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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/crypto, branch v4.7</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.7</id>
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<updated>2016-05-19T16:21:36Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2016-05-19T16:21:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-19T16:21:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f4f27d0028aabce57e44c16c2fdefccd6310d2f3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f4f27d0028aabce57e44c16c2fdefccd6310d2f3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing
     of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this
     is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified
     cryptographically via dm-verity).

     This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by
     default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing).

   - Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key.
     Lots of general fixes and updates.

   - SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via
     finit_module().  Distinguish non-init user namespace capability
     checks.  Apply execstack check on thread stacks"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits)
  LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
  Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting
  seccomp: Fix comment typo
  ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
  ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
  vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory
  fs: fix over-zealous use of "const"
  selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks
  selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
  LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
  fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration
  Yama: consolidate error reporting
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable
  selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label
  selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible
  selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it
  selinux: Change bool variable name to index.
  KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: doc - document correct return value for request allocation</title>
<updated>2016-04-15T14:35:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers3@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-02T15:54:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6eae29e7e7144d01a6d6af111d232b36cdd30f51</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()</title>
<updated>2016-04-11T21:43:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-06T15:14:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a511e1af8b12f44c6e55786c463c9f093c214fb6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a511e1af8b12f44c6e55786c463c9f093c214fb6</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.

What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.

Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.

With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.

Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.

To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained.  For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.


If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject().  The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c</title>
<updated>2016-04-11T21:41:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-06T15:14:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:983023f28bff62b4462fd3575a86a8947ac592d8</id>
<content type='text'>
Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c so that it can be
generalised.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring</title>
<updated>2016-04-06T15:14:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-06T15:14:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bda850cd214e90b1be0cc25bc48c4f6ac53eb543'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bda850cd214e90b1be0cc25bc48c4f6ac53eb543</id>
<content type='text'>
Make the determination of the trustworthiness of a key dependent on whether
a key that can verify it is present in the supplied ring of trusted keys
rather than whether or not the verifying key has KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set.

verify_pkcs7_signature() will return -ENOKEY if the PKCS#7 message trust
chain cannot be verified.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content</title>
<updated>2016-04-06T15:14:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-06T15:14:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e68503bd6836ba765dc8e0ee77ea675fedc07e41'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e68503bd6836ba765dc8e0ee77ea675fedc07e41</id>
<content type='text'>
Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback.  This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.

If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function.  If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.

The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Add identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct</title>
<updated>2016-04-06T15:13:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-06T15:13:33Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a022ec02691cf68e1fe237d5f79d54aa95446cc6</id>
<content type='text'>
Add key identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct so that they can
be used to retain the identifier of the key to be used to verify the
signature in both PKCS#7 and X.509.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key</title>
<updated>2016-04-06T15:13:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-06T15:13:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3b764563177c1e435ef3e2608271c07955f73ea6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3b764563177c1e435ef3e2608271c07955f73ea6</id>
<content type='text'>
Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key in the 4th
element of the key payload and provide a way for it to be destroyed.

For the public key subtype, this will be a public_key_signature struct.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2016-03-17T18:33:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-17T18:33:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bb7aeae3d680c2c777f54274b0270ced0599f33d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bb7aeae3d680c2c777f54274b0270ced0599f33d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "There are a bunch of fixes to the TPM, IMA, and Keys code, with minor
  fixes scattered across the subsystem.

  IMA now requires signed policy, and that policy is also now measured
  and appraised"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (67 commits)
  X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum
  akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layer
  crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad
  sign-file: fix build with CMS support disabled
  MAINTAINERS: update tpmdd urls
  MODSIGN: linux/string.h should be #included to get memcpy()
  certs: Fix misaligned data in extra certificate list
  X.509: Handle midnight alternative notation in GeneralizedTime
  X.509: Support leap seconds
  Handle ISO 8601 leap seconds and encodings of midnight in mktime64()
  X.509: Fix leap year handling again
  PKCS#7: fix unitialized boolean 'want'
  firmware: change kernel read fail to dev_dbg()
  KEYS: Use the symbol value for list size, updated by scripts/insert-sys-cert
  KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling
  modsign: hide openssl output in silent builds
  tpm_tis: fix build warning with tpm_tis_resume
  ima: require signed IMA policy
  ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself
  ima: load policy using path
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum</title>
<updated>2016-03-03T21:49:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-03T21:49:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4e8ae72a75aae285ec5b93518b9680da198afd0d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4e8ae72a75aae285ec5b93518b9680da198afd0d</id>
<content type='text'>
Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of
enum.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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