user/sven/linux.git/fs, branch v4.16.14

fix io_destroy()/aio_complete() race

2018-06-05T09:46:14Z

commit 4faa99965e027cc057c5145ce45fa772caa04e8d upstream. If io_destroy() gets to cancelling everything that can be cancelled and gets to kiocb_cancel() calling the function driver has left in ->ki_cancel, it becomes vulnerable to a race with IO completion. At that point req is already taken off the list and aio_complete() does *NOT* spin until we (in free_ioctx_users()) releases ->ctx_lock. As the result, it proceeds to kiocb_free(), freing req just it gets passed to ->ki_cancel(). Fix is simple - remove from the list after the call of kiocb_cancel(). All instances of ->ki_cancel() already have to cope with the being called with iocb still on list - that's what happens in io_cancel(2). Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 0460fef2a921 "aio: use cancellation list lazily" Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfs: detect agfl count corruption and reset agfl

2018-06-05T09:46:10Z

commit a27ba2607e60312554cbcd43fc660b2c7f29dc9c upstream. The struct xfs_agfl v5 header was originally introduced with unexpected padding that caused the AGFL to operate with one less slot than intended. The header has since been packed, but the fix left an incompatibility for users who upgrade from an old kernel with the unpacked header to a newer kernel with the packed header while the AGFL happens to wrap around the end. The newer kernel recognizes one extra slot at the physical end of the AGFL that the previous kernel did not. The new kernel will eventually attempt to allocate a block from that slot, which contains invalid data, and cause a crash. This condition can be detected by comparing the active range of the AGFL to the count. While this detects a padding mismatch, it can also trigger false positives for unrelated flcount corruption. Since we cannot distinguish a size mismatch due to padding from unrelated corruption, we can't trust the AGFL enough to simply repopulate the empty slot. Instead, avoid unnecessarily complex detection logic and and use a solution that can handle any form of flcount corruption that slips through read verifiers: distrust the entire AGFL and reset it to an empty state. Any valid blocks within the AGFL are intentionally leaked. This requires xfs_repair to rectify (which was already necessary based on the state the AGFL was found in). The reset mitigates the side effect of the padding mismatch problem from a filesystem crash to a free space accounting inconsistency. The generic approach also means that this patch can be safely backported to kernels with or without a packed struct xfs_agfl. Check the AGF for an invalid freelist count on initial read from disk. If detected, set a flag on the xfs_perag to indicate that a reset is required before the AGFL can be used. In the first transaction that attempts to use a flagged AGFL, reset it to empty, warn the user about the inconsistency and allow the freelist fixup code to repopulate the AGFL with new blocks. The xfs_perag flag is cleared to eliminate the need for repeated checks on each block allocation operation. This allows kernels that include the packing fix commit 96f859d52bcb ("libxfs: pack the agfl header structure so XFS_AGFL_SIZE is correct") to handle older unpacked AGFL formats without a filesystem crash. Suggested-by: Dave Chinner Signed-off-by: Brian Foster Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong Reviewed-by Dave Chiluk Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfs: convert XFS_AGFL_SIZE to a helper function

2018-06-05T09:46:10Z

commit a78ee256c325ecfaec13cafc41b315bd4e1dd518 upstream. The AGFL size calculation is about to get more complex, so lets turn the macro into a function first and remove the macro. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner [darrick: forward port to newer kernel, simplify the helper] Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong Reviewed-by: Brian Foster Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

udf: Provide saner default for invalid uid / gid

2018-05-30T06:17:41Z

[ Upstream commit 116e5258e4115aca0c64ac0bf40ded3b353ed626 ] Currently when UDF filesystem is recorded without uid / gid (ids are set to -1), we will assign INVALID_[UG]ID to vfs inode unless user uses uid= and gid= mount options. In such case filesystem could not be modified in any way as VFS refuses to modify files with invalid ids (even by root). This is confusing to users and not very useful default since such media mode is generally used for removable media. Use overflow[ug]id instead so that at least root can modify the filesystem. Reported-by: Steve Kenton Reviewed-by: Pali Rohár Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

gfs2: Fix fallocate chunk size

2018-05-30T06:17:37Z

[ Upstream commit 174d1232ebc84fcde8f5889d1171c9c7e74a10a7 ] The chunk size of allocations in __gfs2_fallocate is calculated incorrectly. The size can collapse, causing __gfs2_fallocate to allocate one block at a time, which is very inefficient. This needs fixing in two places: In gfs2_quota_lock_check, always set ap->allowed to UINT_MAX to indicate that there is no quota limit. This fixes callers that rely on ap->allowed to be set even when quotas are off. In __gfs2_fallocate, reset max_blks to UINT_MAX in each iteration of the loop to make sure that allocation limits from one resource group won't spill over into another resource group. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: fix to check extent cache in f2fs_drop_extent_tree

2018-05-30T06:17:35Z

[ Upstream commit bf617f7a92edc6bb2909db2bfa4576f50b280ee5 ] If noextent_cache mount option is on, we will never initialize extent tree in inode, but still we're going to access it in f2fs_drop_extent_tree, result in kernel panic as below: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038 IP: _raw_write_lock+0xc/0x30 Call Trace: ? f2fs_drop_extent_tree+0x41/0x70 [f2fs] f2fs_fallocate+0x5a0/0xdd0 [f2fs] ? common_file_perm+0x47/0xc0 ? apparmor_file_permission+0x1a/0x20 vfs_fallocate+0x15b/0x290 SyS_fallocate+0x44/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x160 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 This patch fixes to check extent cache status before using in f2fs_drop_extent_tree. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: fix to clear CP_TRIMMED_FLAG

2018-05-30T06:17:35Z

[ Upstream commit cd36d7a17f9da68be9aa67185ba3ad7969934a19 ] Once CP_TRIMMED_FLAG is set, after a reboot, we will never issue discard before LBA becomes invalid again, fix it by clearing the flag in checkpoint without CP_TRIMMED reason. Fixes: 1f43e2ad7bff ("f2fs: introduce CP_TRIMMED_FLAG to avoid unneeded discard") Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: fix to set KEEP_SIZE bit in f2fs_zero_range

2018-05-30T06:17:35Z

[ Upstream commit 17cd07ae95073c298af92c1ba14ac58ce84de33b ] As Jayashree Mohan reported: A simple workload to reproduce this would be : 1. create foo 2. Write (8K - 16K) // foo size = 16K now 3. fsync() 4. falloc zero_range , keep_size (4202496 - 4210688) // foo size must be 16K 5. fdatasync() Crash now On recovery, we see that the file size is 4210688 and not 16K, which violates the semantics of keep_size flag. We have a test case to reproduce this using CrashMonkey on 4.15 kernel. Try this out by simply running : ./c_harness -f /dev/sda -d /dev/cow_ram0 -t f2fs -e 102400 -P -v tests/generic_468_zero.so The root cause is that we miss to set KEEP_SIZE bit correctly in zero_range when zeroing block cross EOF with FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE, let's fix this missing case. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

f2fs: flush cp pack except cp pack 2 page at first

2018-05-30T06:17:35Z

[ Upstream commit 46706d5917f4457a6befe7a39a15c89dbb1ce9ca ] Previously, we attempt to flush the whole cp pack in a single bio, however, when suddenly powering off at this time, we could get into an extreme scenario that cp pack 1 page and cp pack 2 page are updated and latest, but payload or current summaries are still partially outdated. (see reliable write in the UFS specification) This patch submits the whole cp pack except cp pack 2 page at first, and then writes the cp pack 2 page with an extra independent bio with pre-io barrier. Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ext4: don't complain about incorrect features when probing

2018-05-30T06:17:30Z

[ Upstream commit 0d9366d67bcf066b028e57d09c9a86ce879bcc28 ] If mount is auto-probing for filesystem type, it will try various filesystems in order, with the MS_SILENT flag set. We get that flag as the silent arg to ext4_fill_super. If we're probing (silent==1) then don't complain about feature incompatibilities that are found if it looks like it's actually a different valid extN type - failed probes should be silent in this case. If the on-disk features are unknown even to ext4, then complain. Reported-by: Joakim Tjernlund Tested-by: Joakim Tjernlund Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman