<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include/linux/cpu.h, branch v4.4.265</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.265</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.265'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2019-11-16T09:27:52Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure</title>
<updated>2019-11-16T09:27:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vineela Tummalapalli</name>
<email>vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T11:22:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6534fc5ddf887ca38ee2e04a23b062b4503b3d20'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6534fc5ddf887ca38ee2e04a23b062b4503b3d20</id>
<content type='text'>
commit db4d30fbb71b47e4ecb11c4efa5d8aad4b03dfae upstream.

Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:

   https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195

There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.

This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.

It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.

Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.

Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli &lt;vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
 - No support for X86_VENDOR_HYGON, ATOM_AIRMONT_NP
 - Adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting for TSX Async Abort</title>
<updated>2019-11-16T09:27:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-23T10:19:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d601096be42c88a20240dddd426c6273899f2468'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d601096be42c88a20240dddd426c6273899f2468</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6608b45ac5ecb56f9e171252229c39580cc85f0f upstream.

Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the
vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for
the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Sysfs file path is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan &lt;neelima.krishnan@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:45:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-12T20:39:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=31a2c5f7a25b1cf4739ccd0244b0b270c42dab89'/>
<id>urn:sha1:31a2c5f7a25b1cf4739ccd0244b0b270c42dab89</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429 upstream.

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
   it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
   vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:

- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
  leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
  SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
anything.  They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt; (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jikos@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Price &lt;steven.price@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Phil Auld &lt;pauld@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b07a8ef9b7c5055c3a4637c87d07c296d5016fe0.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
 - Drop the auto,nosmt option which we can't support
 - Adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:45:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-18T21:51:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3fb41b4e2d389f2b187e2e12a7c8611d6c4b0e30'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3fb41b4e2d389f2b187e2e12a7c8611d6c4b0e30</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8a4b06d391b0a42a373808979b5028f5c84d9c6a upstream.

Add the sysfs reporting file for MDS. It exposes the vulnerability and
mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
 - Test x86_hyper instead of using hypervisor_is_type()
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T15:42:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andi Kleen</name>
<email>ak@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-13T22:48:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bf0cca01b8736a5e146a980434ba36eb036e37ac'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bf0cca01b8736a5e146a980434ba36eb036e37ac</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 17dbca119312b4e8173d4e25ff64262119fcef38 upstream

L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and normally always enabled, However
they still should be reported in sysfs if the system is vulnerable or
mitigated. Add the necessary CPU feature/bug bits.

- Extend the existing checks for Meltdowns to determine if the system is
  vulnerable. All CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown are also not
  vulnerable to L1TF

- Check for 32bit non PAE and emit a warning as there is no practical way
  for mitigation due to the limited physical address bits

- If the system has more than MAX_PA/2 physical memory the invert page
  workarounds don't protect the system against the L1TF attack anymore,
  because an inverted physical address will also point to valid
  memory. Print a warning in this case and report that the system is
  vulnerable.

Add a function which returns the PFN limit for the L1TF mitigation, which
will be used in follow up patches for sanity and range checks.

[ tglx: Renamed the CPU feature bit to L1TF_PTEINV ]
[ dwmw2: Backport to 4.9 (cpufeatures.h, E820) ]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass</title>
<updated>2018-07-25T08:18:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-14T09:34:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d8067aba239cbd2bfd64cdd548a914b20c58d189'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d8067aba239cbd2bfd64cdd548a914b20c58d189</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c456442cd3a59eeb1d60293c26cbe2ff2c4e42cf upstream

Add the sysfs file for the new vulerability. It does not do much except
show the words 'Vulnerable' for recent x86 cores.

Intel cores prior to family 6 are known not to be vulnerable, and so are
some Atoms and some Xeon Phi.

It assumes that older Cyrix, Centaur, etc. cores are immune.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat &lt;srivatsa@csail.mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) &lt;matt.helsley@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov &lt;amakhalov@vmware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bo Gan &lt;ganb@vmware.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder</title>
<updated>2018-01-17T08:35:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-07T21:48:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=73492b6860129bc3b87b1730486940d0850bfb23'/>
<id>urn:sha1:73492b6860129bc3b87b1730486940d0850bfb23</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 87590ce6e373d1a5401f6539f0c59ef92dd924a9 upstream.

As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes
sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a
particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the
mitigation should be common as well.

Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for
meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2.

Allow architectures to override the show function.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.096657732@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hotplug: Make register and unregister notifier API symmetric</title>
<updated>2016-12-15T16:49:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Hocko</name>
<email>mhocko@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-07T13:54:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1c0f4e0ebb791cad8fee77d8de1ceb684e631698'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1c0f4e0ebb791cad8fee77d8de1ceb684e631698</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 777c6e0daebb3fcefbbd6f620410a946b07ef6d0 upstream.

Yu Zhao has noticed that __unregister_cpu_notifier only unregisters its
notifiers when HOTPLUG_CPU=y while the registration might succeed even
when HOTPLUG_CPU=n if MODULE is enabled. This means that e.g. zswap
might keep a stale notifier on the list on the manual clean up during
the pool tear down and thus corrupt the list. Resulting in the following

[  144.964346] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880658a2be78
[  144.971337] IP: [&lt;ffffffffa290b00b&gt;] raw_notifier_chain_register+0x1b/0x40
&lt;snipped&gt;
[  145.122628] Call Trace:
[  145.125086]  [&lt;ffffffffa28e5cf8&gt;] __register_cpu_notifier+0x18/0x20
[  145.131350]  [&lt;ffffffffa2a5dd73&gt;] zswap_pool_create+0x273/0x400
[  145.137268]  [&lt;ffffffffa2a5e0fc&gt;] __zswap_param_set+0x1fc/0x300
[  145.143188]  [&lt;ffffffffa2944c1d&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[  145.149018]  [&lt;ffffffffa2908798&gt;] ? kernel_param_lock+0x28/0x30
[  145.154940]  [&lt;ffffffffa2a3e8cf&gt;] ? __might_fault+0x4f/0xa0
[  145.160511]  [&lt;ffffffffa2a5e237&gt;] zswap_compressor_param_set+0x17/0x20
[  145.167035]  [&lt;ffffffffa2908d3c&gt;] param_attr_store+0x5c/0xb0
[  145.172694]  [&lt;ffffffffa290848d&gt;] module_attr_store+0x1d/0x30
[  145.178443]  [&lt;ffffffffa2b2b41f&gt;] sysfs_kf_write+0x4f/0x70
[  145.183925]  [&lt;ffffffffa2b2a5b9&gt;] kernfs_fop_write+0x149/0x180
[  145.189761]  [&lt;ffffffffa2a99248&gt;] __vfs_write+0x18/0x40
[  145.194982]  [&lt;ffffffffa2a9a412&gt;] vfs_write+0xb2/0x1a0
[  145.200122]  [&lt;ffffffffa2a9a732&gt;] SyS_write+0x52/0xa0
[  145.205177]  [&lt;ffffffffa2ff4d97&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x17

This can be even triggered manually by changing
/sys/module/zswap/parameters/compressor multiple times.

Fix this issue by making unregister APIs symmetric to the register so
there are no surprises.

Fixes: 47e627bc8c9a ("[PATCH] hotplug: Allow modules to use the cpu hotplug notifiers even if !CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU")
Reported-and-tested-by: Yu Zhao &lt;yuzhao@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161207135438.4310-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu: Remove try_get_online_cpus()</title>
<updated>2015-10-07T23:02:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul E. McKenney</name>
<email>paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-07T22:14:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=02ef3c4a2aae65a1632b27770bfea3f83ca06772'/>
<id>urn:sha1:02ef3c4a2aae65a1632b27770bfea3f83ca06772</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that synchronize_sched_expedited() no longer uses it, there are
no users of try_get_online_cpus() in mainline.  This commit therefore
removes it.

Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>include, lib: add __printf attributes to several function prototypes</title>
<updated>2015-07-17T23:39:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolas Iooss</name>
<email>nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-17T23:23:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8db1486065141e619e4855b84e350ef32064f7e1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8db1486065141e619e4855b84e350ef32064f7e1</id>
<content type='text'>
Using __printf attributes helps to detect several format string issues
at compile time (even though -Wformat-security is currently disabled in
Makefile).  For example it can detect when formatting a pointer as a
number, like the issue fixed in commit a3fa71c40f18 ("wl18xx: show
rx_frames_per_rates as an array as it really is"), or when the arguments
do not match the format string, c.f.  for example commit 5ce1aca81435
("reiserfs: fix __RASSERT format string").

To prevent similar bugs in the future, add a __printf attribute to every
function prototype which needs one in include/linux/ and lib/.  These
functions were mostly found by using gcc's -Wsuggest-attribute=format
flag.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss &lt;nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Felipe Balbi &lt;balbi@ti.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
