<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/fs, branch v4.19.274</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.274</id>
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<updated>2023-02-25T10:51:51Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ext4: Fix function prototype mismatch for ext4_feat_ktype</title>
<updated>2023-02-25T10:51:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-04T21:09:12Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit 118901ad1f25d2334255b3d50512fa20591531cd upstream.

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG),
indirect call targets are validated against the expected function
pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate
ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time,
which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed.

ext4_feat_ktype was setting the "release" handler to "kfree", which
doesn't have a matching function prototype. Add a simple wrapper
with the correct prototype.

This was found as a result of Clang's new -Wcast-function-type-strict
flag, which is more sensitive than the simpler -Wcast-function-type,
which only checks for type width mismatches.

Note that this code is only reached when ext4 is a loadable module and
it is being unloaded:

 CFI failure at kobject_put+0xbb/0x1b0 (target: kfree+0x0/0x180; expected type: 0x7c4aa698)
 ...
 RIP: 0010:kobject_put+0xbb/0x1b0
 ...
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  ext4_exit_sysfs+0x14/0x60 [ext4]
  cleanup_module+0x67/0xedb [ext4]

Fixes: b99fee58a20a ("ext4: create ext4_feat kobject dynamically")
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Build-tested-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavoars@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavoars@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230103234616.never.915-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230104210908.gonna.388-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nilfs2: fix underflow in second superblock position calculations</title>
<updated>2023-02-22T11:47:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ryusuke Konishi</name>
<email>konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-14T22:40:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b96591e2c35c8b47db0ec816b5fc6cb8868000ff</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 99b9402a36f0799f25feee4465bfa4b8dfa74b4d upstream.

Macro NILFS_SB2_OFFSET_BYTES, which computes the position of the second
superblock, underflows when the argument device size is less than 4096
bytes.  Therefore, when using this macro, it is necessary to check in
advance that the device size is not less than a lower limit, or at least
that underflow does not occur.

The current nilfs2 implementation lacks this check, causing out-of-bound
block access when mounting devices smaller than 4096 bytes:

 I/O error, dev loop0, sector 36028797018963960 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0
 phys_seg 1 prio class 2
 NILFS (loop0): unable to read secondary superblock (blocksize = 1024)

In addition, when trying to resize the filesystem to a size below 4096
bytes, this underflow occurs in nilfs_resize_fs(), passing a huge number
of segments to nilfs_sufile_resize(), corrupting parameters such as the
number of segments in superblocks.  This causes excessive loop iterations
in nilfs_sufile_resize() during a subsequent resize ioctl, causing
semaphore ns_segctor_sem to block for a long time and hang the writer
thread:

 INFO: task segctord:5067 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
      Not tainted 6.2.0-rc8-syzkaller-00015-gf6feea56f66d #0
 "echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
 task:segctord        state:D stack:23456 pid:5067  ppid:2
 flags:0x00004000
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5293 [inline]
  __schedule+0x1409/0x43f0 kernel/sched/core.c:6606
  schedule+0xc3/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6682
  rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0xfcf/0x14a0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1190
  nilfs_transaction_lock+0x25c/0x4f0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:357
  nilfs_segctor_thread_construct fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2486 [inline]
  nilfs_segctor_thread+0x52f/0x1140 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2570
  kthread+0x270/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:376
  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308
  &lt;/TASK&gt;
 ...
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  folio_mark_accessed+0x51c/0xf00 mm/swap.c:515
  __nilfs_get_page_block fs/nilfs2/page.c:42 [inline]
  nilfs_grab_buffer+0x3d3/0x540 fs/nilfs2/page.c:61
  nilfs_mdt_submit_block+0xd7/0x8f0 fs/nilfs2/mdt.c:121
  nilfs_mdt_read_block+0xeb/0x430 fs/nilfs2/mdt.c:176
  nilfs_mdt_get_block+0x12d/0xbb0 fs/nilfs2/mdt.c:251
  nilfs_sufile_get_segment_usage_block fs/nilfs2/sufile.c:92 [inline]
  nilfs_sufile_truncate_range fs/nilfs2/sufile.c:679 [inline]
  nilfs_sufile_resize+0x7a3/0x12b0 fs/nilfs2/sufile.c:777
  nilfs_resize_fs+0x20c/0xed0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:422
  nilfs_ioctl_resize fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:1033 [inline]
  nilfs_ioctl+0x137c/0x2440 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:1301
  ...

This fixes these issues by inserting appropriate minimum device size
checks or anti-underflow checks, depending on where the macro is used.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0000000000004e1dfa05f4a48e6b@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230214224043.24141-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi &lt;konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: &lt;syzbot+f0c4082ce5ebebdac63b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi &lt;konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>revert "squashfs: harden sanity check in squashfs_read_xattr_id_table"</title>
<updated>2023-02-22T11:47:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Morton</name>
<email>akpm@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-03T02:07:35Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2ab96a0ee1e32757d067f7e8b6b66ca217e02bd8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a5b21d8d791cd4db609d0bbcaa9e0c7e019888d1 upstream.

This fix was nacked by Philip, for reasons identified in the email linked
below.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/68f15d67-8945-2728-1f17-5b53a80ec52d@squashfs.org.uk
Fixes: 72e544b1b28325 ("squashfs: harden sanity check in squashfs_read_xattr_id_table")
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov &lt;khoroshilov@ispras.ru&gt;
Cc: Fedor Pchelkin &lt;pchelkin@ispras.ru&gt;
Cc: Phillip Lougher &lt;phillip@squashfs.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>aio: fix mremap after fork null-deref</title>
<updated>2023-02-22T11:47:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Seth Jenkins</name>
<email>sethjenkins@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-31T17:25:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d8dca1bfe9adcae38b35add64977818c0c13dd22</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 81e9d6f8647650a7bead74c5f926e29970e834d1 upstream.

Commit e4a0d3e720e7 ("aio: Make it possible to remap aio ring") introduced
a null-deref if mremap is called on an old aio mapping after fork as
mm-&gt;ioctx_table will be set to NULL.

[jmoyer@redhat.com: fix 80 column issue]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/x49sffq4nvg.fsf@segfault.boston.devel.redhat.com
Fixes: e4a0d3e720e7 ("aio: Make it possible to remap aio ring")
Signed-off-by: Seth Jenkins &lt;sethjenkins@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer &lt;jmoyer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise &lt;bcrl@kvack.org&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: limit device extents to the device size</title>
<updated>2023-02-22T11:47:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-18T21:35:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c089e2ece1d7a9981f5b55eaf44d6a3bb602ed2c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3c538de0f2a74d50aff7278c092f88ae59cee688 upstream.

There was a recent regression in btrfs/177 that started happening with
the size class patches ("btrfs: introduce size class to block group
allocator").  This however isn't a regression introduced by those
patches, but rather the bug was uncovered by a change in behavior in
these patches.  The patches triggered more chunk allocations in the
^free-space-tree case, which uncovered a race with device shrink.

The problem is we will set the device total size to the new size, and
use this to find a hole for a device extent.  However during shrink we
may have device extents allocated past this range, so we could
potentially find a hole in a range past our new shrink size.  We don't
actually limit our found extent to the device size anywhere, we assume
that we will not find a hole past our device size.  This isn't true with
shrink as we're relocating block groups and thus creating holes past the
device size.

Fix this by making sure we do not search past the new device size, and
if we wander into any device extents that start after our device size
simply break from the loop and use whatever hole we've already found.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Squashfs: fix handling and sanity checking of xattr_ids count</title>
<updated>2023-02-22T11:47:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Phillip Lougher</name>
<email>phillip@squashfs.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-27T06:18:42Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b38c3e9e0adc01956cc3e5a52e4d3f92f79d88e2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f65c4bbbd682b0877b669828b4e033b8d5d0a2dc upstream.

A Sysbot [1] corrupted filesystem exposes two flaws in the handling and
sanity checking of the xattr_ids count in the filesystem.  Both of these
flaws cause computation overflow due to incorrect typing.

In the corrupted filesystem the xattr_ids value is 4294967071, which
stored in a signed variable becomes the negative number -225.

Flaw 1 (64-bit systems only):

The signed integer xattr_ids variable causes sign extension.

This causes variable overflow in the SQUASHFS_XATTR_*(A) macros.  The
variable is first multiplied by sizeof(struct squashfs_xattr_id) where the
type of the sizeof operator is "unsigned long".

On a 64-bit system this is 64-bits in size, and causes the negative number
to be sign extended and widened to 64-bits and then become unsigned.  This
produces the very large number 18446744073709548016 or 2^64 - 3600.  This
number when rounded up by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE - 1 (8191 bytes) and
divided by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE overflows and produces a length of 0
(stored in len).

Flaw 2 (32-bit systems only):

On a 32-bit system the integer variable is not widened by the unsigned
long type of the sizeof operator (32-bits), and the signedness of the
variable has no effect due it always being treated as unsigned.

The above corrupted xattr_ids value of 4294967071, when multiplied
overflows and produces the number 4294963696 or 2^32 - 3400.  This number
when rounded up by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE - 1 (8191 bytes) and divided by
SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE overflows again and produces a length of 0.

The effect of the 0 length computation:

In conjunction with the corrupted xattr_ids field, the filesystem also has
a corrupted xattr_table_start value, where it matches the end of
filesystem value of 850.

This causes the following sanity check code to fail because the
incorrectly computed len of 0 matches the incorrect size of the table
reported by the superblock (0 bytes).

    len = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES(*xattr_ids);
    indexes = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCKS(*xattr_ids);

    /*
     * The computed size of the index table (len bytes) should exactly
     * match the table start and end points
    */
    start = table_start + sizeof(*id_table);
    end = msblk-&gt;bytes_used;

    if (len != (end - start))
            return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

Changing the xattr_ids variable to be "usigned int" fixes the flaw on a
64-bit system.  This relies on the fact the computation is widened by the
unsigned long type of the sizeof operator.

Casting the variable to u64 in the above macro fixes this flaw on a 32-bit
system.

It also means 64-bit systems do not implicitly rely on the type of the
sizeof operator to widen the computation.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000cd44f005f1a0f17f@google.com/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230127061842.10965-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Fixes: 506220d2ba21 ("squashfs: add more sanity checks in xattr id lookup")
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher &lt;phillip@squashfs.org.uk&gt;
Reported-by: &lt;syzbot+082fa4af80a5bb1a9843@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov &lt;khoroshilov@ispras.ru&gt;
Cc: Fedor Pchelkin &lt;pchelkin@ispras.ru&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: hugetlb: proc: check for hugetlb shared PMD in /proc/PID/smaps</title>
<updated>2023-02-22T11:47:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Kravetz</name>
<email>mike.kravetz@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-26T22:27:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:400723777e17164aec1510f0f2c630ae2eee8a48</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3489dbb696d25602aea8c3e669a6d43b76bd5358 upstream.

Patch series "Fixes for hugetlb mapcount at most 1 for shared PMDs".

This issue of mapcount in hugetlb pages referenced by shared PMDs was
discussed in [1].  The following two patches address user visible behavior
caused by this issue.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/Y9BF+OCdWnCSilEu@monkey/


This patch (of 2):

A hugetlb page will have a mapcount of 1 if mapped by multiple processes
via a shared PMD.  This is because only the first process increases the
map count, and subsequent processes just add the shared PMD page to their
page table.

page_mapcount is being used to decide if a hugetlb page is shared or
private in /proc/PID/smaps.  Pages referenced via a shared PMD were
incorrectly being counted as private.

To fix, check for a shared PMD if mapcount is 1.  If a shared PMD is found
count the hugetlb page as shared.  A new helper to check for a shared PMD
is added.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: simplification, per David]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: hugetlb.h: include page_ref.h for page_count()]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230126222721.222195-2-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Fixes: 25ee01a2fca0 ("mm: hugetlb: proc: add hugetlb-related fields to /proc/PID/smaps")
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Xu &lt;peterx@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Houghton &lt;jthoughton@google.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Muchun Song &lt;songmuchun@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi &lt;naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Vishal Moola (Oracle) &lt;vishal.moola@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Yang Shi &lt;shy828301@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>squashfs: harden sanity check in squashfs_read_xattr_id_table</title>
<updated>2023-02-22T11:47:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Fedor Pchelkin</name>
<email>pchelkin@ispras.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-17T10:52:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b30a74f83265c24d1d0842c6c3928cd2e775a3fb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b30a74f83265c24d1d0842c6c3928cd2e775a3fb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 72e544b1b28325fe78a4687b980871a7e4101f76 ]

While mounting a corrupted filesystem, a signed integer '*xattr_ids' can
become less than zero.  This leads to the incorrect computation of 'len'
and 'indexes' values which can cause null-ptr-deref in copy_bio_to_actor()
or out-of-bounds accesses in the next sanity checks inside
squashfs_read_xattr_id_table().

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230117105226.329303-2-pchelkin@ispras.ru
Fixes: 506220d2ba21 ("squashfs: add more sanity checks in xattr id lookup")
Reported-by: &lt;syzbot+082fa4af80a5bb1a9843@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin &lt;pchelkin@ispras.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov &lt;khoroshilov@ispras.ru&gt;
Cc: Phillip Lougher &lt;phillip@squashfs.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysctl: add a new register_sysctl_init() interface</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:49:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiaoming Ni</name>
<email>nixiaoming@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-03T00:27:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=700e1252c227a2bbcbe70001ce7cd2d26d772666'/>
<id>urn:sha1:700e1252c227a2bbcbe70001ce7cd2d26d772666</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3ddd9a808cee7284931312f2f3e854c9617f44b2 upstream.

Patch series "sysctl: first set of kernel/sysctl cleanups", v2.

Finally had time to respin the series of the work we had started last
year on cleaning up the kernel/sysct.c kitchen sink.  People keeps
stuffing their sysctls in that file and this creates a maintenance
burden.  So this effort is aimed at placing sysctls where they actually
belong.

I'm going to split patches up into series as there is quite a bit of
work.

This first set adds register_sysctl_init() for uses of registerting a
sysctl on the init path, adds const where missing to a few places,
generalizes common values so to be more easy to share, and starts the
move of a few kernel/sysctl.c out where they belong.

The majority of rework on v2 in this first patch set is 0-day fixes.
Eric Biederman's feedback is later addressed in subsequent patch sets.

I'll only post the first two patch sets for now.  We can address the
rest once the first two patch sets get completely reviewed / Acked.

This patch (of 9):

The kernel/sysctl.c is a kitchen sink where everyone leaves their dirty
dishes, this makes it very difficult to maintain.

To help with this maintenance let's start by moving sysctls to places
where they actually belong.  The proc sysctl maintainers do not want to
know what sysctl knobs you wish to add for your own piece of code, we
just care about the core logic.

Today though folks heavily rely on tables on kernel/sysctl.c so they can
easily just extend this table with their needed sysctls.  In order to
help users move their sysctls out we need to provide a helper which can
be used during code initialization.

We special-case the initialization use of register_sysctl() since it
*is* safe to fail, given all that sysctls do is provide a dynamic
interface to query or modify at runtime an existing variable.  So the
use case of register_sysctl() on init should *not* stop if the sysctls
don't end up getting registered.  It would be counter productive to stop
boot if a simple sysctl registration failed.

Provide a helper for init then, and document the recommended init levels
to use for callers of this routine.  We will later use this in
subsequent patches to start slimming down kernel/sysctl.c tables and
moving sysctl registration to the code which actually needs these
sysctls.

[mcgrof@kernel.org: major commit log and documentation rephrasing also moved to fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c                  ]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123202347.818157-1-mcgrof@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123202347.818157-2-mcgrof@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni &lt;nixiaoming@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Iurii Zaikin &lt;yzaikin@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Turner &lt;pjt@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Reichel &lt;sre@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;senozhatsky@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Qing Wang &lt;wangqing@vivo.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise &lt;bcrl@kvack.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Kitt &lt;steve@sk2.org&gt;
Cc: Antti Palosaari &lt;crope@iki.fi&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Clemens Ladisch &lt;clemens@ladisch.de&gt;
Cc: David Airlie &lt;airlied@linux.ie&gt;
Cc: Jani Nikula &lt;jani.nikula@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen &lt;joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Julia Lawall &lt;julia.lawall@inria.fr&gt;
Cc: Lukas Middendorf &lt;kernel@tuxforce.de&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Phillip Potter &lt;phil@philpotter.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi &lt;rodrigo.vivi@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Douglas Gilbert &lt;dgilbert@interlog.com&gt;
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley &lt;jejb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jani Nikula &lt;jani.nikula@intel.com&gt;
Cc: John Ogness &lt;john.ogness@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" &lt;rafael@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cifs: Fix oops due to uncleared server-&gt;smbd_conn in reconnect</title>
<updated>2023-02-06T06:49:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-25T14:02:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a9640c0b268405f2540e8203a545e930ea88bb7d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a9640c0b268405f2540e8203a545e930ea88bb7d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b7ab9161cf5ddc42a288edf9d1a61f3bdffe17c7 ]

In smbd_destroy(), clear the server-&gt;smbd_conn pointer after freeing the
smbd_connection struct that it points to so that reconnection doesn't get
confused.

Fixes: 8ef130f9ec27 ("CIFS: SMBD: Implement function to destroy a SMB Direct connection")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) &lt;pc@cjr.nz&gt;
Acked-by: Tom Talpey &lt;tom@talpey.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Long Li &lt;longli@microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Shilovsky &lt;piastryyy@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg &lt;lsahlber@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
