user/sven/linux.git/include/keys, branch v5.14.9

Merge tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

2021-05-01T22:32:18Z

Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar: "In addition to loading the kernel module signing key onto the builtin keyring, load it onto the IMA keyring as well. Also six trivial changes and bug fixes" * tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependencies ima: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang integrity: Add declarations to init_once void arguments. ima: Fix function name error in comment. ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key keys: cleanup build time module signing keys ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value ima: without an IMA policy loaded, return quickly

Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6

2021-04-26T15:51:23Z

Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - crypto_destroy_tfm now ignores errors as well as NULL pointers Algorithms: - Add explicit curve IDs in ECDH algorithm names - Add NIST P384 curve parameters - Add ECDSA Drivers: - Add support for Green Sardine in ccp - Add ecdh/curve25519 to hisilicon/hpre - Add support for AM64 in sa2ul" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (184 commits) fsverity: relax build time dependency on CRYPTO_SHA256 fscrypt: relax Kconfig dependencies for crypto API algorithms crypto: camellia - drop duplicate "depends on CRYPTO" crypto: s5p-sss - consistently use local 'dev' variable in probe() crypto: s5p-sss - remove unneeded local variable initialization crypto: s5p-sss - simplify getting of_device_id match data ccp: ccp - add support for Green Sardine crypto: ccp - Make ccp_dev_suspend and ccp_dev_resume void functions crypto: octeontx2 - add support for OcteonTX2 98xx CPT block. crypto: chelsio/chcr - Remove useless MODULE_VERSION crypto: ux500/cryp - Remove duplicate argument crypto: chelsio - remove unused function crypto: sa2ul - Add support for AM64 crypto: sa2ul - Support for per channel coherency dt-bindings: crypto: ti,sa2ul: Add new compatible for AM64 crypto: hisilicon - enable new error types for QM crypto: hisilicon - add new error type for SEC crypto: hisilicon - support new error types for ZIP crypto: hisilicon - dynamic configuration 'err_info' crypto: doc - fix kernel-doc notation in chacha.c and af_alg.c ...

Merge tag 'keys-cve-2020-26541-v3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

2021-04-26T15:38:10Z

Pull x509 dbx/mokx UEFI support from David Howells: "Here's a set of patches from Eric Snowberg[1] that add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries in the dbx and mokx UEFI tables (such entries cause matching certificates to be rejected). These are currently ignored and only the hash entries are made use of. Additionally Eric included his patches to allow such certificates to be preloaded. These patches deal with CVE-2020-26541. To quote Eric: 'This is the fifth patch series for adding support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries [2]. It has been expanded to not only include dbx entries but also entries in the mokx. Additionally my series to preload these certificate [3] has also been included'" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com [1] Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-security-module/patch/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/cover/1315485/ [3] * tag 'keys-cve-2020-26541-v3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring certs: Add ability to preload revocation certs certs: Move load_system_certificate_list to a common function certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries

KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys

2021-04-14T13:30:30Z

Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Refer to Documentation/staging/tee.rst for detailed information about TEE. Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework

2021-04-14T13:30:30Z

Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device. Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this, which contains necessary functions of a backend. Also, define a module parameter in order to select a particular trust source in case a platform support multiple trust sources. In case its not specified then implementation itetrates through trust sources list starting with TPM and assign the first trust source as a backend which has initiazed successfully during iteration. Note that current implementation only supports a single trust source at runtime which is either selectable at compile time or during boot via aforementioned module parameter. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs

2021-04-14T13:30:30Z

Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format. The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you don't have to keep passing it in each time. This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so keys with passwords but no policy. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations

2021-04-14T13:30:30Z

In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. so before keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new directly supplied password: keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator for which form is input. Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips") Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring

2021-04-09T14:40:20Z

The kernel currently only loads the kernel module signing key onto the builtin trusted keyring. Load the module signing key onto the IMA keyring as well. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Acked-by: Stefan Berger Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

ima: Support EC keys for signature verification

2021-03-26T08:41:59Z

Add support for IMA signature verification for EC keys. Since SHA type of hashes can be used by RSA and ECDSA signature schemes we need to look at the key and derive from the key which signature scheme to use. Since this can be applied to all types of keys, we change the selection of the encoding type to be driven by the key's signature scheme rather than by the hash type. Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Howells Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang Acked-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries

2021-03-11T16:31:28Z

This fixes CVE-2020-26541. The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. The dbx is capable of containing any number of EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries. Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are skipped. Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring. Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected. [DH: Made the following changes: - Added to have a config option to enable the facility. This allows a Kconfig solution to make sure that pkcs7_validate_trust() is enabled.[1][2] - Moved the functions out from the middle of the blacklist functions. - Added kerneldoc comments.] Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen cc: Randy Dunlap cc: Mickaël Salaün cc: Arnd Bergmann cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901165143.10295-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # rfc Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200909172736.73003-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200911182230.62266-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428672051.677100.11064981943343605138.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433310942.902181.4901864302675874242.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529605075.163428.14625520893961300757.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bc2c24e3-ed68-2521-0bf4-a1f6be4a895d@infradead.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225125638.1841436-1-arnd@kernel.org/ [2]