user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/ceph, branch v4.19.28

libceph: bump CEPH_MSG_MAX_DATA_LEN

2018-11-21T08:19:16Z

commit 94e6992bb560be8bffb47f287194adf070b57695 upstream. If the read is large enough, we end up spinning in the messenger: libceph: osd0 192.168.122.1:6801 io error libceph: osd0 192.168.122.1:6801 io error libceph: osd0 192.168.122.1:6801 io error This is a receive side limit, so only reads were affected. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: implement CEPHX_V2 calculation mode

2018-08-02T19:33:25Z

Derive the signature from the entire buffer (both AES cipher blocks) instead of using just the first half of the first block, leaving out data_crc entirely. This addresses CVE-2018-1129. Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24837 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil

libceph: add authorizer challenge

2018-08-02T19:33:24Z

When a client authenticates with a service, an authorizer is sent with a nonce to the service (ceph_x_authorize_[ab]) and the service responds with a mutation of that nonce (ceph_x_authorize_reply). This lets the client verify the service is who it says it is but it doesn't protect against a replay: someone can trivially capture the exchange and reuse the same authorizer to authenticate themselves. Allow the service to reject an initial authorizer with a random challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge). The client then has to respond with an updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection instance. The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally if the client side advertises they have CEPHX_V2 feature bit. This addresses CVE-2018-1128. Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24836 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil

libceph: store ceph_auth_handshake pointer in ceph_connection

2018-08-02T19:33:22Z

We already copy authorizer_reply_buf and authorizer_reply_buf_len into ceph_connection. Factoring out __prepare_write_connect() requires two more: authorizer_buf and authorizer_buf_len. Store the pointer to the handshake in con->auth rather than piling on. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil

libceph: remove now unused ceph_{en,de}code_timespec()

2018-08-02T19:33:20Z

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: use timespec64 for r_mtime

2018-08-02T19:33:14Z

The request mtime field is used all over ceph, and is currently represented as a 'timespec' structure in Linux. This changes it to timespec64 to allow times beyond 2038, modifying all users at the same time. [ Remove now redundant ts variable in writepage_nounlock(). ] Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: use timespec64 in for keepalive2 and ticket validity

2018-08-02T19:26:12Z

ceph_con_keepalive_expired() is the last user of timespec_add() and some of the last uses of ktime_get_real_ts(). Replacing this with timespec64 based interfaces lets us remove that deprecated API. I'm introducing new ceph_encode_timespec64()/ceph_decode_timespec64() here that take timespec64 structures and convert to/from ceph_timespec, which is defined to have an unsigned 32-bit tv_sec member. This extends the range of valid times to year 2106, avoiding the year 2038 overflow. The ceph file system portion still uses the old functions for inode timestamps, this will be done separately after the VFS layer is converted. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: change ceph_pagelist_encode_string() to take u32

2018-08-02T19:26:11Z

The wire format dictates that the length of string fits into 4 bytes. Take u32 instead of size_t to reflect that. We were already truncating len in ceph_pagelist_encode_32() -- this just pushes that truncation one level up. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: make ceph_osdc_notify{,_ack}() payload_len u32

2018-08-02T19:26:11Z

The wire format dictates that payload_len fits into 4 bytes. Take u32 instead of size_t to reflect that. All callers pass a small integer, so no changes required. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: allocate the locator string with GFP_NOFAIL

2018-06-04T18:46:00Z

calc_target() isn't supposed to fail with anything but POOL_DNE, in which case we report that the pool doesn't exist and fail the request with -ENOENT. Doing this for -ENOMEM is at the very least confusing and also harmful -- as the preceding requests complete, a short-lived locator string allocation is likely to succeed after a wait. (We used to call ceph_object_locator_to_pg() for a pi lookup. In theory that could fail with -ENOENT, hence the "ret != -ENOENT" warning being removed.) Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov