user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/capability.h, branch v6.12.69

capability: just use a 'u64' instead of a 'u32[2]' array

2023-03-01T18:01:22Z

Back in 2008 we extended the capability bits from 32 to 64, and we did it by extending the single 32-bit capability word from one word to an array of two words. It was then obfuscated by hiding the "2" behind two macro expansions, with the reasoning being that maybe it gets extended further some day. That reasoning may have been valid at the time, but the last thing we want to do is to extend the capability set any more. And the array of values not only causes source code oddities (with loops to deal with it), but also results in worse code generation. It's a lose-lose situation. So just change the 'u32[2]' into a 'u64' and be done with it. We still have to deal with the fact that the user space interface is designed around an array of these 32-bit values, but that was the case before too, since the array layouts were different (ie user space doesn't use an array of 32-bit values for individual capability masks, but an array of 32-bit slices of multiple masks). So that marshalling of data is actually simplified too, even if it does remain somewhat obscure and odd. This was all triggered by my reaction to the new "cap_isidentical()" introduced recently. By just using a saner data structure, it went from unsigned __capi; CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { if (a.cap[__capi] != b.cap[__capi]) return false; } return true; to just being return a.val == b.val; instead. Which is rather more obvious both to humans and to compilers. Cc: Mateusz Guzik Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Serge Hallyn Cc: Al Viro Cc: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

capability: add cap_isidentical

2023-02-28T00:39:19Z

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Cc: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs: port privilege checking helpers to mnt_idmap

2023-01-19T08:24:29Z

Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft)

fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap

2023-01-19T08:24:28Z

commoncap: handle idmapped mounts

2021-01-24T13:27:17Z

When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(), security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and makes them aware of idmapped mounts. In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper. For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored alongside the capabilities. In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0 according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: David Howells Cc: Al Viro Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Acked-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

acl: handle idmapped mounts

2021-01-24T13:27:17Z

The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: David Howells Cc: Al Viro Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

capability: handle idmapped mounts

2021-01-24T13:27:16Z

In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given inode the capability framework exposes the two helpers privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former verifies that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace and the latter additionally verifies that the caller has the requested capability in their current user namespace. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is passed all operations are a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a change in behavior. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: David Howells Cc: Al Viro Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: James Morris Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

vfs: move cap_convert_nscap() call into vfs_setxattr()

2020-12-14T14:26:13Z

cap_convert_nscap() does permission checking as well as conversion of the xattr value conditionally based on fs's user-ns. This is needed by overlayfs and probably other layered fs (ecryptfs) and is what vfs_foo() is supposed to do anyway. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Acked-by: James Morris

capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE

2020-07-19T18:14:42Z

This patch introduces CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, a new capability facilitating checkpoint/restore for non-root users. Over the last years, The CRIU (Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace) team has been asked numerous times if it is possible to checkpoint/restore a process as non-root. The answer usually was: 'almost'. The main blocker to restore a process as non-root was to control the PID of the restored process. This feature available via the clone3 system call, or via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid is unfortunately guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. In the past two years, requests for non-root checkpoint/restore have increased due to the following use cases: * Checkpoint/Restore in an HPC environment in combination with a resource manager distributing jobs where users are always running as non-root. There is a desire to provide a way to checkpoint and restore long running jobs. * Container migration as non-root * We have been in contact with JVM developers who are integrating CRIU into a Java VM to decrease the startup time. These checkpoint/restore applications are not meant to be running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. We have seen the following workarounds: * Use a setuid wrapper around CRIU: See https://github.com/FredHutch/slurm-examples/blob/master/checkpointer/lib/checkpointer/checkpointer-suid.c * Use a setuid helper that writes to ns_last_pid. Unfortunately, this helper delegation technique is impossible to use with clone3, and is thus prone to races. See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid * Cycle through PIDs with fork() until the desired PID is reached: This has been demonstrated to work with cycling rates of 100,000 PIDs/s See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid * Patch out the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check from the kernel * Run the desired application in a new user and PID namespace to provide a local CAP_SYS_ADMIN for controlling PIDs. This technique has limited use in typical container environments (e.g., Kubernetes) as /proc is typically protected with read-only layers (e.g., /proc/sys) for hardening purposes. Read-only layers prevent additional /proc mounts (due to proc's SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE property), making the use of new PID namespaces limited as certain applications need access to /proc matching their PID namespace. The introduced capability allows to: * Control PIDs when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable for the corresponding PID namespace via ns_last_pid/clone3. * Open files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace, useful for recovering files that are unreachable via the file system such as deleted files, or memfd files. See corresponding selftest for an example with clone3(). Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Acked-by: Christian Brauner Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-2-areber@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

bpf, capability: Introduce CAP_BPF

2020-05-15T15:29:41Z

Split BPF operations that are allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN into combination of CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN. For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well. The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF: - to load tracing program types BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc} use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON - to load networking program types BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, SK_SKB, etc} use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN There are few exceptions from this rule: - bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using tracing mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_PERFMON if networking program is using this helper. - BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only to discourage production use. - BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN. - bpf_probe_write_user() is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only. CAPs are not checked at attach/detach time with two exceptions: - loading BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB is allowed for unprivileged users, hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at attach time. - flow_dissector detach doesn't check prog FD at detach, hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at detach time. CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to iterate BPF objects (progs, maps, links) via get_next_id command and convert them to file descriptor via GET_FD_BY_ID command. This restriction guarantees that mutliple tasks with CAP_BPF are not able to affect each other. That leads to clean isolation of tasks. For example: task A with CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN loads and attaches a firewall via bpf_link. task B with the same capabilities cannot detach that firewall unless task A explicitly passed link FD to task B via scm_rights or bpffs. CAP_SYS_ADMIN can still detach/unload everything. Two networking user apps with CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_NET_ADMIN can accidentely mess with each other programs and maps. Two networking user apps with CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_BPF cannot affect each other. CAP_NET_ADMIN + CAP_BPF allows networking programs access only packet data. Such networking progs cannot access arbitrary kernel memory or leak pointers. bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should NOT be installed with CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets. But users with these two permissions will be able to use these tracing tools. CAP_PERFMON is least secure, since it allows kprobes and kernel memory access. CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic via iproute2. CAP_BPF is the safest from security point of view and harmless on its own. Having CAP_BPF and/or CAP_NET_ADMIN is not enough to write into arbitrary map and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog. CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system. Existing unprivileged BPF operations are not affected. In particular unprivileged users are allowed to load socket_filter and cg_skb program types and to create array, hash, prog_array, map-in-map map types. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com