<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/keys, branch v5.12.15</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:09Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries</title>
<updated>2021-06-30T12:47:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Snowberg</name>
<email>eric.snowberg@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-22T18:10:51Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7be8fb1494c65f57bb6a95743cfbd3312fe9bf52</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 56c5812623f95313f6a46fbf0beee7fa17c68bbf ]

This fixes CVE-2020-26541.

The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now
revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure
Boot enabled.  The dbx is capable of containing any number of
EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
entries.

Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are
skipped.

Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring.
Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring
are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected.

[DH: Made the following changes:
 - Added to have a config option to enable the facility.  This allows a
   Kconfig solution to make sure that pkcs7_validate_trust() is
   enabled.[1][2]
 - Moved the functions out from the middle of the blacklist functions.
 - Added kerneldoc comments.]

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
cc: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@kernel.org&gt;
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901165143.10295-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # rfc
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200909172736.73003-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200911182230.62266-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428672051.677100.11064981943343605138.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433310942.902181.4901864302675874242.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529605075.163428.14625520893961300757.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bc2c24e3-ed68-2521-0bf4-a1f6be4a895d@infradead.org/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225125638.1841436-1-arnd@kernel.org/ [2]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations</title>
<updated>2021-05-14T08:52:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Bottomley</name>
<email>James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-27T19:06:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:364400df2df9ea0410c126dde1ac1fc115231fd0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit de66514d934d70ce73c302ce0644b54970fc7196 ]

In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number.  The spec actually
recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1
hash as the authorization.  Because the spec doesn't require this
hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex
number.  For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length
passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted
keys for ease of use.  Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this
into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys.

so before

keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u

after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new
directly supplied password:

keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u

Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct
password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator
for which form is input.

Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix.  The TPM
2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty
authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in
20 bytes of zeros.  A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the
Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch
makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys.

Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips")
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones</title>
<updated>2021-01-21T16:16:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander A. Klimov</name>
<email>grandmaster@al2klimov.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-16T19:52:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c52b7c807b0a6ae26582208a0b07c2a6a796b50f</id>
<content type='text'>
Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.

Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
  If not .svg:
    For each line:
      If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
        For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
	  If neither `\bgnu\.org/license`, nor `\bmozilla\.org/MPL\b`:
            If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
            return 200 OK and serve the same content:
              Replace HTTP with HTTPS.

Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov &lt;grandmaster@al2klimov.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel &lt;mathstuf@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Don't leak the service-side session key to userspace</title>
<updated>2020-11-23T18:09:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-27T10:07:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d2ae4e918218f543214fbd906db68a6c580efbbb</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't let someone reading a service-side rxrpc-type key get access to the
session key that was exchanged with the client.  The server application
will, at some point, need to be able to read the information in the ticket,
but this probably shouldn't include the key material.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Remove the rxk5 security class as it's now defunct</title>
<updated>2020-11-23T18:09:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-03T07:21:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8a5dc321158fb3032cf990deb7473e22826e7346</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove the rxrpc rxk5 security class as it's now defunct and nothing uses
it anymore.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'docs-5.9' of git://git.lwn.net/linux</title>
<updated>2020-08-05T05:47:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-05T05:47:54Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2324d50d051ec0f14a548e78554fb02513d6dcef</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
 "It's been a busy cycle for documentation - hopefully the busiest for a
  while to come. Changes include:

   - Some new Chinese translations

   - Progress on the battle against double words words and non-HTTPS
     URLs

   - Some block-mq documentation

   - More RST conversions from Mauro. At this point, that task is
     essentially complete, so we shouldn't see this kind of churn again
     for a while. Unless we decide to switch to asciidoc or
     something...:)

   - Lots of typo fixes, warning fixes, and more"

* tag 'docs-5.9' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (195 commits)
  scripts/kernel-doc: optionally treat warnings as errors
  docs: ia64: correct typo
  mailmap: add entry for &lt;alobakin@marvell.com&gt;
  doc/zh_CN: add cpu-load Chinese version
  Documentation/admin-guide: tainted-kernels: fix spelling mistake
  MAINTAINERS: adjust kprobes.rst entry to new location
  devices.txt: document rfkill allocation
  PCI: correct flag name
  docs: filesystems: vfs: correct flag name
  docs: filesystems: vfs: correct sync_mode flag names
  docs: path-lookup: markup fixes for emphasis
  docs: path-lookup: more markup fixes
  docs: path-lookup: fix HTML entity mojibake
  CREDITS: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
  docs: process: Add an example for creating a fixes tag
  doc/zh_CN: add Chinese translation prefer section
  doc/zh_CN: add clearing-warn-once Chinese version
  doc/zh_CN: add admin-guide index
  doc:it_IT: process: coding-style.rst: Correct __maybe_unused compiler label
  futex: MAINTAINERS: Re-add selftests directory
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>docs: crypto: convert asymmetric-keys.txt to ReST</title>
<updated>2020-06-19T20:03:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mauro Carvalho Chehab</name>
<email>mchehab+huawei@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-15T06:50:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0efaaa86581c596f9426482c731f262d843807b6</id>
<content type='text'>
This file is almost compatible with ReST. Just minor changes
were needed:

- Adjust document and titles markups;
- Adjust numbered list markups;
- Add a comments markup for the Contents section;
- Add markups for literal blocks.

Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab+huawei@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c2275ea94e0507a01b020ab66dfa824d8b1c2545.1592203650.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RxRPC: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array</title>
<updated>2020-06-16T04:08:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavoars@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-28T14:35:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:18bdc20be19741ac97499a37e42323248114b496</id>
<content type='text'>
There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a
dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should
always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of
one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavoars@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: encrypted-type: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array</title>
<updated>2020-06-16T04:08:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavoars@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-28T14:35:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ad8cb1654d2f123bbff317a8168028e2b451ed11'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ad8cb1654d2f123bbff317a8168028e2b451ed11</id>
<content type='text'>
There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a
dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should
always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of
one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavoars@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: Implement update for the big_key type</title>
<updated>2020-06-02T16:22:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-12T13:03:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b6f61c31464940513ef4eccb3a030a405b4256d6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b6f61c31464940513ef4eccb3a030a405b4256d6</id>
<content type='text'>
Implement the -&gt;update op for the big_key type.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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