user/sven/linux.git/include/crypto, branch v4.14.266

crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion

2021-09-22T09:45:24Z

commit f985911b7bc75d5c98ed24d8aaa8b94c590f7c6a upstream. Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying 256 bytes datafile by keyctl command, run script: RAWDATA=rawdata SIGDATA=sigdata modprobe pkcs8_key_parser rm -rf *.der *.pem *.pfx rm -rf $RAWDATA dd if=/dev/random of=$RAWDATA bs=256 count=1 openssl req -nodes -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem \ -subj "/C=CN/ST=GD/L=SZ/O=vihoo/OU=dev/CN=xx.com/emailAddress=yy@xx.com" KEY_ID=`openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | keyctl \ padd asymmetric 123 @s` keyctl pkey_sign $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 > $SIGDATA keyctl pkey_verify $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA $SIGDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 Then the kernel reports: WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540 pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190 ... Call Trace: public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380 ? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180 ? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130 asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80 keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The reason of this issue, in function 'asymmetric_key_verify_signature': '.digest_size(u8) = params->in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an u8 value, so use u32 instead of u8 for digest_size field. And reorder struct public_key_signature, it saves 8 bytes on a 64-bit machine. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: shash - avoid comparing pointers to exported functions under CFI

2021-07-20T14:17:32Z

[ Upstream commit 22ca9f4aaf431a9413dcc115dd590123307f274f ] crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() is implemented by testing whether the .setkey() member of a struct shash_alg points to the default version, called shash_no_setkey(). As crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() is a static inline, this requires shash_no_setkey() to be exported to modules. Unfortunately, when building with CFI, function pointers are routed via CFI stubs which are private to each module (or to the kernel proper) and so this function pointer comparison may fail spuriously. Let's fix this by turning crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() into an out of line function. Cc: Sami Tolvanen Cc: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: api - check for ERR pointers in crypto_destroy_tfm()

2021-05-22T08:57:16Z

[ Upstream commit 83681f2bebb34dbb3f03fecd8f570308ab8b7c2c ] Given that crypto_alloc_tfm() may return ERR pointers, and to avoid crashes on obscure error paths where such pointers are presented to crypto_destroy_tfm() (such as [0]), add an ERR_PTR check there before dereferencing the second argument as a struct crypto_tfm pointer. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/000000000000de949705bc59e0f6@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+12cf5fbfdeba210a89dd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: af_alg - fix use-after-free in af_alg_accept() due to bh_lock_sock()

2020-07-09T07:36:30Z

commit 34c86f4c4a7be3b3e35aa48bd18299d4c756064d upstream. The locking in af_alg_release_parent is broken as the BH socket lock can only be taken if there is a code-path to handle the case where the lock is owned by process-context. Instead of adding such handling, we can fix this by changing the ref counts to atomic_t. This patch also modifies the main refcnt to include both normal and nokey sockets. This way we don't have to fudge the nokey ref count when a socket changes from nokey to normal. Credits go to Mauricio Faria de Oliveira who diagnosed this bug and sent a patch for it: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20200605161657.535043-1-mfo@canonical.com/ Reported-by: Brian Moyles Reported-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira Fixes: 37f96694cf73 ("crypto: af_alg - Use bh_lock_sock in...") Cc: Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: vmac - separate tfm and request context

2018-08-17T19:01:10Z

commit bb29648102335586e9a66289a1d98a0cb392b6e5 upstream. syzbot reported a crash in vmac_final() when multiple threads concurrently use the same "vmac(aes)" transform through AF_ALG. The bug is pretty fundamental: the VMAC template doesn't separate per-request state from per-tfm (per-key) state like the other hash algorithms do, but rather stores it all in the tfm context. That's wrong. Also, vmac_final() incorrectly zeroes most of the state including the derived keys and cached pseudorandom pad. Therefore, only the first VMAC invocation with a given key calculates the correct digest. Fix these bugs by splitting the per-tfm state from the per-request state and using the proper init/update/final sequencing for requests. Reproducer for the crash: #include #include #include int main() { int fd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "hash", .salg_name = "vmac(aes)", }; char buf[256] = { 0 }; fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buf, 16); fork(); fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL); for (;;) write(fd, buf, 256); } The immediate cause of the crash is that vmac_ctx_t.partial_size exceeds VMAC_NHBYTES, causing vmac_final() to memset() a negative length. Reported-by: syzbot+264bca3a6e8d645550d3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: f1939f7c5645 ("crypto: vmac - New hash algorithm for intel_txt support") Cc: # v2.6.32+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: af_alg - Fix race around ctx->rcvused by making it atomic_t

2018-03-03T09:24:29Z

[ Upstream commit af955bf15d2c27496b0269b1f05c26f758c68314 ] This variable was increased and decreased without any protection. Result was an occasional misscount and negative wrap around resulting in false resource allocation failures. Fixes: 7d2c3f54e6f6 ("crypto: af_alg - remove locking in async callback") Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key

2018-02-16T19:23:00Z

commit 9fa68f620041be04720d0cbfb1bd3ddfc6310b24 upstream. Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default. However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using "hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow. A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it is really unkeyed. Examples of this include: - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension - dm-verity - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device) This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no privileges to call. Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the ->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed. The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation. Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: poly1305 - remove ->setkey() method

2018-02-16T19:23:00Z

commit a16e772e664b9a261424107784804cffc8894977 upstream. Since Poly1305 requires a nonce per invocation, the Linux kernel implementations of Poly1305 don't use the crypto API's keying mechanism and instead expect the key and nonce as the first 32 bytes of the data. But ->setkey() is still defined as a stub returning an error code. This prevents Poly1305 from being used through AF_ALG and will also break it completely once we start enforcing that all crypto API users (not just AF_ALG) call ->setkey() if present. Fix it by removing crypto_poly1305_setkey(), leaving ->setkey as NULL. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: hash - introduce crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey()

2018-02-16T19:22:59Z

commit cd6ed77ad5d223dc6299fb58f62e0f5267f7e2ba upstream. Templates that use an shash spawn can use crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() to determine whether the underlying algorithm requires a key or not. But there was no corresponding function for ahash spawns. Add it. Note that the new function actually has to support both shash and ahash algorithms, since the ahash API can be used with either. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: gcm - add GCM IV size constant

2018-02-03T16:38:49Z

commit ef780324592dd639e4bfbc5b9bf8934b234b7c99 upstream. Many GCM users use directly GCM IV size instead of using some constant. This patch add all IV size constant used by GCM. Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman