 R09: ffffed103ee27259
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee27258 R12: fffffffffffffff4
R13: 0000000000000006 R14: ffff8881f59838c0 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  00007f072254f700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fff8b286668 CR3: 00000001f0542002 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 drop_sysctl_table+0x152/0x9f0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1629
 get_subdir fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1022 [inline]
 __register_sysctl_table+0xd65/0x1090 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1335
 br_netfilter_init+0xbc/0x1000 [br_netfilter]
 do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
 load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f072254ec58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f072254ec70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f072254f6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: br_netfilter(+) dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb_dw2102 dvb_usb classmate_laptop palmas_regulator cn videobuf2_v4l2 v4l2_common snd_soc_bd28623 mptbase snd_usb_usx2y snd_usbmidi_lib snd_rawmidi wmi libnvdimm lockd sunrpc grace rc_kworld_pc150u rc_core rtc_da9063 sha1_ssse3 i2c_cros_ec_tunnel adxl34x_spi adxl34x nfnetlink lib80211 i5500_temp dvb_as102 dvb_core videobuf2_common videodev media videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops udc_core lnbp22 leds_lp3952 hid_roccat_ryos s1d13xxxfb mtd vport_geneve openvswitch nf_conncount nf_nat_ipv6 nsh geneve udp_tunnel ip6_udp_tunnel snd_soc_mt6351 sis_agp phylink snd_soc_adau1761_spi snd_soc_adau1761 snd_soc_adau17x1 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine ac97_bus snd_compress snd_soc_adau_utils snd_soc_sigmadsp_regmap snd_soc_sigmadsp raid_class hid_roccat_konepure hid_roccat_common hid_roccat c2port_duramar2150 core mdio_bcm_unimac iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle
 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim devlink vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel joydev mousedev ide_pci_generic piix aesni_intel aes_x86_64 ide_core crypto_simd atkbd cryptd glue_helper serio_raw ata_generic pata_acpi i2c_piix4 floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables ipv6 [last unloaded: lm73]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
   (ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 770020de38961fd0 ]---

A new dir entry can be created in get_subdir and its 'header-&gt;parent' is
set to NULL.  Only after insert_header success, it will be set to 'dir',
otherwise 'header-&gt;parent' is set to NULL and drop_sysctl_table is called.
However in err handling path of get_subdir, drop_sysctl_table also be
called on 'new-&gt;header' regardless its value of parent pointer.  Then
put_links is called, which triggers NULL-ptr deref when access member of
header-&gt;parent.

In fact we have multiple error paths which call drop_sysctl_table() there,
upon failure on insert_links() we also call drop_sysctl_table().And even
in the successful case on __register_sysctl_table() we still always call
drop_sysctl_table().This patch fix it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190314085527.13244-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Fixes: 0e47c99d7fe25 ("sysctl: Replace root_list with links between sysctl_table_sets")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Reported-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkci@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;    [3.4+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: Remove empty line in /proc/self/status</title>
<updated>2019-01-26T08:42:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gwendal Grignou</name>
<email>gwendal@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-14T18:13:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b820fe255e5092ddbc4fa940b2f85a62a2986abf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b820fe255e5092ddbc4fa940b2f85a62a2986abf</id>
<content type='text'>
Prevent an empty line in /proc/self/status, allow iotop to work.

iotop does not like empty lines, fails with:
  File "/usr/local/lib64/python2.7/site-packages/iotop/data.py", line
196, in parse_proc_pid_status
    key, value = line.split(':\t', 1)
ValueError: need more than 1 value to unpack

[reading /proc/self/status]

Fixes: 84964fa3e5a0 ("proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations")
Signed-off-by: Gwendal Grignou &lt;gwendal@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: do not access cmdline nor environ from file-backed areas</title>
<updated>2018-12-17T20:55:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-11T06:11:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=adc143b97d06a3305707726e69b4247db050cb88'/>
<id>urn:sha1:adc143b97d06a3305707726e69b4247db050cb88</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7f7ccc2ccc2e70c6054685f5e3522efa81556830 upstream.

proc_pid_cmdline_read() and environ_read() directly access the target
process' VM to retrieve the command line and environment. If this
process remaps these areas onto a file via mmap(), the requesting
process may experience various issues such as extra delays if the
underlying device is slow to respond.

Let's simply refuse to access file-backed areas in these functions.
For this we add a new FOLL_ANON gup flag that is passed to all calls
to access_remote_vm(). The code already takes care of such failures
(including unmapped areas). Accesses via /proc/pid/mem were not
changed though.

This was assigned CVE-2018-1120.

Note for stable backports: the patch may apply to kernels prior to 4.11
but silently miss one location; it must be checked that no call to
access_remote_vm() keeps zero as the last argument.

Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
 - Update the extra call to access_remote_vm() from proc_pid_cmdline_read()
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: don't use FOLL_FORCE for reading cmdline and environment</title>
<updated>2018-12-17T20:55:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-25T02:00:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=56941bb6400ca6ed0fdcaaa1f8c8183234bf199c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:56941bb6400ca6ed0fdcaaa1f8c8183234bf199c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 272ddc8b37354c3fe111ab26d25e792629148eee upstream.

Now that Lorenzo cleaned things up and made the FOLL_FORCE users
explicit, it becomes obvious how some of them don't really need
FOLL_FORCE at all.

So remove FOLL_FORCE from the proc code that reads the command line and
arguments from user space.

The mem_rw() function actually does want FOLL_FORCE, because gdd (and
possibly many other debuggers) use it as a much more convenient version
of PTRACE_PEEKDATA, but we should consider making the FOLL_FORCE part
conditional on actually being a ptracer.  This does not actually do
that, just moves adds a comment to that effect and moves the gup_flags
settings next to each other.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: replace access_remote_vm() write parameter with gup_flags</title>
<updated>2018-12-17T20:55:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lorenzo Stoakes</name>
<email>lstoakes@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-13T00:20:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=079d9ea86202777cd57c69879a5ba8db6a2c1b1e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:079d9ea86202777cd57c69879a5ba8db6a2c1b1e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6347e8d5bcce33fc36e651901efefbe2c93a43ef upstream.

This removes the 'write' argument from access_remote_vm() and replaces
it with 'gup_flags' as use of this function previously silently implied
FOLL_FORCE, whereas after this patch callers explicitly pass this flag.

We make this explicit as use of FOLL_FORCE can result in surprising
behaviour (and hence bugs) within the mm subsystem.

Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lstoakes@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: restrict kernel stack dumps to root</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T06:52:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-05T22:51:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=574757073482f77ec10caea5e57726190a2837fa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:574757073482f77ec10caea5e57726190a2837fa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f8a00cef17206ecd1b30d3d9f99e10d9fa707aa7 upstream.

Currently, you can use /proc/self/task/*/stack to cause a stack walk on
a task you control while it is running on another CPU.  That means that
the stack can change under the stack walker.  The stack walker does
have guards against going completely off the rails and into random
kernel memory, but it can interpret random data from your kernel stack
as instruction pointers and stack pointers.  This can cause exposure of
kernel stack contents to userspace.

Restrict the ability to inspect kernel stacks of arbitrary tasks to root
in order to prevent a local attacker from exploiting racy stack unwinding
to leak kernel task stack contents.  See the added comment for a longer
rationale.

There don't seem to be any users of this userspace API that can't
gracefully bail out if reading from the file fails.  Therefore, I believe
that this change is unlikely to break things.  In the case that this patch
does end up needing a revert, the next-best solution might be to fake a
single-entry stack based on wchan.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927153316.200286-1-jannh@google.com
Fixes: 2ec220e27f50 ("proc: add /proc/*/stack")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ken Chen &lt;kenchen@google.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: Use underscores for SSBD in 'status'</title>
<updated>2018-07-25T08:18:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-14T09:37:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=765897c6486de605eae3f94f77f2c800c9a2a254'/>
<id>urn:sha1:765897c6486de605eae3f94f77f2c800c9a2a254</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e96f46ee8587607a828f783daa6eb5b44d25004d upstream

The style for the 'status' file is CamelCase or this. _.

Fixes: fae1fa0fc ("proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations")
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat &lt;srivatsa@csail.mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) &lt;matt.helsley@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov &lt;amakhalov@vmware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bo Gan &lt;ganb@vmware.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>prctl: Add force disable speculation</title>
<updated>2018-07-25T08:18:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-14T09:36:41Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit 356e4bfff2c5489e016fdb925adbf12a1e3950ee upstream

For certain use cases it is desired to enforce mitigations so they cannot
be undone afterwards. That's important for loader stubs which want to
prevent a child from disabling the mitigation again. Will also be used for
seccomp(). The extra state preserving of the prctl state for SSB is a
preparatory step for EBPF dymanic speculation control.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat &lt;srivatsa@csail.mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) &lt;matt.helsley@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov &lt;amakhalov@vmware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bo Gan &lt;ganb@vmware.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
