<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/fs, branch v6.1.54</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.54</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.54'/>
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<updated>2023-09-19T10:28:06Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: use the correct superblock to compare fsid in btrfs_validate_super</title>
<updated>2023-09-19T10:28:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Anand Jain</name>
<email>anand.jain@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-31T11:16:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=09974a1352d3479748cfb08dbfc39a3c019e4486'/>
<id>urn:sha1:09974a1352d3479748cfb08dbfc39a3c019e4486</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d167aa76dc0683828588c25767da07fb549e4f48 upstream.

The function btrfs_validate_super() should verify the fsid in the provided
superblock argument. Because, all its callers expect it to do that.

Such as in the following stack:

   write_all_supers()
       sb = fs_info-&gt;super_for_commit;
       btrfs_validate_write_super(.., sb)
         btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..)

   scrub_one_super()
	btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..)

And
   check_dev_super()
	btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..)

However, it currently verifies the fs_info::super_copy::fsid instead,
which is not correct.  Fix this using the correct fsid in the superblock
argument.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn &lt;johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com&gt;
Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: zoned: re-enable metadata over-commit for zoned mode</title>
<updated>2023-09-19T10:28:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Naohiro Aota</name>
<email>naohiro.aota@wdc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-07T16:12:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b692f7d1576baf961fa02f681658640ac4edca92</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5b135b382a360f4c87cf8896d1465b0b07f10cb0 upstream.

Now that, we can re-enable metadata over-commit. As we moved the activation
from the reservation time to the write time, we no longer need to ensure
all the reserved bytes is properly activated.

Without the metadata over-commit, it suffers from lower performance because
it needs to flush the delalloc items more often and allocate more block
groups. Re-enabling metadata over-commit will solve the issue.

Fixes: 79417d040f4f ("btrfs: zoned: disable metadata overcommit for zoned")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn &lt;johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota &lt;naohiro.aota@wdc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: set page extent mapped after read_folio in relocate_one_page</title>
<updated>2023-09-19T10:28:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josef Bacik</name>
<email>josef@toxicpanda.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-31T15:13:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=08daa38ca212d87f77beae839bc9be71079c7abf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:08daa38ca212d87f77beae839bc9be71079c7abf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e7f1326cc24e22b38afc3acd328480a1183f9e79 upstream.

One of the CI runs triggered the following panic

  assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) &amp;&amp; page-&gt;private, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229!
  Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 0 PID: 923660 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #1
  pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
  lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
  sp : ffff800093213720
  x29: ffff800093213720 x28: ffff8000932138b4 x27: 000000000c280000
  x26: 00000001b5d00000 x25: 000000000c281000 x24: 000000000c281fff
  x23: 0000000000001000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff42b95bf880
  x20: ffff42b9528e0000 x19: 0000000000001000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
  x17: 667274622f736620 x16: 6e69202c65746176 x15: 0000000000000028
  x14: 0000000000000003 x13: 00000000002672d7 x12: 0000000000000000
  x11: ffffcd3f0ccd9204 x10: ffffcd3f0554ae50 x9 : ffffcd3f0379528c
  x8 : ffff800093213428 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffcd3f091771e8
  x5 : ffff42b97f333948 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
  x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff42b9556cde80 x0 : 000000000000004f
  Call trace:
   btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
   btrfs_subpage_set_dirty+0x38/0xa0
   btrfs_page_set_dirty+0x58/0x88
   relocate_one_page+0x204/0x5f0
   relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x11c/0x180
   relocate_data_extent+0xd0/0xf8
   relocate_block_group+0x3d0/0x4e8
   btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2d8/0x490
   btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x54/0x1a8
   btrfs_balance+0x7f4/0x1150
   btrfs_ioctl+0x10f0/0x20b8
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x120/0x11d8
   invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8
   do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x158
   el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
   el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
  Code: 91098021 b0007fa0 91346000 97e9c6d2 (d4210000)

This is the same problem outlined in 17b17fcd6d44 ("btrfs:
set_page_extent_mapped after read_folio in btrfs_cont_expand") , and the
fix is the same.  I originally looked for the same pattern elsewhere in
our code, but mistakenly skipped over this code because I saw the page
cache readahead before we set_page_extent_mapped, not realizing that
this was only in the !page case, that we can still end up with a
!uptodate page and then do the btrfs_read_folio further down.

The fix here is the same as the above mentioned patch, move the
set_page_extent_mapped call to after the btrfs_read_folio() block to
make sure that we have the subpage blocksize stuff setup properly before
using the page.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: don't start transaction when joining with TRANS_JOIN_NOSTART</title>
<updated>2023-09-19T10:28:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
<email>fdmanana@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-26T15:56:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=91f6a538d625d360400eb03ce4d65297c695302c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:91f6a538d625d360400eb03ce4d65297c695302c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4490e803e1fe9fab8db5025e44e23b55df54078b upstream.

When joining a transaction with TRANS_JOIN_NOSTART, if we don't find a
running transaction we end up creating one. This goes against the purpose
of TRANS_JOIN_NOSTART which is to join a running transaction if its state
is at or below the state TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START, otherwise return an
-ENOENT error and don't start a new transaction. So fix this to not create
a new transaction if there's no running transaction at or below that
state.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Fixes: a6d155d2e363 ("Btrfs: fix deadlock between fiemap and transaction commits")
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: free qgroup rsv on io failure</title>
<updated>2023-09-19T10:28:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Boris Burkov</name>
<email>boris@bur.io</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-21T16:02:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f933a1c43b68103c4deaf2e4289fc1e65428d8b4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e28b02118b94e42be3355458a2406c6861e2dd32 upstream.

If we do a write whose bio suffers an error, we will never reclaim the
qgroup reserved space for it. We allocate the space in the write_iter
codepath, then release the reservation as we allocate the ordered
extent, but we only create a delayed ref if the ordered extent finishes.
If it has an error, we simply leak the rsv. This is apparent in running
any error injecting (dmerror) fstests like btrfs/146 or btrfs/160. Such
tests fail due to dmesg on umount complaining about the leaked qgroup
data space.

When we clean up other aspects of space on failed ordered_extents, also
free the qgroup rsv.

Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov &lt;boris@bur.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: fix start transaction qgroup rsv double free</title>
<updated>2023-09-19T10:28:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Boris Burkov</name>
<email>boris@bur.io</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-21T16:02:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=cdc3ba292df88a4561f97b2cc25ff6b30f5d6962'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cdc3ba292df88a4561f97b2cc25ff6b30f5d6962</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a6496849671a5bc9218ecec25a983253b34351b1 upstream.

btrfs_start_transaction reserves metadata space of the PERTRANS type
before it identifies a transaction to start/join. This allows flushing
when reserving that space without a deadlock. However, it results in a
race which temporarily breaks qgroup rsv accounting.

T1                                              T2
start_transaction
do_stuff
                                            start_transaction
                                                qgroup_reserve_meta_pertrans
commit_transaction
    qgroup_free_meta_all_pertrans
                                            hit an error starting txn
                                            goto reserve_fail
                                            qgroup_free_meta_pertrans (already freed!)

The basic issue is that there is nothing preventing another commit from
committing before start_transaction finishes (in fact sometimes we
intentionally wait for it) so any error path that frees the reserve is
at risk of this race.

While this exact space was getting freed anyway, and it's not a huge
deal to double free it (just a warning, the free code catches this), it
can result in incorrectly freeing some other pertrans reservation in
this same reservation, which could then lead to spuriously granting
reservations we might not have the space for. Therefore, I do believe it
is worth fixing.

To fix it, use the existing prealloc-&gt;pertrans conversion mechanism.
When we first reserve the space, we reserve prealloc space and only when
we are sure we have a transaction do we convert it to pertrans. This way
any racing commits do not blow away our reservation, but we still get a
pertrans reservation that is freed when _this_ transaction gets committed.

This issue can be reproduced by running generic/269 with either qgroups
or squotas enabled via mkfs on the scratch device.

Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov &lt;boris@bur.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: zoned: do not zone finish data relocation block group</title>
<updated>2023-09-19T10:28:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Naohiro Aota</name>
<email>naohiro.aota@wdc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-21T07:42:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:59c38f050d9bace5dab5b187efdbab864ce85ab4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 332581bde2a419d5f12a93a1cdc2856af649a3cc upstream.

When multiple writes happen at once, we may need to sacrifice a currently
active block group to be zone finished for a new allocation. We choose a
block group with the least free space left, and zone finish it.

To do the finishing, we need to send IOs for already allocated region
and wait for them and on-going IOs. Otherwise, these IOs fail because the
zone is already finished at the time the IO reach a device.

However, if a block group dedicated to the data relocation is zone
finished, there is a chance that finishing it before an ongoing write IO
reaches the device. That is because there is timing gap between an
allocation is done (block_group-&gt;reservations == 0, as pre-allocation is
done) and an ordered extent is created when the relocation IO starts.
Thus, if we finish the zone between them, we can fail the IOs.

We cannot simply use "fs_info-&gt;data_reloc_bg == block_group-&gt;start" to
avoid the zone finishing. Because, the data_reloc_bg may already switch to
a new block group, while there are still ongoing write IOs to the old
data_reloc_bg.

So, this patch reworks the BLOCK_GROUP_FLAG_ZONED_DATA_RELOC bit to
indicate there is a data relocation allocation and/or ongoing write to the
block group. The bit is set on allocation and cleared in end_io function of
the last IO for the currently allocated region.

To change the timing of the bit setting also solves the issue that the bit
being left even after there is no IO going on. With the current code, if
the data_reloc_bg switches after the last IO to the current data_reloc_bg,
the bit is set at this timing and there is no one clearing that bit. As a
result, that block group is kept unallocatable for anything.

Fixes: 343d8a30851c ("btrfs: zoned: prevent allocation from previous data relocation BG")
Fixes: 74e91b12b115 ("btrfs: zoned: zone finish unused block group")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn &lt;johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota &lt;naohiro.aota@wdc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fuse: nlookup missing decrement in fuse_direntplus_link</title>
<updated>2023-09-19T10:28:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>ruanmeisi</name>
<email>ruan.meisi@zte.com.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-25T11:13:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ef819c2f8e8a0da58d765ab1960cb976565ce0af'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ef819c2f8e8a0da58d765ab1960cb976565ce0af</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b8bd342d50cbf606666488488f9fea374aceb2d5 upstream.

During our debugging of glusterfs, we found an Assertion failed error:
inode_lookup &gt;= nlookup, which was caused by the nlookup value in the
kernel being greater than that in the FUSE file system.

The issue was introduced by fuse_direntplus_link, where in the function,
fuse_iget increments nlookup, and if d_splice_alias returns failure,
fuse_direntplus_link returns failure without decrementing nlookup
https://github.com/gluster/glusterfs/pull/4081

Signed-off-by: ruanmeisi &lt;ruan.meisi@zte.com.cn&gt;
Fixes: 0b05b18381ee ("fuse: implement NFS-like readdirplus support")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.9
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: avoid false alarm of circular locking</title>
<updated>2023-09-19T10:28:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jaegeuk Kim</name>
<email>jaegeuk@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-18T18:34:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=980b592c60874d9b8bca5663549edc73acd42946'/>
<id>urn:sha1:980b592c60874d9b8bca5663549edc73acd42946</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5c13e2388bf3426fd69a89eb46e50469e9624e56 upstream.

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.5.0-rc5-syzkaller-00353-gae545c3283dc #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor273/5027 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888077fe1fb0 (&amp;fi-&gt;i_sem){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_down_write fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2133 [inline]
ffff888077fe1fb0 (&amp;fi-&gt;i_sem){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x300/0x6f0 fs/f2fs/inline.c:644

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888077fe07c8 (&amp;fi-&gt;i_xattr_sem){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_down_read fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2108 [inline]
ffff888077fe07c8 (&amp;fi-&gt;i_xattr_sem){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_add_dentry+0x92/0x230 fs/f2fs/dir.c:783

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-&gt; #1 (&amp;fi-&gt;i_xattr_sem){.+.+}-{3:3}:
       down_read+0x9c/0x470 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1520
       f2fs_down_read fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2108 [inline]
       f2fs_getxattr+0xb1e/0x12c0 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:532
       __f2fs_get_acl+0x5a/0x900 fs/f2fs/acl.c:179
       f2fs_acl_create fs/f2fs/acl.c:377 [inline]
       f2fs_init_acl+0x15c/0xb30 fs/f2fs/acl.c:420
       f2fs_init_inode_metadata+0x159/0x1290 fs/f2fs/dir.c:558
       f2fs_add_regular_entry+0x79e/0xb90 fs/f2fs/dir.c:740
       f2fs_add_dentry+0x1de/0x230 fs/f2fs/dir.c:788
       f2fs_do_add_link+0x190/0x280 fs/f2fs/dir.c:827
       f2fs_add_link fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3554 [inline]
       f2fs_mkdir+0x377/0x620 fs/f2fs/namei.c:781
       vfs_mkdir+0x532/0x7e0 fs/namei.c:4117
       do_mkdirat+0x2a9/0x330 fs/namei.c:4140
       __do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:4160 [inline]
       __se_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:4158 [inline]
       __x64_sys_mkdir+0xf2/0x140 fs/namei.c:4158
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

-&gt; #0 (&amp;fi-&gt;i_sem){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
       lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline]
       lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726
       down_write+0x93/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1573
       f2fs_down_write fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2133 [inline]
       f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x300/0x6f0 fs/f2fs/inline.c:644
       f2fs_add_dentry+0xa6/0x230 fs/f2fs/dir.c:784
       f2fs_do_add_link+0x190/0x280 fs/f2fs/dir.c:827
       f2fs_add_link fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3554 [inline]
       f2fs_mkdir+0x377/0x620 fs/f2fs/namei.c:781
       vfs_mkdir+0x532/0x7e0 fs/namei.c:4117
       ovl_do_mkdir fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h:196 [inline]
       ovl_mkdir_real+0xb5/0x370 fs/overlayfs/dir.c:146
       ovl_workdir_create+0x3de/0x820 fs/overlayfs/super.c:309
       ovl_make_workdir fs/overlayfs/super.c:711 [inline]
       ovl_get_workdir fs/overlayfs/super.c:864 [inline]
       ovl_fill_super+0xdab/0x6180 fs/overlayfs/super.c:1400
       vfs_get_super+0xf9/0x290 fs/super.c:1152
       vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x350 fs/super.c:1519
       do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3335 [inline]
       path_mount+0x1492/0x1ed0 fs/namespace.c:3662
       do_mount fs/namespace.c:3675 [inline]
       __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3884 [inline]
       __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3861 [inline]
       __x64_sys_mount+0x293/0x310 fs/namespace.c:3861
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  rlock(&amp;fi-&gt;i_xattr_sem);
                               lock(&amp;fi-&gt;i_sem);
                               lock(&amp;fi-&gt;i_xattr_sem);
  lock(&amp;fi-&gt;i_sem);

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e5600587fa9cbf8e3826@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 5eda1ad1aaff "f2fs: fix deadlock in i_xattr_sem and inode page lock"
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>f2fs: flush inode if atomic file is aborted</title>
<updated>2023-09-19T10:28:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jaegeuk Kim</name>
<email>jaegeuk@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-07T14:03:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1c64dbe8fa3552a340bca6d7fa09468c16ed2a85'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1c64dbe8fa3552a340bca6d7fa09468c16ed2a85</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a3ab55746612247ce3dcaac6de66f5ffc055b9df upstream.

Let's flush the inode being aborted atomic operation to avoid stale dirty
inode during eviction in this call stack:

  f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync+0x22/0x40 [f2fs]
  f2fs_abort_atomic_write+0xc4/0xf0 [f2fs]
  f2fs_evict_inode+0x3f/0x690 [f2fs]
  ? sugov_start+0x140/0x140
  evict+0xc3/0x1c0
  evict_inodes+0x17b/0x210
  generic_shutdown_super+0x32/0x120
  kill_block_super+0x21/0x50
  deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x90
  cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160
  task_work_run+0x59/0x90
  do_exit+0x33b/0xa50
  do_group_exit+0x2d/0x80
  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x14/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

This triggers f2fs_bug_on() in f2fs_evict_inode:
 f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE));

This fixes the syzbot report:

loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072
F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint
F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:869!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 5014 Comm: syz-executor220 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller-11479-g6cd06ab12d1a #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd &lt;0f&gt; 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8880273b8000 RSI: ffffffff83a2bd0d RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: ffff888077db91b0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888029a3c000
R13: ffff888077db9660 R14: ffff888029a3c0b8 R15: ffff888077db9c50
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1909bb9000 CR3: 00000000276a9000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 evict+0x2ed/0x6b0 fs/inode.c:665
 dispose_list+0x117/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:698
 evict_inodes+0x345/0x440 fs/inode.c:748
 generic_shutdown_super+0xaf/0x480 fs/super.c:478
 kill_block_super+0x64/0xb0 fs/super.c:1417
 kill_f2fs_super+0x2af/0x3c0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4704
 deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x160 fs/super.c:330
 deactivate_super+0xb1/0xd0 fs/super.c:361
 cleanup_mnt+0x2ae/0x3d0 fs/namespace.c:1254
 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0xa9a/0x29a0 kernel/exit.c:874
 do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1024
 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1035 [inline]
 __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1033 [inline]
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1033
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f309be71a09
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f309be719df.
RSP: 002b:00007fff171df518 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f309bef7330 RCX: 00007f309be71a09
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffffffffc0 R09: 00007f309bef1e40
R10: 0000000000010600 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f309bef7330
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
 &lt;/TASK&gt;
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd &lt;0f&gt; 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8880273b8000 RSI: ffffffff83a2bd0d RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: ffff888077db91b0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888029a3c000
R13: ffff888077db9660 R14: ffff888029a3c0b8 R15: ffff888077db9c50
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1909bb9000 CR3: 00000000276a9000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e1246909d526a9d470fa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu &lt;chao@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim &lt;jaegeuk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
