<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/fs, branch v5.13.16</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.13.16</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.13.16'/>
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<updated>2021-09-08T06:50:20Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ceph: fix possible null-pointer dereference in ceph_mdsmap_decode()</title>
<updated>2021-09-08T06:50:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tuo Li</name>
<email>islituo@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-05T15:14:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c7858c55cb5d84646f8cffad97cad0ae7335fb6d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c7858c55cb5d84646f8cffad97cad0ae7335fb6d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a9e6ffbc5b7324b6639ee89028908b1e91ceed51 ]

kcalloc() is called to allocate memory for m-&gt;m_info, and if it fails,
ceph_mdsmap_destroy() behind the label out_err will be called:
  ceph_mdsmap_destroy(m);

In ceph_mdsmap_destroy(), m-&gt;m_info is dereferenced through:
  kfree(m-&gt;m_info[i].export_targets);

To fix this possible null-pointer dereference, check m-&gt;m_info before the
for loop to free m-&gt;m_info[i].export_targets.

[ jlayton: fix up whitespace damage
	   only kfree(m-&gt;m_info) if it's non-NULL ]

Reported-by: TOTE Robot &lt;oslab@tsinghua.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tuo Li &lt;islituo@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix e2fsprogs checksum failure for mounted filesystem</title>
<updated>2021-09-08T06:50:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-12T12:47:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b6de6ec37320d28c02d256d94144c6108174c4e7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b6de6ec37320d28c02d256d94144c6108174c4e7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b2bbb92f7042e8075fb036bf97043339576330c3 upstream.

Commit 81414b4dd48 ("ext4: remove redundant sb checksum
recomputation") removed checksum recalculation after updating
superblock free space / inode counters in ext4_fill_super() based on
the fact that we will recalculate the checksum on superblock
writeout.

That is correct assumption but until the writeout happens (which can
take a long time) the checksum is incorrect in the buffer cache and if
programs such as tune2fs or resize2fs is called shortly after a file
system is mounted can fail.  So return back the checksum recalculation
and add a comment explaining why.

Fixes: 81414b4dd48f ("ext4: remove redundant sb checksum recomputation")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Boyang Xue &lt;bxue@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210812124737.21981-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: fix race writing to an inline_data file while its xattrs are changing</title>
<updated>2021-09-08T06:50:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-21T03:44:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c764e8fa4491da66780fcb30a0d43bfd3fccd12c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a54c4613dac1500b40e4ab55199f7c51f028e848 upstream.

The location of the system.data extended attribute can change whenever
xattr_sem is not taken.  So we need to recalculate the i_inline_off
field since it mgiht have changed between ext4_write_begin() and
ext4_write_end().

This means that caching i_inline_off is probably not helpful, so in
the long run we should probably get rid of it and shrink the in-memory
ext4 inode slightly, but let's fix the race the simple way for now.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: f19d5870cbf72 ("ext4: add normal write support for inline data")
Reported-by: syzbot+13146364637c7363a7de@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ubifs: report correct st_size for encrypted symlinks</title>
<updated>2021-09-03T08:23:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-02T06:53:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=9caa2e5a818dee5fce284ec426ad24dad1470d93'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9caa2e5a818dee5fce284ec426ad24dad1470d93</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 064c734986011390b4d111f1a99372b7f26c3850 upstream.

The stat() family of syscalls report the wrong size for encrypted
symlinks, which has caused breakage in several userspace programs.

Fix this by calling fscrypt_symlink_getattr() after ubifs_getattr() for
encrypted symlinks.  This function computes the correct size by reading
and decrypting the symlink target (if it's not already cached).

For more details, see the commit which added fscrypt_symlink_getattr().

Fixes: ca7f85be8d6c ("ubifs: Add support for encrypted symlinks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210702065350.209646-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: report correct st_size for encrypted symlinks</title>
<updated>2021-09-03T08:23:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-02T06:53:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7532df5ee0853c38ad43a89c01fd304194cce140'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7532df5ee0853c38ad43a89c01fd304194cce140</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 461b43a8f92e68e96c4424b31e15f2b35f1bbfa9 upstream.

The stat() family of syscalls report the wrong size for encrypted
symlinks, which has caused breakage in several userspace programs.

Fix this by calling fscrypt_symlink_getattr() after f2fs_getattr() for
encrypted symlinks.  This function computes the correct size by reading
and decrypting the symlink target (if it's not already cached).

For more details, see the commit which added fscrypt_symlink_getattr().

Fixes: cbaf042a3cc6 ("f2fs crypto: add symlink encryption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210702065350.209646-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: report correct st_size for encrypted symlinks</title>
<updated>2021-09-03T08:23:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-02T06:53:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f04584399d1cf1d4f8f4956b1b97e87dd1d6a0f1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f04584399d1cf1d4f8f4956b1b97e87dd1d6a0f1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8c4bca10ceafc43b1ca0a9fab5fa27e13cbce99e upstream.

The stat() family of syscalls report the wrong size for encrypted
symlinks, which has caused breakage in several userspace programs.

Fix this by calling fscrypt_symlink_getattr() after ext4_getattr() for
encrypted symlinks.  This function computes the correct size by reading
and decrypting the symlink target (if it's not already cached).

For more details, see the commit which added fscrypt_symlink_getattr().

Fixes: f348c252320b ("ext4 crypto: add symlink encryption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210702065350.209646-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: add fscrypt_symlink_getattr() for computing st_size</title>
<updated>2021-09-03T08:23:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-02T06:53:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=2bc40caa809921c21f9b86ebb5bcc90ae56391da'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2bc40caa809921c21f9b86ebb5bcc90ae56391da</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d18760560593e5af921f51a8c9b64b6109d634c2 upstream.

Add a helper function fscrypt_symlink_getattr() which will be called
from the various filesystems' -&gt;getattr() methods to read and decrypt
the target of encrypted symlinks in order to report the correct st_size.

Detailed explanation:

As required by POSIX and as documented in various man pages, st_size for
a symlink is supposed to be the length of the symlink target.
Unfortunately, st_size has always been wrong for encrypted symlinks
because st_size is populated from i_size from disk, which intentionally
contains the length of the encrypted symlink target.  That's slightly
greater than the length of the decrypted symlink target (which is the
symlink target that userspace usually sees), and usually won't match the
length of the no-key encoded symlink target either.

This hadn't been fixed yet because reporting the correct st_size would
require reading the symlink target from disk and decrypting or encoding
it, which historically has been considered too heavyweight to do in
-&gt;getattr().  Also historically, the wrong st_size had only broken a
test (LTP lstat03) and there were no known complaints from real users.
(This is probably because the st_size of symlinks isn't used too often,
and when it is, typically it's for a hint for what buffer size to pass
to readlink() -- which a slightly-too-large size still works for.)

However, a couple things have changed now.  First, there have recently
been complaints about the current behavior from real users:

- Breakage in rpmbuild:
  https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/issues/1682
  https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/305

- Breakage in toybox cpio:
  https://www.mail-archive.com/toybox@lists.landley.net/msg07193.html

- Breakage in libgit2: https://issuetracker.google.com/issues/189629152
  (on Android public issue tracker, requires login)

Second, we now cache decrypted symlink targets in -&gt;i_link.  Therefore,
taking the performance hit of reading and decrypting the symlink target
in -&gt;getattr() wouldn't be as big a deal as it used to be, since usually
it will just save having to do the same thing later.

Also note that eCryptfs ended up having to read and decrypt symlink
targets in -&gt;getattr() as well, to fix this same issue; see
commit 3a60a1686f0d ("eCryptfs: Decrypt symlink target for stat size").

So, let's just bite the bullet, and read and decrypt the symlink target
in -&gt;getattr() in order to report the correct st_size.  Add a function
fscrypt_symlink_getattr() which the filesystems will call to do this.

(Alternatively, we could store the decrypted size of symlinks on-disk.
But there isn't a great place to do so, and encryption is meant to hide
the original size to some extent; that property would be lost.)

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210702065350.209646-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fix NULL pointer dereference when deleting device by invalid id</title>
<updated>2021-09-03T08:23:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
<email>wqu@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-06T10:24:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=301aabe0239f227818622096be7e180fcdbedf80'/>
<id>urn:sha1:301aabe0239f227818622096be7e180fcdbedf80</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e4571b8c5e9ffa1e85c0c671995bd4dcc5c75091 upstream.

[BUG]
It's easy to trigger NULL pointer dereference, just by removing a
non-existing device id:

 # mkfs.btrfs -f -m single -d single /dev/test/scratch1 \
				     /dev/test/scratch2
 # mount /dev/test/scratch1 /mnt/btrfs
 # btrfs device remove 3 /mnt/btrfs

Then we have the following kernel NULL pointer dereference:

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 0 P4D 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
 CPU: 9 PID: 649 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.14.0-rc3-custom+ #35
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 RIP: 0010:btrfs_rm_device+0x4de/0x6b0 [btrfs]
  btrfs_ioctl+0x18bb/0x3190 [btrfs]
  ? lock_is_held_type+0xa5/0x120
  ? find_held_lock.constprop.0+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x201/0x6a0
  ? lock_release+0xd2/0x2d0
  ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

[CAUSE]
Commit a27a94c2b0c7 ("btrfs: Make btrfs_find_device_by_devspec return
btrfs_device directly") moves the "missing" device path check into
btrfs_rm_device().

But btrfs_rm_device() itself can have case where it only receives
@devid, with NULL as @device_path.

In that case, calling strcmp() on NULL will trigger the NULL pointer
dereference.

Before that commit, we handle the "missing" case inside
btrfs_find_device_by_devspec(), which will not check @device_path at all
if @devid is provided, thus no way to trigger the bug.

[FIX]
Before calling strcmp(), also make sure @device_path is not NULL.

Fixes: a27a94c2b0c7 ("btrfs: Make btrfs_find_device_by_devspec return btrfs_device directly")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck &lt;butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pipe: do FASYNC notifications for every pipe IO, not just state changes</title>
<updated>2021-09-03T08:23:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-24T17:39:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6b7533e796aa9dec22f7c4cd4aa36d798e5ed368'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6b7533e796aa9dec22f7c4cd4aa36d798e5ed368</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fe67f4dd8daa252eb9aa7acb61555f3cc3c1ce4c upstream.

It turns out that the SIGIO/FASYNC situation is almost exactly the same
as the EPOLLET case was: user space really wants to be notified after
every operation.

Now, in a perfect world it should be sufficient to only notify user
space on "state transitions" when the IO state changes (ie when a pipe
goes from unreadable to readable, or from unwritable to writable).  User
space should then do as much as possible - fully emptying the buffer or
what not - and we'll notify it again the next time the state changes.

But as with EPOLLET, we have at least one case (stress-ng) where the
kernel sent SIGIO due to the pipe being marked for asynchronous
notification, but the user space signal handler then didn't actually
necessarily read it all before returning (it read more than what was
written, but since there could be multiple writes, it could leave data
pending).

The user space code then expected to get another SIGIO for subsequent
writes - even though the pipe had been readable the whole time - and
would only then read more.

This is arguably a user space bug - and Colin King already fixed the
stress-ng code in question - but the kernel regression rules are clear:
it doesn't matter if kernel people think that user space did something
silly and wrong.  What matters is that it used to work.

So if user space depends on specific historical kernel behavior, it's a
regression when that behavior changes.  It's on us: we were silly to
have that non-optimal historical behavior, and our old kernel behavior
was what user space was tested against.

Because of how the FASYNC notification was tied to wakeup behavior, this
was first broken by commits f467a6a66419 and 1b6b26ae7053 ("pipe: fix
and clarify pipe read/write wakeup logic"), but at the time it seems
nobody noticed.  Probably because the stress-ng problem case ends up
being timing-dependent too.

It was then unwittingly fixed by commit 3a34b13a88ca ("pipe: make pipe
writes always wake up readers") only to be broken again when by commit
3b844826b6c6 ("pipe: avoid unnecessary EPOLLET wakeups under normal
loads").

And at that point the kernel test robot noticed the performance
refression in the stress-ng.sigio.ops_per_sec case.  So the "Fixes" tag
below is somewhat ad hoc, but it matches when the issue was noticed.

Fix it for good (knock wood) by simply making the kill_fasync() case
separate from the wakeup case.  FASYNC is quite rare, and we clearly
shouldn't even try to use the "avoid unnecessary wakeups" logic for it.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210824151337.GC27667@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
Fixes: 3b844826b6c6 ("pipe: avoid unnecessary EPOLLET wakeups under normal loads")
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;oliver.sang@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Oliver Sang &lt;oliver.sang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pipe: avoid unnecessary EPOLLET wakeups under normal loads</title>
<updated>2021-09-03T08:23:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-05T17:04:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4abb1d77321ae43f9d22e50521c05039212ad65c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4abb1d77321ae43f9d22e50521c05039212ad65c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3b844826b6c6affa80755254da322b017358a2f4 upstream.

I had forgotten just how sensitive hackbench is to extra pipe wakeups,
and commit 3a34b13a88ca ("pipe: make pipe writes always wake up
readers") ended up causing a quite noticeable regression on larger
machines.

Now, hackbench isn't necessarily a hugely meaningful benchmark, and it's
not clear that this matters in real life all that much, but as Mel
points out, it's used often enough when comparing kernels and so the
performance regression shows up like a sore thumb.

It's easy enough to fix at least for the common cases where pipes are
used purely for data transfer, and you never have any exciting poll
usage at all.  So set a special 'poll_usage' flag when there is polling
activity, and make the ugly "EPOLLET has crazy legacy expectations"
semantics explicit to only that case.

I would love to limit it to just the broken EPOLLET case, but the pipe
code can't see the difference between epoll and regular select/poll, so
any non-read/write waiting will trigger the extra wakeup behavior.  That
is sufficient for at least the hackbench case.

Apart from making the odd extra wakeup cases more explicitly about
EPOLLET, this also makes the extra wakeup be at the _end_ of the pipe
write, not at the first write chunk.  That is actually much saner
semantics (as much as you can call any of the legacy edge-triggered
expectations for EPOLLET "sane") since it means that you know the wakeup
will happen once the write is done, rather than possibly in the middle
of one.

[ For stable people: I'm putting a "Fixes" tag on this, but I leave it
  up to you to decide whether you actually want to backport it or not.
  It likely has no impact outside of synthetic benchmarks  - Linus ]

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210802024945.GA8372@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
Fixes: 3a34b13a88ca ("pipe: make pipe writes always wake up readers")
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;oliver.sang@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Sandeep Patil &lt;sspatil@android.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
