user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/audit.h, branch v4.19.281

audit: eliminate audit_enabled magic number comparison

2018-06-19T14:43:55Z

Remove comparison of audit_enabled to magic numbers outside of audit. Related: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/86 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

audit: use inline function to set audit context

2018-05-14T21:45:21Z

Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an access function to set the audit context pointer for the task rather than reaching directly into the task struct to set it. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs [PM: merge fuzz in audit.h] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

audit: use inline function to get audit context

2018-05-14T21:24:18Z

Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an access function to retrieve the audit context pointer for the task rather than reaching directly into the task struct to get it. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs [PM: merge fuzz in auditsc.c and selinuxfs.c, checkpatch.pl fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro

2018-05-14T19:56:35Z

Use a macro, "AUDIT_SID_UNSET", to replace each instance of initialization and comparison to an audit session ID. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging

2018-05-08T06:04:23Z

Seccomp logging for "handled" actions such as RET_TRAP, RET_TRACE, or RET_ERRNO can be very noisy for processes that are being audited. This patch modifies the seccomp logging behavior to treat processes that are being inspected via the audit subsystem the same as processes that aren't under inspection. Handled actions will no longer be logged just because the process is being inspected. Since v4.14, applications have the ability to request logging of handled actions by using the SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag when loading seccomp filters. With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is: if action == RET_ALLOW: do not log else if action not in actions_logged: do not log else if action == RET_KILL: log else if action == RET_LOG: log else if filter-requests-logging: log else: do not log Reported-by: Steve Grubb Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl

2018-05-08T06:03:28Z

The decision to log a seccomp action will always be subject to the value of the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl, even for processes that are being inspected via the audit subsystem, in an upcoming patch. Therefore, we need to emit an audit record on attempts at writing to the actions_logged sysctl when auditing is enabled. This patch updates the write handler for the actions_logged sysctl to emit an audit record on attempts to write to the sysctl. Successful writes to the sysctl will result in a record that includes a normalized list of logged actions in the "actions" field and a "res" field equal to 1. Unsuccessful writes to the sysctl will result in a record that doesn't include the "actions" field and has a "res" field equal to 0. Not all unsuccessful writes to the sysctl are audited. For example, an audit record will not be emitted if an unprivileged process attempts to open the sysctl file for reading since that access control check is not part of the sysctl's write handler. Below are some example audit records when writing various strings to the actions_logged sysctl. Writing "not-a-real-action", when the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl previously was "kill_process kill_thread trap errno trace log", emits this audit record: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392371.454:120): op=seccomp-logging actions=? old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,trap,errno,trace,log res=0 If you then write "kill_process kill_thread errno trace log", this audit record is emitted: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392401.645:126): op=seccomp-logging actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,trap,errno,trace,log res=1 If you then write "log log errno trace kill_process kill_thread", which is unordered and contains the log action twice, it results in the same actions value as the previous record: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392436.354:132): op=seccomp-logging actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log res=1 If you then write an empty string to the sysctl, this audit record is emitted: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392494.413:138): op=seccomp-logging actions=(none) old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log res=1 No audit records are generated when reading the actions_logged sysctl. Suggested-by: Steve Grubb Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

audit: remove path param from link denied function

2018-03-21T15:17:41Z

In commit 45b578fe4c3cade6f4ca1fc934ce199afd857edc ("audit: link denied should not directly generate PATH record") the need for the struct path *link parameter was removed. Remove the now useless struct path argument. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

Merge tag 'audit-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit

2017-11-15T21:28:48Z

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Another relatively small pull request for audit, nine patches total. The only real new bit of functionality is the patch from Richard which adds the ability to filter records based on the filesystem type. The remainder are bug fixes and cleanups; the bug fix highlights include: - ensuring that we properly audit init/PID-1 (me) - allowing the audit daemon to shutdown the kernel/auditd connection cleanly by setting the audit PID to zero (Steve)" * tag 'audit-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic Audit: remove unused audit_log_secctx function audit: Allow auditd to set pid to 0 to end auditing audit: Add new syscalls to the perm=w filter audit: use audit_set_enabled() in audit_enable() audit: convert audit_ever_enabled to a boolean audit: don't use simple_strtol() anymore audit: initialize the audit subsystem as early as possible audit: ensure that 'audit=1' actually enables audit for PID 1

Audit: remove unused audit_log_secctx function

2017-11-10T21:08:47Z

The function audit_log_secctx() is unused in the upstream kernel. All it does is wrap another function that doesn't need wrapping. It claims to give you the SELinux context, but that is not true if you are using a different security module. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

audit: Record fanotify access control decisions

2017-10-10T11:18:06Z

The fanotify interface allows user space daemons to make access control decisions. Under common criteria requirements, we need to optionally record decisions based on policy. This patch adds a bit mask, FAN_AUDIT, that a user space daemon can 'or' into the response decision which will tell the kernel that it made a decision and record it. It would be used something like this in user space code: response.response = FAN_DENY | FAN_AUDIT; write(fd, &response, sizeof(struct fanotify_response)); When the syscall ends, the audit system will record the decision as a AUDIT_FANOTIFY auxiliary record to denote that the reason this event occurred is the result of an access control decision from fanotify rather than DAC or MAC policy. A sample event looks like this: type=PATH msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): item=0 name="./evil-ls" inode=1319561 dev=fc:03 mode=0100755 ouid=1000 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL type=CWD msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): cwd="/home/sgrubb" type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): arch=c000003e syscall=2 success=no exit=-1 a0=32cb3fca90 a1=0 a2=43 a3=8 items=1 ppid=901 pid=959 auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000 fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts1 ses=3 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t: s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2 Prior to using the audit flag, the developer needs to call fanotify_init or'ing in FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT to ensure that the kernel supports auditing. The calling process must also have the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE capability. Signed-off-by: sgrubb Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein Signed-off-by: Jan Kara