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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/crypto, branch v4.19.230</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2021-09-22T09:47:59Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T09:47:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>zhenwei pi</name>
<email>pizhenwei@bytedance.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-19T12:37:10Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:aab312696d37de80502ca633b40184de24f22917</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f985911b7bc75d5c98ed24d8aaa8b94c590f7c6a upstream.

Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying 256
bytes datafile by keyctl command, run script:
RAWDATA=rawdata
SIGDATA=sigdata

modprobe pkcs8_key_parser

rm -rf *.der *.pem *.pfx
rm -rf $RAWDATA
dd if=/dev/random of=$RAWDATA bs=256 count=1

openssl req -nodes -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem \
  -subj "/C=CN/ST=GD/L=SZ/O=vihoo/OU=dev/CN=xx.com/emailAddress=yy@xx.com"

KEY_ID=`openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | keyctl \
  padd asymmetric 123 @s`

keyctl pkey_sign $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 &gt; $SIGDATA
keyctl pkey_verify $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA $SIGDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1

Then the kernel reports:
 WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540
   pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190
 ...
 Call Trace:
  public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380
  ? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180
  ? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130
  asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80
  keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100
  do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

The reason of this issue, in function 'asymmetric_key_verify_signature':
'.digest_size(u8) = params-&gt;in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an u8 value,
so use u32 instead of u8 for digest_size field. And reorder struct
public_key_signature, it saves 8 bytes on a 64-bit machine.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi &lt;pizhenwei@bytedance.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: shash - avoid comparing pointers to exported functions under CFI</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:15:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ardb@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-10T06:21:50Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0c4c098c0405b364310d4021ac1f59f611c59538</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 22ca9f4aaf431a9413dcc115dd590123307f274f ]

crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() is implemented by testing whether the
.setkey() member of a struct shash_alg points to the default version,
called shash_no_setkey(). As crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() is a static
inline, this requires shash_no_setkey() to be exported to modules.

Unfortunately, when building with CFI, function pointers are routed
via CFI stubs which are private to each module (or to the kernel proper)
and so this function pointer comparison may fail spuriously.

Let's fix this by turning crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() into an out of
line function.

Cc: Sami Tolvanen &lt;samitolvanen@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen &lt;samitolvanen@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - check for ERR pointers in crypto_destroy_tfm()</title>
<updated>2021-05-22T08:59:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ardb@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-02T20:33:03Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:67afaf1a0a3b2e23645c86636d887a7ca84a09ed</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 83681f2bebb34dbb3f03fecd8f570308ab8b7c2c ]

Given that crypto_alloc_tfm() may return ERR pointers, and to avoid
crashes on obscure error paths where such pointers are presented to
crypto_destroy_tfm() (such as [0]), add an ERR_PTR check there
before dereferencing the second argument as a struct crypto_tfm
pointer.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/000000000000de949705bc59e0f6@google.com/

Reported-by: syzbot+12cf5fbfdeba210a89dd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: af_alg - fix use-after-free in af_alg_accept() due to bh_lock_sock()</title>
<updated>2020-07-09T07:37:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-08T06:48:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9a8ecc6a3ebe625eddd6e96f419762b198de93ce</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 34c86f4c4a7be3b3e35aa48bd18299d4c756064d upstream.

The locking in af_alg_release_parent is broken as the BH socket
lock can only be taken if there is a code-path to handle the case
where the lock is owned by process-context.  Instead of adding
such handling, we can fix this by changing the ref counts to
atomic_t.

This patch also modifies the main refcnt to include both normal
and nokey sockets.  This way we don't have to fudge the nokey
ref count when a socket changes from nokey to normal.

Credits go to Mauricio Faria de Oliveira who diagnosed this bug
and sent a patch for it:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20200605161657.535043-1-mfo@canonical.com/

Reported-by: Brian Moyles &lt;bmoyles@netflix.com&gt;
Reported-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira &lt;mfo@canonical.com&gt;
Fixes: 37f96694cf73 ("crypto: af_alg - Use bh_lock_sock in...")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: chacha20 - Fix chacha20_block() keystream alignment (again)</title>
<updated>2019-11-20T17:47:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-12T03:05:10Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ad28c2ba4318e9c882647c57edd5a435edf57907</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a5e9f557098e54af44ade5d501379be18435bfbf ]

In commit 9f480faec58c ("crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for
chacha20_block()"), I had missed that chacha20_block() can be called
directly on the buffer passed to get_random_bytes(), which can have any
alignment.  So, while my commit didn't break anything, it didn't fully
solve the alignment problems.

Revert my solution and just update chacha20_block() to use
put_unaligned_le32(), so the output buffer need not be aligned.
This is simpler, and on many CPUs it's the same speed.

But, I kept the 'tmp' buffers in extract_crng_user() and
_get_random_bytes() 4-byte aligned, since that alignment is actually
needed for _crng_backtrack_protect() too.

Reported-by: Stephan Müller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: speck - remove Speck</title>
<updated>2018-11-13T19:08:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-07T06:22:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3252b60cf810aec6460f4777a7730bfc70448729</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 578bdaabd015b9b164842c3e8ace9802f38e7ecc upstream.

These are unused, undesired, and have never actually been used by
anybody. The original authors of this code have changed their mind about
its inclusion. While originally proposed for disk encryption on low-end
devices, the idea was discarded [1] in favor of something else before
that could really get going. Therefore, this patch removes Speck.

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&amp;m=153359499015659

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: scatterwalk - remove scatterwalk_samebuf()</title>
<updated>2018-08-03T10:06:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-23T17:04:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3dd8cc00c34ab9cde4bcc808ebc607e7b9861280</id>
<content type='text'>
scatterwalk_samebuf() is never used.  Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: scatterwalk - remove 'chain' argument from scatterwalk_crypto_chain()</title>
<updated>2018-08-03T10:06:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-23T17:01:33Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8c30fbe63e4eff1b221f8db70ae5c48a9331eae0</id>
<content type='text'>
All callers pass chain=0 to scatterwalk_crypto_chain().

Remove this unneeded parameter.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: drbg - in-place cipher operation for CTR</title>
<updated>2018-08-03T10:05:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephan Müller</name>
<email>smueller@chronox.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-20T17:42:01Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:43490e8046b5d273eb82710b04290c5997138adc</id>
<content type='text'>
The cipher implementations of the kernel crypto API favor in-place
cipher operations. Thus, switch the CTR cipher operation in the DRBG to
perform in-place operations. This is implemented by using the output
buffer as input buffer and zeroizing it before the cipher operation to
implement a CTR encryption of a NULL buffer.

The speed improvement is quite visibile with the following comparison
using the LRNG implementation.

Without the patch set:

      16 bytes|           12.267661 MB/s|    61338304 bytes |  5000000213 ns
      32 bytes|           23.603770 MB/s|   118018848 bytes |  5000000073 ns
      64 bytes|           46.732262 MB/s|   233661312 bytes |  5000000241 ns
     128 bytes|           90.038042 MB/s|   450190208 bytes |  5000000244 ns
     256 bytes|          160.399616 MB/s|   801998080 bytes |  5000000393 ns
     512 bytes|          259.878400 MB/s|  1299392000 bytes |  5000001675 ns
    1024 bytes|          386.050662 MB/s|  1930253312 bytes |  5000001661 ns
    2048 bytes|          493.641728 MB/s|  2468208640 bytes |  5000001598 ns
    4096 bytes|          581.835981 MB/s|  2909179904 bytes |  5000003426 ns

With the patch set:

      16 bytes |         17.051142 MB/s |     85255712 bytes |  5000000854 ns
      32 bytes |         32.695898 MB/s |    163479488 bytes |  5000000544 ns
      64 bytes |         64.490739 MB/s |    322453696 bytes |  5000000954 ns
     128 bytes |        123.285043 MB/s |    616425216 bytes |  5000000201 ns
     256 bytes |        233.434573 MB/s |   1167172864 bytes |  5000000573 ns
     512 bytes |        384.405197 MB/s |   1922025984 bytes |  5000000671 ns
    1024 bytes |        566.313370 MB/s |   2831566848 bytes |  5000001080 ns
    2048 bytes |        744.518042 MB/s |   3722590208 bytes |  5000000926 ns
    4096 bytes |        867.501670 MB/s |   4337508352 bytes |  5000002181 ns

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux</title>
<updated>2018-08-03T09:55:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-03T09:55:12Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c5f5aeef9b55b362ad5a0e04e4b41cd63b208842</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge mainline to pick up c7513c2a2714 ("crypto/arm64: aes-ce-gcm -
add missing kernel_neon_begin/end pair").
</content>
</entry>
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