<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/fs, branch v4.14.39</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.39</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.39'/>
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<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:07Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix bitmap position validation</title>
<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lukas Czerner</name>
<email>lczerner@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-24T15:31:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ae0db58dabe5463dcbcce095e83177536ed22d6a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ae0db58dabe5463dcbcce095e83177536ed22d6a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 22be37acce25d66ecf6403fc8f44df9c5ded2372 upstream.

Currently in ext4_valid_block_bitmap() we expect the bitmap to be
positioned anywhere between 0 and s_blocksize clusters, but that's
wrong because the bitmap can be placed anywhere in the block group. This
causes false positives when validating bitmaps on perfectly valid file
system layouts. Fix it by checking whether the bitmap is within the group
boundary.

The problem can be reproduced using the following

mkfs -t ext3 -E stride=256 /dev/vdb1
mount /dev/vdb1 /mnt/test
cd /mnt/test
wget https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/linux-4.16.3.tar.xz
tar xf linux-4.16.3.tar.xz

This will result in the warnings in the logs

EXT4-fs error (device vdb1): ext4_validate_block_bitmap:399: comm tar: bg 84: block 2774529: invalid block bitmap

[ Changed slightly for clarity and to not drop a overflow test -- TYT ]

Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner &lt;lczerner@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 7dac4a1726a9 ("ext4: add validity checks for bitmap block numbers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: add validity checks for bitmap block numbers</title>
<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-27T03:54:10Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b39430ea068797bb45b72429db3743064280b1be</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7dac4a1726a9c64a517d595c40e95e2d0d135f6f upstream.

An privileged attacker can cause a crash by mounting a crafted ext4
image which triggers a out-of-bounds read in the function
ext4_valid_block_bitmap() in fs/ext4/balloc.c.

This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-1093.

BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199181
BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1560782
Reported-by: Wen Xu &lt;wen.xu@gatech.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: add MODULE_SOFTDEP to ensure crc32c is included in the initramfs</title>
<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-26T04:44:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=55cc3bb0a6c7da92dd1332cc8e1651dc2be89bfc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:55cc3bb0a6c7da92dd1332cc8e1651dc2be89bfc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7ef79ad52136712172eb0525bf0b462516bf2f93 upstream.

Fixes: a45403b51582 ("ext4: always initialize the crc32c checksum driver")
Reported-by: François Valenduc &lt;francoisvalenduc@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: set h_journal if there is a failure starting a reserved handle</title>
<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-18T15:49:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4a3674acbf8b076bb42b68f5d95f0877acabf210</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b2569260d55228b617bd82aba6d0db2faeeb4116 upstream.

If ext4 tries to start a reserved handle via
jbd2_journal_start_reserved(), and the journal has been aborted, this
can result in a NULL pointer dereference.  This is because the fields
h_journal and h_transaction in the handle structure share the same
memory, via a union, so jbd2_journal_start_reserved() will clear
h_journal before calling start_this_handle().  If this function fails
due to an aborted handle, h_journal will still be NULL, and the call
to jbd2_journal_free_reserved() will pass a NULL journal to
sub_reserve_credits().

This can be reproduced by running "kvm-xfstests -c dioread_nolock
generic/475".

Cc: stable@kernel.org # 3.11
Fixes: 8f7d89f36829b ("jbd2: transaction reservation support")
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger &lt;adilger@dilger.ca&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: prevent right-shifting extents beyond EXT_MAX_BLOCKS</title>
<updated>2018-05-01T19:58:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-12T15:48:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1a538cb0879d8646437836d540b6e952d9103f63</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 349fa7d6e1935f49bf4161c4900711b2989180a9 upstream.

During the "insert range" fallocate operation, extents starting at the
range offset are shifted "right" (to a higher file offset) by the range
length.  But, as shown by syzbot, it's not validated that this doesn't
cause extents to be shifted beyond EXT_MAX_BLOCKS.  In that case
-&gt;ee_block can wrap around, corrupting the extent tree.

Fix it by returning an error if the space between the end of the last
extent and EXT4_MAX_BLOCKS is smaller than the range being inserted.

This bug can be reproduced by running the following commands when the
current directory is on an ext4 filesystem with a 4k block size:

        fallocate -l 8192 file
        fallocate --keep-size -o 0xfffffffe000 -l 4096 -n file
        fallocate --insert-range -l 8192 file

Then after unmounting the filesystem, e2fsck reports corruption.

Reported-by: syzbot+06c885be0edcdaeab40c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 331573febb6a ("ext4: Add support FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE for fallocate")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs/proc/kcore, x86/mm/kcore: Fix SMAP fault when dumping vsyscall user page</title>
<updated>2018-04-26T09:02:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jia Zhang</name>
<email>zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-12T14:44:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f4d6e4598a29f6f7df6937d943c01e1eeb9ee871'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f4d6e4598a29f6f7df6937d943c01e1eeb9ee871</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 595dd46ebfc10be041a365d0a3fa99df50b6ba73 ]

Commit:

  df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data")

... introduced a bounce buffer to work around CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y.
However, accessing the vsyscall user page will cause an SMAP fault.

Replace memcpy() with copy_from_user() to fix this bug works, but adding
a common way to handle this sort of user page may be useful for future.

Currently, only vsyscall page requires KCORE_USER.

Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang &lt;zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518446694-21124-2-git-send-email-zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cifs: silence compiler warnings showing up with gcc-8.0.0</title>
<updated>2018-04-26T09:02:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-02T15:48:47Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:05921c492fdb6046e5a91a83dba3320701421902</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ade7db991b47ab3016a414468164f4966bd08202 ]

This bug was fixed before, but came up again with the latest
compiler in another function:

fs/cifs/cifssmb.c: In function 'CIFSSMBSetEA':
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:6362:3: error: 'strncpy' offset 8 is out of the bounds [0, 4] [-Werror=array-bounds]
   strncpy(parm_data-&gt;list[0].name, ea_name, name_len);

Let's apply the same fix that was used for the other instances.

Fixes: b2a3ad9ca502 ("cifs: silence compiler warnings showing up with gcc-4.7.0")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: fix /proc/*/map_files lookup</title>
<updated>2018-04-26T09:02:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-06T23:36:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:05e52e5bd103a335288415d5399cdb120a05a5e4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ac7f1061c2c11bb8936b1b6a94cdb48de732f7a4 ]

Current code does:

	if (sscanf(dentry-&gt;d_name.name, "%lx-%lx", start, end) != 2)

However sscanf() is broken garbage.

It silently accepts whitespace between format specifiers
(did you know that?).

It silently accepts valid strings which result in integer overflow.

Do not use sscanf() for any even remotely reliable parsing code.

	OK
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/55a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
	/lib/systemd/systemd

	broken
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/               55a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
	/lib/systemd/systemd

	broken
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/55a23af39000-55a23b05b000    '
	/lib/systemd/systemd

	very broken
	# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/1000000000000000055a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
	/lib/systemd/systemd

Andrei said:

: This patch breaks criu.  It was a bug in criu.  And this bug is on a minor
: path, which works when memfd_create() isn't available.  It is a reason why
: I ask to not backport this patch to stable kernels.
:
: In CRIU this bug can be triggered, only if this patch will be backported
: to a kernel which version is lower than v3.16.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171120212706.GA14325@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: return error when we attempt to access a dirty bh in jbd2</title>
<updated>2018-04-26T09:02:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>piaojun</name>
<email>piaojun@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-01T00:15:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a7fbc7f3134ab4848898383a0852a8e768311498'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a7fbc7f3134ab4848898383a0852a8e768311498</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d984187e3a1ad7d12447a7ab2c43ce3717a2b5b3 ]

We should not reuse the dirty bh in jbd2 directly due to the following
situation:

1. When removing extent rec, we will dirty the bhs of extent rec and
   truncate log at the same time, and hand them over to jbd2.

2. The bhs are submitted to jbd2 area successfully.

3. The write-back thread of device help flush the bhs to disk but
   encounter write error due to abnormal storage link.

4. After a while the storage link become normal. Truncate log flush
   worker triggered by the next space reclaiming found the dirty bh of
   truncate log and clear its 'BH_Write_EIO' and then set it uptodate in
   __ocfs2_journal_access():

   ocfs2_truncate_log_worker
     ocfs2_flush_truncate_log
       __ocfs2_flush_truncate_log
         ocfs2_replay_truncate_records
           ocfs2_journal_access_di
             __ocfs2_journal_access // here we clear io_error and set 'tl_bh' uptodata.

5. Then jbd2 will flush the bh of truncate log to disk, but the bh of
   extent rec is still in error state, and unfortunately nobody will
   take care of it.

6. At last the space of extent rec was not reduced, but truncate log
   flush worker have given it back to globalalloc. That will cause
   duplicate cluster problem which could be identified by fsck.ocfs2.

Sadly we can hardly revert this but set fs read-only in case of ruining
atomicity and consistency of space reclaim.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5A6E8092.8090701@huawei.com
Fixes: acf8fdbe6afb ("ocfs2: do not BUG if buffer not uptodate in __ocfs2_journal_access")
Signed-off-by: Jun Piao &lt;piaojun@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Yiwen Jiang &lt;jiangyiwen@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Changwei Ge &lt;ge.changwei@h3c.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@versity.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Joseph Qi &lt;jiangqi903@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2/acl: use 'ip_xattr_sem' to protect getting extended attribute</title>
<updated>2018-04-26T09:02:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>piaojun</name>
<email>piaojun@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-01T00:14:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a66174eb4a149b7919d174d9a7ce6ad9909c5ee2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a66174eb4a149b7919d174d9a7ce6ad9909c5ee2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 16c8d569f5704a84164f30ff01b29879f3438065 ]

The race between *set_acl and *get_acl will cause getting incomplete
xattr data as below:

  processA                                    processB

  ocfs2_set_acl
    ocfs2_xattr_set
      __ocfs2_xattr_set_handle

                                              ocfs2_get_acl_nolock
                                                ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock:

processB may get incomplete xattr data if processA hasn't set_acl done.

So we should use 'ip_xattr_sem' to protect getting extended attribute in
ocfs2_get_acl_nolock(), as other processes could be changing it
concurrently.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5A5DDCFF.7030001@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jun Piao &lt;piaojun@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Chen &lt;alex.chen@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@versity.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Joseph Qi &lt;jiangqi903@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Changwei Ge &lt;ge.changwei@h3c.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
