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<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h, branch v4.16.14</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2018-05-22T16:56:31Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack</title>
<updated>2018-05-22T16:56:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-15T16:27:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:75e3417f898fe1d2451e7ceffe93db5c66772b0a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit af86ca4e3088fe5eacf2f7e58c01fa68ca067672 upstream

Detect code patterns where malicious 'speculative store bypass' can be used
and sanitize such patterns.

 39: (bf) r3 = r10
 40: (07) r3 += -216
 41: (79) r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)   // slow read
 42: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -72) = 0  // verifier inserts this instruction
 43: (7b) *(u64 *)(r8 +0) = r3   // this store becomes slow due to r8
 44: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r6 +0)   // cpu speculatively executes this load
 45: (71) r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 +0)    // speculatively arbitrary 'load byte'
                                 // is now sanitized

Above code after x86 JIT becomes:
 e5: mov    %rbp,%rdx
 e8: add    $0xffffffffffffff28,%rdx
 ef: mov    0x0(%r13),%r14
 f3: movq   $0x0,-0x48(%rbp)
 fb: mov    %rdx,0x0(%r14)
 ff: mov    0x0(%rbx),%rdi
103: movzbq 0x0(%rdi),%rsi

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: export function to write into verifier log buffer</title>
<updated>2018-01-10T12:49:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Quentin Monnet</name>
<email>quentin.monnet@netronome.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-10T12:26:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:430e68d10baf55e4c40d4dd1de8201c1caf5dddd</id>
<content type='text'>
Rename the BPF verifier `verbose()` to `bpf_verifier_log_write()` and
export it, so that other components (in particular, drivers for BPF
offload) can reuse the user buffer log to dump error messages at
verification time.

Renaming `verbose()` was necessary in order to avoid a name so generic
to be exported to the global namespace. However to prevent too much pain
for backports, the calls to `verbose()` in the kernel BPF verifier were
not changed. Instead, use function aliasing to make `verbose` point to
`bpf_verifier_log_write`. Another solution could consist in making a
wrapper around `verbose()`, but since it is a variadic function, I don't
see a clean way without creating two identical wrappers, one for the
verifier and one to export.

Signed-off-by: Quentin Monnet &lt;quentin.monnet@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: offload: allow netdev to disappear while verifier is running</title>
<updated>2017-12-31T15:12:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>jakub.kicinski@netronome.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-28T02:39:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cae1927c0b4a93ae15de824faca1f6f611a44fcd</id>
<content type='text'>
To allow verifier instruction callbacks without any extra locking
NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification would wait on a waitqueue for verifier
to finish.  This design decision was made when rtnl lock was providing
all the locking.  Use the read/write lock instead and remove the
workqueue.

Verifier will now call into the offload code, so dev_ops are moved
to offload structure.  Since verifier calls are all under
bpf_prog_is_dev_bound() we no longer need static inline implementations
to please builds with CONFIG_NET=n.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet &lt;quentin.monnet@netronome.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next</title>
<updated>2017-12-28T01:40:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-28T01:40:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fcffe2edbd390cad499b27d20512ef000d7ecf54</id>
<content type='text'>
Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2017-12-28

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.

The main changes are:

1) Fix incorrect state pruning related to recognition of zero initialized
   stack slots, where stacksafe exploration would mistakenly return a
   positive pruning verdict too early ignoring other slots, from Gianluca.

2) Various BPF to BPF calls related follow-up fixes. Fix an off-by-one
   in maximum call depth check, and rework maximum stack depth tracking
   logic to fix a bypass of the total stack size check reported by Jann.
   Also fix a bug in arm64 JIT where prog-&gt;jited_len was uninitialized.
   Addition of various test cases to BPF selftests, from Alexei.

3) Addition of a BPF selftest to test_verifier that is related to BPF to
   BPF calls which demonstrates a late caller stack size increase and
   thus out of bounds access. Fixed above in 2). Test case from Jann.

4) Addition of correlating BPF helper calls, BPF to BPF calls as well
   as BPF maps to bpftool xlated dump in order to allow for better
   BPF program introspection and debugging, from Daniel.

5) Fixing several bugs in BPF to BPF calls kallsyms handling in order
   to get it actually to work for subprogs, from Daniel.

6) Extending sparc64 JIT support for BPF to BPF calls and fix a couple
   of build errors for libbpf on sparc64, from David.

7) Allow narrower context access for BPF dev cgroup typed programs in
   order to adapt to LLVM code generation. Also adjust memlock rlimit
   in the test_dev_cgroup BPF selftest, from Yonghong.

8) Add netdevsim Kconfig entry to BPF selftests since test_offload.py
   relies on netdevsim device being available, from Jakub.

9) Reduce scope of xdp_do_generic_redirect_map() to being static,
   from Xiongwei.

10) Minor cleanups and spelling fixes in BPF verifier, from Colin.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix maximum stack depth tracking logic</title>
<updated>2017-12-27T17:36:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-25T21:15:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:70a87ffea8acc390ae315fa1930e849f656bdb88</id>
<content type='text'>
Instead of computing max stack depth for current call chain
during the main verifier pass track stack depth of each
function independently and after do_check() is done do
another pass over all instructions analyzing depth
of all possible call stacks.

Fixes: f4d7e40a5b71 ("bpf: introduce function calls (verification)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net</title>
<updated>2017-12-22T16:16:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-22T16:16:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fba961ab29e5ffb055592442808bb0f7962e05da</id>
<content type='text'>
Lots of overlapping changes.  Also on the net-next side
the XDP state management is handled more in the generic
layers so undo the 'net' nfp fix which isn't applicable
in net-next.

Include a necessary change by Jakub Kicinski, with log message:

====================
cls_bpf no longer takes care of offload tracking.  Make sure
netdevsim performs necessary checks.  This fixes a warning
caused by TC trying to remove a filter it has not added.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet &lt;quentin.monnet@netronome.com&gt;
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix integer overflows</title>
<updated>2017-12-21T01:15:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-19T04:12:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bb7f0f989ca7de1153bd128a40a71709e339fa03'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bb7f0f989ca7de1153bd128a40a71709e339fa03</id>
<content type='text'>
There were various issues related to the limited size of integers used in
the verifier:
 - `off + size` overflow in __check_map_access()
 - `off + reg-&gt;off` overflow in check_mem_access()
 - `off + reg-&gt;var_off.value` overflow or 32-bit truncation of
   `reg-&gt;var_off.value` in check_mem_access()
 - 32-bit truncation in check_stack_boundary()

Make sure that any integer math cannot overflow by not allowing
pointer math with large values.

Also reduce the scope of "scalar op scalar" tracking.

Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs</title>
<updated>2017-12-17T19:34:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-15T01:55:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1c2a088a6626d4f51d2f2c97b0cbedbfbf3637f6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1c2a088a6626d4f51d2f2c97b0cbedbfbf3637f6</id>
<content type='text'>
Typical JIT does several passes over bpf instructions to
compute total size and relative offsets of jumps and calls.
With multitple bpf functions calling each other all relative calls
will have invalid offsets intially therefore we need to additional
last pass over the program to emit calls with correct offsets.
For example in case of three bpf functions:
main:
  call foo
  call bpf_map_lookup
  exit
foo:
  call bar
  exit
bar:
  exit

We will call bpf_int_jit_compile() indepedently for main(), foo() and bar()
x64 JIT typically does 4-5 passes to converge.
After these initial passes the image for these 3 functions
will be good except call targets, since start addresses of
foo() and bar() are unknown when we were JITing main()
(note that call bpf_map_lookup will be resolved properly
during initial passes).
Once start addresses of 3 functions are known we patch
call_insn-&gt;imm to point to right functions and call
bpf_int_jit_compile() again which needs only one pass.
Additional safety checks are done to make sure this
last pass doesn't produce image that is larger or smaller
than previous pass.

When constant blinding is on it's applied to all functions
at the first pass, since doing it once again at the last
pass can change size of the JITed code.

Tested on x64 and arm64 hw with JIT on/off, blinding on/off.
x64 jits bpf-to-bpf calls correctly while arm64 falls back to interpreter.
All other JITs that support normal BPF_CALL will behave the same way
since bpf-to-bpf call is equivalent to bpf-to-kernel call from
JITs point of view.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: teach verifier to recognize zero initialized stack</title>
<updated>2017-12-17T19:34:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-15T01:55:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cc2b14d51053eb055c06f45e1a5cdbfcf2b79e94</id>
<content type='text'>
programs with function calls are often passing various
pointers via stack. When all calls are inlined llvm
flattens stack accesses and optimizes away extra branches.
When functions are not inlined it becomes the job of
the verifier to recognize zero initialized stack to avoid
exploring paths that program will not take.
The following program would fail otherwise:

ptr = &amp;buffer_on_stack;
*ptr = 0;
...
func_call(.., ptr, ...) {
  if (..)
    *ptr = bpf_map_lookup();
}
...
if (*ptr != 0) {
  // Access (*ptr)-&gt;field is valid.
  // Without stack_zero tracking such (*ptr)-&gt;field access
  // will be rejected
}

since stack slots are no longer uniform invalid | spill | misc
add liveness marking to all slots, but do it in 8 byte chunks.
So if nothing was read or written in [fp-16, fp-9] range
it will be marked as LIVE_NONE.
If any byte in that range was read, it will be marked LIVE_READ
and stacksafe() check will perform byte-by-byte verification.
If all bytes in the range were written the slot will be
marked as LIVE_WRITTEN.
This significantly speeds up state equality comparison
and reduces total number of states processed.

                    before   after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o       2051    2003
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o       3287    3164
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o     1080    1080
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o   24980   12361
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o    34308   16605
bpf_netdev.o          15404   10962
bpf_overlay.o         7191    6679

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: introduce function calls (verification)</title>
<updated>2017-12-17T19:34:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-15T01:55:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f4d7e40a5b7157e1329c3c5b10f60d8289fc2941</id>
<content type='text'>
Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function.

To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does:
1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries
2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function
It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee
(if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee
can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller.
3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total
stack depth is still less than 512 bytes
4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack,
since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns
5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call
is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view.
The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called.
It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure
that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller
will be different from state pruning point of view
6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis

Implementation details:
. struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that
  led to this function
. struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of
  registers in the given frame and its stack
. propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where
  mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined
  with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot.
  Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic
. skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view,
  but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative,
  since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9
  will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing
  inefficient pruning later
. mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it
  more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness
  to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within
  basic block only and control flow will be responsible for
  propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls.
. tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with
  bpf-to-bpf calls
. returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack
  frame of the caller is not allowed

Testing:
. no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers
. large number of tests follows in next patches

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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